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

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ABSTRACTS

Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders

By O. R. HOLSTI and J. N. ROSENAU

Based on a sample of 2,282 leaders in all walks of American life, this study probes the impact of U.S. involvement in Vietnam on the perceptions, convictions, and belief systems of those who occupy high positions of leadership. The findings clearly indicate that the post-World War II consensus on U.S. foreign policy has been shattered; that the Vietnam experience was a critical sequence of events in this respect; and that differing, largely mutually exclusive belief systems have emerged among the nation's leaders. The competing conceptions of international politics were found to be so coherent and integrated that they are unlikely to change soon or casually. Barring another traumatic event on the order of Pearl Harbor or Vietnam, the prospects for an early emergence of a new foreign policy consensus in the United States thus seem slim, and beyond the capacity of any political figure or group to fashion.

Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power: The Mexican State versus Transnational Automobile Corporations

By D. C. BENNETT and K. E. SHARPE

The authors explore the often conflictual bargaining relations between transnational corporations and host governments of less developed countries. They focus particular attention on the conflict that surrounded the creation of the Mexican automobile industry (1960-1964), criticizing and reformulating a current approach to these issues. The argument proceeds in two parts—agenda setting and bargaining power. Each part is organized around a central criticism of the bargaining power approach and provides an alternative formulation which is then applied to an analysis of the bargaining relationship between the Mexican Government and the transnational automobile corporations.

Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis

By S. SIENKIEWICZ

The effects of uncertainty in strategic analysis are generally not well understood, but are increasingly important in relating the strategic calculations by means of which we evaluate the adequacy of our strategic forces to the deterrence of attack in the world of real political leaders, in real crises. Assumptions must be made about many unknowns and uncertainties—ranging from the behavior of national leaders to the technical characteristics of weapons systems—in order to make the problem calculable. The assumptions we make for purposes of analysis, however, are not necessarily the same as those that political leaders can make in considering the actual use of nuclear forces. This distinction is at the root of the relationship between strategic analysis and real-world deterrence. Systematic examination of the uncertainties in strategic analysis, therefore, can help us to better understand the difference between our analytical model and the real world, and hence to put our strategic problems in better perspective.

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Practitioners' Views of International Negotiation

By G. R. WINHAM

A Checklist for Negotiators, produced during a study session on negotiation in the State Department's Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy, highlights certain changes that are occurring in the diplomatic function. First, practitioners make a distinction between the internal (or domestic) and external aspects of negotiation, which reflects a growing politicization of the diplomatic function and an increasing trend toward a mediatorial model of diplomacy. Second, practitioners emphasize managerial rather than strategic concerns, which is consistent with the large, complex problems that foreign offices are increasingly facing. Third, practitioners attach more importance to issues and substantive information than to personality or sociological variables. This is a reflection of the increasing scope, and resulting anonymity, of international diplomatic processes. These three points introduce new concerns into the theoretical literature on international negotiation.

Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding International Interdependence

By S. J. MICHALAK, JR.

In *Power and Interdependence*, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye make a major contribution to the discipline by explicating a theoretical model for conceptualizing interdependence and isolating a set of variables that will enhance further understanding of the politics of such issues. What is needed next is a series of studies that explores the interrelationships among the variables Keohane and Nye identify. Because these interrelationships will surely vary with interdependency contexts within which bargaining takes place, five such contexts are outlined. Until this research is done, the advice that Keohane and Nye offer policy makers in the developed countries must be considered premature. The essay concludes with some critical comments about Keohane and Nye's discussion of political realism.

New Perspectives on Historical States-Systems

By D. S. YOST

Theoretical analyses of international systems tend to fall into three categories: case studies of specific past systems aiming at modest generalizations; rigorous examinations of the current global system in search of manipulable variables; and heuristic models of hypothetical international systems. The late Martin Wight's studies of historical states-systems indicate possible ways of giving this area of theoretical inquiry a new empirical and conceptual foundation. Wight's insights about norms and values within specific past and present states-systems, and about ambiguities involved in identifying their boundaries and transformation mechanisms, seem especially valuable and original when compared to recent work in the same field by F. S. Northedge. Even Wight's work is essentially exploratory, however. Numerous historical states-systems remain to be thoroughly studied, and Wight's analytical framework may require some modifications.

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

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VIETNAM, CONSENSUS, AND THE BELIEF SYSTEMS OF AMERICAN LEADERS

By OLE R. HOLSTI and JAMES N. ROSENAU*

The lessons of history are never simple. Whoever thinks he sees one should probably go on with his reading.

—*John K. Fairbank*[1]

I. Introduction

AFTER the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Senator Arthur Vandenberg wrote, "In my own mind, my convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist."[2] The leading spokesman for American isolationism thus acknowledged that the disaster in Hawaii was of such significance as to reshape his core beliefs about international politics and the proper American response to a rapidly changing world. The impact of such events as Pearl Harbor did not vanish with the destruction of the Pacific Fleet—or even with the end of World War II. It lived on in the minds of Vandenberg and many of his contemporaries as a symbol of the futility of isolationism, and continued to have a deep influence on the conduct of American diplomacy. Indeed, not until a

* An earlier, and much longer, version of this paper, entitled "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," was delivered at the 1977 Hendricks Symposium on American Politics and World Order, University of Nebraska, October 6-7, 1977.

We gratefully record that the project reported here was made possible by the support of the Research Council of Duke University, the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, and the Institute for Transnational Studies of the University of Southern California. We have also incurred debts to many persons who have assisted us in various ways. Sidney Verba and Donald Ferree of Harvard University commented helpfully on earlier drafts of our questionnaire. Professor Edward Laurance of the Naval Post-Graduate School made it possible for us to include military officers at that institution in our sample. Daniel Harkins and Tom Johnson provided us with indispensable programming assistance. Others at Duke and U.S.C. who helped in various ways were: Linda Ram, Edwin McClain, Robert Kolin, Joan Campbell, Sarah Crenshaw, Mark Casciari, Brenda Funches, Raymond A. Lavine, Hugo Orozco, Eliza Hubbard, Bruce Smith, Antony Burt, Cindy Gail Abrams, Jim Wolfe, Gary K. Gartin, Eric Holsti, Heidi Rosenau, Kay Neves, and Alice Dorman. Finally, we are greatly indebted to the 2,282 respondents who took the time to fill out our rather lengthy questionnaire.

[1] Fairbank, "The Meaning of Vietnam," *New York Review of Books*, XXII, June 12, 1975, p. 31.

[2] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1952), 1.

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generation later, with the United States mired in a seemingly endless war in Southeast Asia, did some of the "lessons" of Pearl Harbor and other events leading up to World War II come under sustained challenge by informed and thoughtful critics.

This example highlights the question whether the war in Vietnam will shape the world views of American leaders in the coming decades in the same way Pearl Harbor did for Vandenberg and his contemporaries. It is too early to be certain, but there are signs that the impact of Vietnam did not end with the departure of the last American from Saigon in April 1975. If a modern-day Rip Van Winkle had gone to sleep during the height of the war, for example, and had woken up during the winter of 1975–1976, he would have found Washington divided by a vigorous foreign policy debate on the appropriate scope of American involvement in a small, war-torn Third-World nation. Assuming that Rip had taken even a casual interest in the bitter Vietnam dialogue that divided the country for almost a decade, the reasoning and theories he would find in speeches, editorials, congressional debates, news conferences, and press briefings by members of the foreign policy establishment would have had a distinctly familiar ring. Even the words and phrases might lead him to wonder whether his sleep had indeed been of more than a few hours' duration. "American credibility," "racial war," "the first step into a quagmire," "domino theory," "regional balance of power," "executive secrecy," "covert military operations," "strategic location," and "inconsistent with détente" are only a few of the more prominent examples that might lead him to think that the policy battles on Vietnam were still in full bloom. And, in a sense, he would be correct, for the parallels between the substance and terminology of the Vietnam debates of the 1960s and the arguments on U.S. policy in Angola were no mere coincidence. Near the core of policy differences on Angola were two questions that linked it to the conflict in Southeast Asia: What are the lessons that should have been learned from the long and unsuccessful American involvement in Vietnam? Which, if any, of these lessons are applicable in Angola?

The Vietnam experience thus set the terms of the debate. Many of those taking part in it were drawing parallels between past events and a contemporary situation, and they were arguing that the lessons of the Vietnam experience should govern American policy toward Angola. More importantly, the policy outcome might well have been different had it not been for the Vietnam experience. It seems likely, for example, that congressional action prohibiting further use of American funds in Angola was significantly influenced by both the perceived parallels

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between the civil war in that African nation and the initial steps leading to military intervention in Vietnam, and the premise that the "lessons" of the latter should be applied in the case of Angola.

Angola is not an isolated case. Others could be cited, indicating that while the physical presence of the United States in Vietnam may have ended in 1975, it is unlikely that the legacy of Vietnam can—or necessarily should—be easily escaped. If it is true that some cataclysmic events can traumatize and shape the beliefs and world views of an entire generation, then perhaps the Vietnam War will continue to have a significant impact on American foreign policy well beyond the end of the present decade, if not the end of the 20th century. Those who reached political maturity during the decade 1965–1975, and whose political world views may have been galvanized by the Vietnam issue, will be assuming positions of leadership well into the next century. For them, the inclination to adduce lessons for the future conduct of American foreign policy may prove very strong. Put somewhat differently, there is no reason to believe that the war in Southeast Asia will have less of an effect on those who passed through it than did such events as the outbreak of World War I, American rejection of membership in the League of Nations, the Great Depression, the effort to forestall World War II by meeting Hitler's demands at the Munich Conference, or the invasion of South Korea in 1950.

For present purposes, the possible impact of history on policy making can be summarized in four points:

(1) The propensity to rely upon history as a strategy for coping with complexities and uncertainties in decision making is rather widespread;
(2) An inadequate understanding of history can result in costly policy errors, but it does not follow that the introduction of historical thinking into policy deliberations will necessarily improve the quality of either the decision-making process or the resulting choices;
(3) Some types of historical episodes, such as traumatic events that have been experienced first-hand, are especially likely to live on in "the reality world of the mind";
(4) A particularly dramatic (or traumatic) episode may indeed be the crucial formative event for those who experience it, but they will not necessarily interpret its significance in an identical manner.

These considerations led us to initiate a project intended to gather systematic evidence about the reactions of American leaders (both within and outside government) to the Vietnam War—beliefs about why the U.S. effort failed, the consequences that may flow from the failure, and the lessons to be derived from it. Many former officials of

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the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations have made their views known on these matters. Other prominent Americans have expressed themselves in articles, speeches, editorials, letters to the editor, and at least two substantial collections of essays. These materials may be useful for gaining some insight into the beliefs of prominent Americans about what should be learned from America's longest war; but they are not a wholly adequate substitute for more systematic evidence drawn from a broader spectrum of leaders. To obtain such evidence, we undertook a large-scale survey using a mailed questionnaire.[3] After a brief description of the methods used to generate the data and the hypotheses that have guided our inquiry, we will analyze the results of one major dimension of the survey.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND THE SAMPLE

Over 150 articles, speeches, editorials, interviews, and press conferences served as a major source of 221 substantive items used in the questionnaire.[4] Besides asking the respondents to assess the lessons of Vietnam and the sources and consequences of American failure in Southeast Asia, we sought to elicit their general orientations toward foreign policy and domestic politics, as well as data about their personal backgrounds. To permit some cross-survey comparisons, we included several questions that were also used in other recent surveys of American leaders.[5]

The sample consists of three parts. The first is a random sample of 2,000 persons listed in the most recent edition of *Who's Who in America*. The second part was constructed on the basis of quotas for leaders from each of seven groups whose inclusion we wanted to ensure: For-

[3] We recognize that there are a number of drawbacks to the use of mailed questionnaires. There is validity in the observation that elite interviews may provide more revealing information about attitudes and beliefs than questionnaires. This point is particularly relevant when the population of interest can be clearly defined, when it is quite limited in number, and when it is geographically concentrated rather than dispersed. However, our goal was to gain access to the occupants of a broad range of top leadership roles; for that purpose, interviews seemed out of the question. Given limited research resources, the trade-off is between a small number of interviews and much broader coverage by means of a mailed questionnaire. Choice of the latter strategy does not, of course, preclude interviews of a small sample in the future.

[4] A bibliography of these items appears in Appendix A of Holsti and Rosenau, "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam: A Study of American Leadership," a paper prepared for the 17th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 1976.

[5] John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1975* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1975); Barry Sussman, *Elites in America* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Post Publishing Co., 1976); Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth Hanson, *Interest and Ideology* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 1975); Allen H. Barton, "Consensus and Conflict Among American Leaders," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXXVIII (Winter 1974–1975), 508-30.

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eign Service officers, labor leaders, politicians, clergy, foreign affairs experts outside government, media persons, and women. Finally, one of the largest occupational groups in our sample consisted of military personnel, including senior officers then serving in the Pentagon and junior officers attending a service school. Since we purposely set out to survey particular types of persons, our sample is hardly a random one; however, it can reasonably be said to include most, if not all, of the major components of the nation's leadership structure.

The questionnaires were sent out in February 1976, with a follow-up mailing two months later. Assuming that all of them were either delivered to the addressees or returned to us (that is, none were lost or destroyed in transit), we calculated the number of potential respondents to be 4,290; over 53 percent (2,282) completed and returned the questionnaire.

UNDERLYING PROPOSITIONS AND SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES

Much of the analysis that follows derives from a series of hypotheses that have their roots in three concepts: *consensus*, *Vietnam*, and *belief system*. More specifically, our hypotheses and data analyses are guided by three central propositions. The first two of these are:

(1) The broad consensus among American leaders that marked the period following World War II has been shattered.
(2) The Vietnam War was a watershed event in the sense that it has given rise to sharply divergent views on the nature of the international system and the appropriate international role for the United States.

Observations of a shattered consensus among American leaders on foreign policy issues have not been in short supply during recent years. Even a casual reader of newspaper headlines could hardly miss some of the more overt symptoms of deep cleavage: the Congress and the White House have clashed sharply not only on a number of major foreign policy questions, but also on the proper division of labor between them; the 1976 electoral campaign revealed clearly that both major political parties are split on a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from the Panama Canal to SALT negotiations; and concepts such as "détente" have failed to generate a broad consensus in the way that "containment" did a generation ago. It has certainly not escaped notice that the American intervention in Vietnam was a divisive rather than unifying experience.

If all this is the case, why undertake an extensive study of American leaders merely to document the obvious? There are several reasons for

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doing so. Our propositions suggest that the cleavages among Americans go far deeper than disagreements over specific policy issues, reaching into such basic questions as the nature of the international system, the proper role for the United States within it, and the ends and means that should constitute the core of the nation's external relations.

Moreover, the mere acknowledgement that Vietnam divided American society for a decade is not an answer to all the significant questions that can be raised about the impact of that conflict. It is not an answer, for example, to such questions as: What do Americans believe they should learn from the war for the future conduct of American foreign policy? Do these lessons continue to reflect the deep divisions that marked the decade-long war? Or, was former President Ford correct in asserting that the lessons of Vietnam are so obvious that they have been learned by all Americans,[6] and that, accordingly, they may now serve as the foundations on which to build a new consensus as to the proper role of the United States in the world?

Finally, if American leaders in fact disagree about the continuing meaning of the Vietnam experience, are the lessons they have drawn relatively isolated ones, and therefore probably evanescent ideas in their cognitive maps? Our third basic proposition asserts, to the contrary, that:

(3) The divergent sets of beliefs about foreign policy are sufficiently coherent to be properly described as competing belief systems.

This proposition extends the first two by predicting not only the existence of deep, Vietnam-related cleavages among American leaders, but it also suggests that these divisions are rooted in and sustained by internally consistent clusters of foreign policy beliefs that reinforce each other. In adopting Converse's familiar definition of a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence," we outline below a series of specific hypotheses linking four clusters of beliefs that may be "bound together."[7]

[6] News conference, May 6, 1975.

[7] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press 1964), 207.

It might well be argued that, since the hypotheses all pertain to the single issue of Vietnam, neither they nor the data used to test them are sufficient to justify the derivation of coherent belief systems—that, while the issue is an important one, the internal consistency of beliefs will break down once analysis moves beyond the issue of Vietnam. This argument is valid, but we have attempted to answer it elsewhere: our questionnaire included a number of items on foreign policy issues other than Vietnam that are analyzed in Holsti and Rosenau, "America's Foreign Policy Agenda: The Post-Vietnam Beliefs of American Leaders," in Charles W. Kegley and Patrick J. McGowan,

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In order to undertake a plausible test of these propositions, it is necessary to demonstrate not only the existence of cleavages on fundamental foreign policy issues and the existence of coherent, internally consistent belief systems; it is also necessary to demonstrate the central role of the Vietnam issue. We seek to satisfy the latter requirement by using the respondents' views (Table 1) on the Vietnam War (what we shall

TABLE 1: EARLY AND LATE POSITIONS ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM
(Percentages of 2,282 respondents favoring various policies)

Some people felt that we should have done everything possible to gain a complete military victory in Vietnam. Others felt that we should have withdrawn as soon as possible. Still others had opinions in between these two. Please indicate which position came closest to your own feelings—both when the war first became an issue and later toward the end of U.S. involvement.

	When the war first became an issue	*Toward the end of U.S. involvement*
I tended to favor a complete military victory	51	22
I tended to favor a complete withdrawal	22	57
I tended to feel in between these two	22	18
Not sure	5	3
	100	100

henceforth refer to as their policy preferences) as the sole criterion for classifying them (Table 2). In doing so, we set aside until future analyses of our data such interesting questions as: Why did some respondents oppose the effort in Vietnam from the beginning, whereas others supported it? What are the generational, occupational, political, ideological, educational, and other attributes of the respondents associated with a persistent preference for withdrawal from Vietnam; with persistent support for the goal of military victory; with shifts in one direction or the other during the course of the war?

Table 1 describes our respondents' policy preferences during the early and late stages of the Vietnam War. Retrospective statements about positions on controversial issues must be used with some caution; in view of the subsequent failure of the American undertaking in Vietnam, the

eds., *Challenges to America: U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Beverly Hills: Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, IV, 1979), 231-68.

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TABLE 2: THE 2,282 RESPONDENTS CLASSIFIED INTO SEVEN GROUPS BY POSITIONS ON VIETNAM DURING EARLY AND LATE STAGES OF THE WAR*

Some people felt that we should have done everything possible to gain a complete military victory in Vietnam. Others felt that we should have withdrawn as soon as possible. Still others had opinions in between these two. Please indicate which position came closest to your own feelings—both when the war first became an issue and later toward the end of U.S. involvement.

When the war first became an issue	*Toward the End of U.S. Involvement*: I tended to favor a complete military victory	I tended to feel in-between these two	Not sure	I tended to favor a complete withdrawal
I tended to favor a complete military victory	SUPPORTERS ($n = 363$, 15.9%)	AMBIVALENT SUPPORTERS ($n = 346$, 15.2%)		CONVERTED CRITICS ($n = 867$, 38.0%)
I tended to feel in-between these two	CONVERTED SUPPORTERS ($n = 128$, 5.6%)	AMBIVALENTS ($n = 128$, 5.6%)		
Not sure				
I tended to favor a complete withdrawal		AMBIVALENT CRITICS ($n = 63$, 2.8%)		CRITICS ($n = 378$, 16.6%)

* Nine respondents did not indicate their position on Vietnam in either the early or late stages of the war.

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number of respondents asserting that they originally favored a complete military victory may be understated. But even if we disregard the possible operation of selective memory, a comparison of the two columns in Table 1 makes clear that American leaders underwent a profound change on this issue, approaching and perhaps even exceeding that experienced by the population as a whole. Indeed, the only comparable change, since the advent of regular opinion polling, would appear to have taken place during 1945–1947, when expectations about Soviet cooperation in the postwar world underwent a precipitous decline.

Table 1 does not, however, reveal how many respondents maintained their positions throughout the course of the war and how many changed their views, nor does it indicate the exact pattern of changes. This deficiency is remedied in Table 2, which depicts every combination of policy preferences during the two periods. The resulting seven groups have been given designations that deliberately avoid labels burdened with pejorative meanings such as "hawks" and "doves."

Having identified seven groups of respondents on the basis of their policy preferences, we are now able to outline a series of hypotheses linking the groups to diagnoses, prognoses, and prescriptions pertaining to the Vietnam experience.

A. *Diagnosis: Sources of failure in Vietnam (Table 3)*[8]

1. Compared to the Critics, the Supporters will, in diagnosing the sources of failure, attribute greater significance to:
   a. Constraints imposed on the war effort by domestic groups and institutions;
   b. Self-imposed restraints on the employment of U.S. military capabilities (means);
   c. Actions and inactions of other parties, including those of North Vietnam's allies as well as those of the alliance partners of the United States;
   d. A lack of clear American goals.

2. Compared to the Supporters, the Critics will, in diagnosing the sources of failure, attribute greater significance to:
   a. A lack of knowledge and understanding of the Third World, of Southeast Asia and, more specifically, of the peoples of Vietnam;
   b. The fundamentally unsound nature of the U.S. undertaking in Vietnam (ends);
   c. Inadequate intelligence about the situation in Vietnam;
   d. Excessive reliance on air power in the conduct of military operations;

[8] Virtually all of these hypotheses were formulated before the questionnaire was mailed out. Some examples may be found in Holsti and Rosenau (fn. 4).

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e. Opposition of world opinion to U.S. goals and policies in Vietnam.

3. Compared to the Supporters and Critics, respondents in the other five groups (Converted Supporters, Ambivalent Supporters, Ambivalents, Ambivalent Critics, and Converted Critics) will take intermediate positions in diagnosing the sources of American failure in Vietnam. More precisely, the responses of these five groups will be arrayed in the order given.

B. *Prognosis: Consequences arising from the Vietnam experience (Table 5)*

1. Compared to the Critics, the Supporters will, in predicting the consequences of the Vietnam War, place greater emphasis on:
   a. Adverse effects on structures and processes in the international system;
   b. Encouragement to America's adversaries to pursue policies contrary to the interests of the United States;
   c. Constraints on future U.S. policy under a more limited conception of vital national interests;
   d. Certain types of future U.S. undertakings.

2. Compared to the Supporters, the Critics will, in predicting the consequences of the Vietnam War, place greater emphasis on damage to American society and institutions.

3. Compared to the Supporters and Critics, respondents in the other five groups will take intermediate positions in predicting the consequences of the Vietnam War.

C. *Prescription: Lessons to be learned from Vietnam (Table 7)*

1. Compared to the Critics, the Supporters will, in prescribing lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War, give greater emphasis to:
   a. The bipolarity and interconnectedness of the international system;
   b. Threats from communist adversaries to U.S. national interests;
   c. Military power in the pursuit of foreign policy goals;
   d. Unilateral U.S. action as a means of coping with conflict issues;
   e. The negative consequences of domestic constraints on the effective pursuit of foreign policy goals;
   f. Air power as an effective substitute for ground forces in the conduct of future limited wars.

2. Compared to the Supporters, the Critics will, in prescribing lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War, give greater emphasis to:
   a. The desirability of reducing the scope of U.S. commitments abroad;
   b. The ineffective performance of the U.S. government in conducting a sound foreign policy;
   c. Limiting the nature of U.S. interests;

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d. The declining efficiency of military power as an instrument of foreign policy;
e. The excessive influence of weak allies on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

3. Compared to the Supporters and Critics, respondents in the other five groups will take intermediate positions in prescribing lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War.

4. There will be no significant differences among respondents in the seven groups with respect to the belief that there are important lessons to be learned from the past for the contemporary conduct of foreign relations.[9]

II. Diagnosis: Sources of Failure in Vietnam

The manner in which a nation's leaders diagnose its failures in foreign policy is sometimes tinged with ominous overtones. At various times during the war in Southeast Asia, senior officials in Washington suggested that their policies should be supported in order to head off a right-wing backlash that would surely follow any defeat in Vietnam. Whether or not these were merely self-serving efforts to garner support for the administration's policies, there are historical examples in which diagnoses of past failures have played a significant role in the politics of the postwar era. Hitler's effective use of the "stab in the back" myth after World War I was one source of his appeal to Germans. The failure of American policy in China after World War II, followed soon thereafter by the stalemated war in Korea, provided the context for Senator Joseph McCarthy's own version of a "stab in the back" explanation, in which the knives were allegedly wielded by State Department officials ranging from the corps of China experts to Secretaries of State Marshall and Acheson.

During the initial postwar debate on Vietnam, few Americans denied

[9] Although the data have been subjected to various statistical tests, we shall avoid burdening the reader with more than the minimum discussion of them. To determine whether differences among the seven groups identified in Tables 3, 5, and 7 are statistically significant, we have undertaken analyses of variance (ANOVA). The choice of a criterion of significance is always an arbitrary one. Because our sample is large, the familiar .05 or .01 levels seemed too lax. We therefore selected the more stringent .001 level—that is, we accept differences among the groups as significant if such results could have occurred by chance less than once in a thousand times. The .001 level corresponds to an F ratio of 3.47. Because the use of parametric statistics on these data will not evoke universal approval, we have also done the same analyses using a nonparametric test (*chi* square). Both the analysis of variance and the *chi* square tests only indicate whether the differences between groups are sufficiently great to meet a specific level of significance (.001 in this case). Since our hypotheses also specify a *direction* of difference among the groups, they are rejected unless they meet *both* the statistical and directional criteria. The results of these tests are summarized in Table 9.

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that—despite an enormous commitment of manpower and resources—the United States had failed to achieve its goals. But widespread agreement on this point did not imply a broad consensus on the causes of failure. From the wide range of interpretations that have emerged in voluminous postmortems on Vietnam, we abstracted 21 summary statements on the causes of the American failure for inclusion in our questionnaire. They are listed in Table 3; the respondents were asked to rate each statement as "very important," "moderately important," "slightly important," or "not at all important."

ACTIONS OF OTHERS

Many of the respondents characterized Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam and to the Vietcong as "very important," while a substantially smaller number viewed North Vietnamese violations of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement as a "very important" factor in the outcome of the war; even fewer attributed such importance to the failure of the SEATO allies to provide support. Indeed, more respondents (29 percent) selected the "not at all important" alternative on the last item than was the case for any other item in the questionnaire.

When we disaggregate the data into the seven groups, however, we find some rather sharp distinctions in the diagnoses of the failure in Vietnam (Table 3). All of the groups attributed considerable importance to Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam and the Vietcong, but there was a greater tendency to do so for those toward the Supporter end of the spectrum. This pattern is even more evident in case of the items on North Vietnamese violations of the Paris Peace Agreement and the failure of America's allies to provide support. The differences across the groups for all the items were statistically significant, and they are in the predicted direction. That is, respondents who were most consistently supportive of the goal of military victory in Vietnam were also more likely to attribute importance to the role of other actors in the conflict.

AN UNSOUND UNDERTAKING

As a group, the respondents attributed considerable importance to two propositions concerning the nature of the U.S. undertaking in Vietnam. Nearly half of them indicated that lack of popular support for the regime in Saigon was a "very important" cause of the failure in Vietnam; half of the remainder viewed the above as a "moderately important" consideration. An almost identical distribution was recorded in response to the statement that "America's goals in Vietnam were inherently unrealistic." In short, a substantial proportion of our 2,282

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respondents diagnosed the situation in Vietnam as a basically futile undertaking—if not a totally unwinnable one.

The disaggregated data in Table 3, however, confirm our expectations that the Supporters of the goal of a military victory in Vietnam would be less likely to attribute importance to the propositions that Washington's goals were unrealistic and that the regime in Saigon failed to gain support among the people of South Vietnam, whereas the Critics would diagnose these factors as much more important. Among the latter, 88 percent gave a "very important" rating to the item on the lack of realistic goals; over 76 percent did so on the question concerning support for the regime in Saigon. The comparable figures for the Supporters were 21 and 26 percent, respectively. The differences among the seven groups are significant and in the predicted direction.

MILITARY FACTORS

In the debate over the sources of failure in Vietnam, probably few issues received more attention than the conduct of military operations. At the heart of the matter lie these key questions: Was the Vietnam intervention a doomed undertaking that, because of the very nature of the situation, could not be won at any reasonable price? Or was it a war that could have been won had military operations been conducted differently?

The results summarized in Table 3 indicate strong support for the proposition that the United States fought with a "no-win" approach; almost half of the respondents rated this as a "very important" source of failure. Greater ambivalence is evident on the importance of self-imposed restrictions on air power and insufficient attention to advice from military commanders; relatively little importance was attributed to the allegation that American military assistance to Saigon after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was inadequate.

The results for each of the seven groups yield dramatic differences; indeed, their views on the role of military factors span virtually the entire scale. Added perspective on the striking differences revealed in this part of Table 3 can be gained from the fact that, for the four items listed, 85, 69, 57, and 34 percent, respectively, of the Supporters selected the "very important" rating, whereas the comparable figures for the Critics were 13, 8, 3, and 3 percent. It is hard to imagine more dramatic evidence of a systematic lack of consensus among the nation's leaders than these results of their efforts to diagnose why the longest war in American history ended in failure. The results also confirm the hypothesis that those who consistently favored military victory in Vietnam

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Table 3: Sources of Failure in Vietnam

(Mean scores for each of seven groups of respondents classified by their positions on Vietnam during the early and late stages of the war)*

Observers of American foreign policy have identified several factors that may have prevented the United States from achieving its goals in the Vietnam undertaking. In your judgment, how important were the reasons listed below in America's inability to achieve all of its goals?

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
ACTIONS OF OTHERS								
***The Soviets and Chinese provided aid to North Vietnam and the Vietcong ($F = 20.0$)	0.78	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.83	0.75	0.76	0.66
***North Vietnam violated the 1973 peace agreement ($F = 62.6$)	0.57	0.76	0.69	0.72	0.68	0.48	0.52	0.27
***America's allies failed to support us ($F = 25.1$)	0.41	0.53	0.51	0.48	0.38	0.33	0.39	0.23
AN UNSOUND UNDERTAKING								
***The regime in Saigon lacked popular support ($F = 90.7$)	0.77	0.59	0.63	0.68	0.68	0.88	0.83	0.91
***America's goals in Vietnam were inherently unrealistic ($F = 57.1$)	0.75	0.53	0.61	0.61	0.65	0.92	0.82	0.95

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TABLE 3 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
MILITARY FACTORS								
***The United States fought with a "no-win" approach ($F = 109.6$)	0.65	0.94	0.89	0.80	0.52	0.49	0.60	0.33
***The use of American air power was restricted ($F = 109.7$)	0.56	0.85	0.79	0.72	0.49	0.30	0.48	0.26
***Insufficient attention was paid to advice from the military ($F = 123.2$)	0.46	0.81	0.70	0.58	0.36	0.27	0.37	0.16
***U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam after the 1973 Peace Agreement was inadequate ($F = 63.8$)	0.38	0.60	0.49	0.52	0.44	0.20	0.30	0.16
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS								
***Reporting by the mass media turned the public against the war ($F = 26.6$)	0.69	0.83	0.75	0.74	0.69	0.71	0.65	0.57
***Pressures from domestic dissidents cast doubt on American commitments ($F = 21.8$)	0.66	0.76	0.73	0.73	0.72	0.65	0.62	0.53

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TABLE 3 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
***Congressional involvement hampered the executive in the conduct of the war ($F = 74.4$)	0.50	0.76	0.68	0.59	0.47	0.42	0.41	0.30
***The Watergate scandal paralyzed the American government ($F = 12.8$)	0.46	0.57	0.55	0.51	0.43	0.48	0.42	0.35
***The American people lost the spirit which led to greatness ($F = 51.0$)	0.40	0.65	0.56	0.54	0.38	0.31	0.31	0.21
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING								
***Americans underestimated the dedication of the North Vietnamese ($F = 36.9$)	0.80	0.63	0.68	0.78	0.77	0.85	0.85	0.91
***The U.S. lacked understanding of nationalism in the "Third World" ($F = 48.0$)	0.69	0.50	0.56	0.60	0.65	0.86	0.74	0.87
***Americans were ignorant of Vietnamese history, culture, and society ($F = 22.4$)	0.66	0.51	0.57	0.61	0.63	0.79	0.70	0.78

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TABLE 3 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
OTHERS								
***The U.S. had no clear goals in the Vietnam undertaking ($F = 4.74$)	0.72	0.75	0.76	0.71	0.59	0.81	0.72	0.70
Intelligence agencies failed to provide adequate information about the situation in Vietnam ($F = 3.46$)	0.58	0.57	0.52	0.63	0.48	0.63	0.61	0.56
***America relied excessively on air power ($F = 10.4$)	0.48	0.39	0.34	0.49	0.49	0.60	0.51	0.56
***Much of world opinion opposed U.S. goals and policies ($F = 4.5$)	0.62	0.57	0.55	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.64	0.67

* Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Very Important" as 3.00, "Moderately Important" as 2.00, "Slightly Important" as 1.00, and "Not at all Important" as 0.00. The resulting scores were then divided by three to create a scale ranging from 0.00 to 1.00.

** Includes 9 respondents who failed to state their positions on Vietnam and thus could not be classified among the seven groups.

*** Differences among groups significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis variance) or non-parametric (*chi*-square) statistics. *F* ratios (given in parenthesis immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

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believed that the war could and should have been won, but was not because of self-imposed restraints on military forces. On the other hand, those who favored withdrawal from Vietnam not only regarded it as an unwinnable situation, but also one that could not have been salvaged by a different deployment of military capabilities. The differences among the seven groups are statistically significant and in the predicted direction.

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

An important and venerable school of thought maintains that there are basic incompatibilities between democratic institutions and the requirements for success in foreign policy undertakings. Critics of the Wilsonian position that democracy is a necessary and, perhaps, sufficient condition for successful foreign policy include a number of articulate observers, including Alexis de Tocqueville, Walter Lippmann, and George F. Kennan.[10]

The deep division on the Vietnam War in Congress, among the media, on campuses, and in American society in general suggests the hypothesis that substantial numbers of Americans perceived domestic constraints as a major source of failure in Vietnam. More than two-thirds of the respondents attributed at least moderate importance to the role of the mass media and domestic dissidents as sources of failure in Vietnam. At the same time, less than half regarded either the role of Congress in the conduct of the war or the Watergate scandal to be of at least moderate importance, and most respondents were inclined to dismiss as of little or no importance the diagnosis that "the American people lost the spirit that led to greatness."

The data in Table 3 provide strong support for the hypothesis that persons consistently championing the quest for military victory in Vietnam would be more inclined to attribute significance to domestic constraints, whereas those favoring a withdrawal from Southeast Asia would tend to regard such a role of domestic institutions and events as of less importance. For each of the five items, the highest scores are to be found among the Supporters, whereas those of the Critics are in every case the lowest. Not only do the scores follow a pattern consistent with our hypothesis, but differences across the seven groups are statistically significant. Although one might question whether the absence

[10] This theme may be found in Kennan's *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1951), and continues through his writings up to his most recent book, *The Cloud of Danger* (Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown 1977).

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of the Watergate issue would have altered the outcome in Vietnam,[11] even differences on this item are highly significant.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING

A critic of American policy in Southeast Asia once noted that at the start of our involvement in that part of the world, not a single university in the United States offered a course in the Vietnamese language and culture. Other evidence that most Americans knew little of the country into which they poured so much blood and money is not difficult to find. But the fact of ignorance is not the issue here; rather, the question is whether our sample of American leaders attributed importance to the lack of knowledge in their diagnoses of why the war effort failed.

The results summarized in Table 3 indicate that a large proportion of the respondents regarded at least three related gaps in knowledge and understanding to be moderately or very important in explaining the outcome in Vietnam: the dedication of the North Vietnamese was underestimated; the nature of nationalism in the Third World was misunderstood; and ignorance prevailed with respect to Vietnamese history, culture, and society.

As was the case with the assessment of the role of domestic constraints, the respondents' relatively high agreement that lack of knowledge and understanding were important sources of failure in Vietnam conceals rather sharp differences among the seven groups. The data indicate strong agreement with our hypotheses that the Supporters would be much less inclined than the Critics to attribute importance to American ignorance of Vietnam, and that the other five groups would be arrayed between these two groups. For all three items, the differences between the seven groups are statistically significant; the observed differences follow a pattern of ascending scores from Supporters to Critics.

OTHER SOURCES OF FAILURE

Our questionnaire included four additional items diagnosing possible sources of American failure in Vietnam. Because none of these explanations fits well into any of the five clusters of items discussed above,[12]

[11] It should be noted that the Paris Peace Agreement was signed in January 1973, some time before the Nixon Administration's cover-up of the Watergate scandal started to unravel.

[12] That is, they did not meet both the substantive and statistical criteria (based on correlations and factor analysis) used to determine whether we were justified in treating items together. For a fuller discussion, see the conference paper cited in the acknowledgment footnote.

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results for each of them appear separately in Table 3. Our respondents generally agreed that the U.S. lacked clear goals in the Vietnam undertaking: almost three out of every four rated this lack as moderately or very important. The hypothesis that Supporters of the war effort would be more inclined than Critics to attribute importance to the absence of clear goals is not verified, however. Differences among the seven groups are statistically significant, but the results do not form a consistent pattern of increasing or decreasing scores across the seven groups. The most accurate summarizing statement is that all groups tended to attribute moderate importance to the lack of clarity in American goals.

The view that inadequate intelligence contributed to the failure in Vietnam elicited only moderate support from our respondents, and a notably high proportion of them expressed uncertainty. The hypothesis that the Critics would attribute greater significance to intelligence failures rested on the same line of reasoning as that concerning lack of knowledge and understanding of Vietnam. However, the data do not support the hypothesis.

Advocates of air power have tended to attribute North Vietnamese willingness to sign the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973 to the intense bombing raids conducted by the U.S. Air Force during the previous month. Some of these observers have further argued that had similar air raids been undertaken much earlier, the war could have been brought to a successful conclusion—and much sooner. Others have taken the position that the military value of air power has often been overstated even in conventional wars—for example, in World War II —and that its relevance against guerrilla operations is highly dubious. The data near the end of Table 3 indicate considerable ambivalence among our respondents. The hypothesis that the Critics would attribute greater importance to excessive reliance on air power receives moderately strong support. The scores for the three groups of Critics are in fact higher than those for the other four groups, but the pattern of descending scores from Critics to Supporters is not wholly consistent.

The importance to be attributed to "world opinion" in politics is an issue that American leaders have debated virtually every generation for the past two centuries.[13] The question lies at the heart of the recurrent debate between "realists" and "idealists" in foreign affairs. Sixty percent of our respondents attributed at least moderate importance to the opposition to American goals and policies in Vietnam from much of world opinion. The hypothesis that those toward the critical end

[13] Recall the phrase "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind" in the Declaration of Independence.

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of the spectrum would be more inclined to stress world opinion as a source of failure in Vietnam receives some support. Differences among the seven groups are statistically significant, and there is a general—albeit not perfectly consistent—pattern of ascending importance attributed to world opinion across the spectrum from Supporters to Critics.

SOURCES OF FAILURE: CONCLUSION

Table 4 summarizes the findings on the manner in which the seven groups of respondents diagnosed the failure of the U.S. to achieve its goals in Vietnam by indicating how each group ranked the most important of the 21 alternative explanations of failure. Several points are significant. First, notwithstanding a fairly demanding criterion for inclusion in the rankings (a mean score of 0.67 on a scale of 0.00 to 1.00), respondents in each group tended to diagnose the failure of American policies in multi-causal terms. With the exception of the Ambivalents, no group had fewer than seven explanations that qualify for inclusion in the table. Second, the columns in Table 4 confirm in a rather striking way the lack of consensus in the diagnosis of failure. The ranks assigned to various explanations differ from column to column. Moreover, even though the rankings include as many as ten explanations, *no one explanation appears in all seven columns*, and only three appear in six of the seven.

III. Prognosis: The Consequences of Vietnam

The discussions of the war in Southeast Asia usually did not focus solely on the fate of South Vietnam; interest in the broader consequences of success or failure was no less intense. Terms such as "domino theory," "quagmire," "credibility," "commitment," "lessons of Munich," and many others became central symbols—objects of derision or eternal verities, depending upon one's orientation—in the often bitter dialogue about the probable consequences of one course of action or another. At the heart of many debates were such questions as: Will the consequences of Vietnam be confined to that country, or will they spill over to other nations or regions? Will the outcome in Vietnam significantly affect the balance of power in the region or, indeed, in the international system? What will be the impact of Vietnam on the foreign policy orientations of America's adversaries; its allies; the so-called "non-aligned" nations?

Discussion of the consequences arising from the Vietnam experience

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TABLE 4: RANKING OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES OF FAILURE CITED BY EACH GROUP*

Supporters	*Converted Supporters*	*Ambivalent Supporters*	*Ambivalents*	*Ambivalent Critics*	*Converted Critics*	*Critics*
American "no-win" approach	American "no-win" approach	Soviet and Chinese aid	Soviet and Chinese aid	Unrealistic U.S. goals	N. Vietnamese dedication	Unrealistic U.S. goals
Restricted air power	Soviet and Chinese aid	American "no-win" approach	N. Vietnamese dedication	Saigon lacked popular support	Saigon lacked popular support	Saigon lacked popular support
Soviet and Chinese aid	Restricted air power	N. Vietnamese dedication	Dissidents hurt U.S. credibility	Misunderstood Third-World nationalism	Unrealistic U.S. goals	N. Vietnamese dedication
Media hurt war support in U.S.	U.S. had no clear goals	Media hurt war support in U.S.	Media hurt war support in U.S.	N. Vietnamese dedication	Soviet and Chinese aid	Misunderstood Third-World nationalism
Military advice unheeded	Media hurt war support in U.S.	Dissidents hurt U.S. credibility	Saigon lacked popular support	U.S. had no clear goals	Misunderstood Third-World nationalism	U.S. ignorance of Vietnam
Dissidents hurt U.S. credibility	Dissidents hurt U.S. credibility	N. Vietnam peace violations	N. Vietnam peace violations	U.S. ignorance of Vietnam	U.S. had no clear goals	U.S. had no clear goals
N. Vietnam peace violations	Military advice unheeded	U.S. had no clear goals		Soviet and Chinese aid	U.S. ignorance of Vietnam	Opposition of world opinion
Congressional interference	N. Vietnam peace violations	Restricted air power		Media hurt war support in U.S.		
U.S. had no clear goals	N. Vietnamese dedication	Saigon lacked popular support				
	Congressional interference					

* This table lists all the explanations of "failure" that received at least an average rating of 0.67 (Moderately Important) on a scale of 1.00 (Very Important) to 3.00 (Not at All Important). Explanations are listed in order of decreasing importance for each group.

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has not been limited to its impact on the international system. It has included further controversial questions: To what extent, if any, have American society and institutions been permanently damaged by the involvement in the war? In what ways, if any, will bitter memories of Vietnam act as a constraint on the future conduct of American diplomacy? As one observer put it, "The most lasting international consequence of Vietnam—and not only for Americans—may well be on Americans' perceptions of themselves, of the world, and of the proper role of the United States in it."[14]

This section explores the concerns over the repercussions of Vietnam by testing the relevance of the previously cited hypotheses to 13 possible consequences of the war.

IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Much of the debate during and since the conclusion of the war in Vietnam has centered on a series of predicted international consequences that might flow from that conflict. At issue have been questions about the impact of the war on the structure of the international system, America's leadership role in that system, the credibility of American defense commitments, and the future of both allies and adversary nations (especially the Soviet Union and China).

The first three items in Table 5 reveal substantial ambivalence among the respondents over the impact of the Vietnam episode on the international system. Nearly three-fourths of them agreed that the credibility of American defense commitments had been seriously eroded as a consequence of the war. However, slight majorities disagreed with two propositions: the general one that the structure of the international system was fundamentally altered by the outcome in Vietnam, and the more specific one that systemic changes representing a swing toward the ascendency of communist influence in world affairs were initiated.

The hypotheses introduced earlier predicted that those toward the support end of the spectrum would be inclined to expect negative international consequences as a result of the Vietnam experience; those toward the criticism end would be likely to focus on the domestic consequences of the war. The data provide substantial support for our hypotheses. For the two items on the shape of the international system and on the tide of influence in world affairs, there is a consistent pattern of agreement, increasing from the Critics' end of the scale to that of

[14] Alastair Buchan, "The Indochina War and World Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 53 (July 1975), 649.

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Table 5: Consequences of Vietnam

(Mean scores for each of seven groups of respondents classified by their positions on Vietnam during the early and late stages of the war)*

There has been quite a bit of discussion about the consequences *of the Vietnam episode. Some of these are listed below. Please indicate your assessment of each statement.*

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM								
***The Vietnam episode has raised profound doubts about American credibility in the minds of our allies ($F = 23.8$)	0.38	0.65	0.57	0.51	0.32	0.49	0.26	0.19
***The shape of the international system we have known since World War II has been irrevocably altered by America's inability to prevent the collapse of the Thieu regime in 1975 ($F = 12.2$)	—0.12	0.13	0.09	0.01	—0.15	—0.17	—0.20	—0.36
***The tide of influence in world affairs has swung toward communism as a result of the Vietnam War ($F = 31.7$)	—0.16	0.19	0.01	0.00	—0.15	—0.19	—0.28	—0.41

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TABLE 5 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
ADVERSARIES ENCOURAGED								
***Communist nations have been encouraged to seek triumphs elsewhere as a result of Vietnam ($F = 83.9$)	0.32	0.76	0.60	0.55	0.35	0.07	0.21	−0.18
***The major assumptions of détente have been proven false by the events in Vietnam ($F = 45.4$)	−0.13	0.27	0.13	0.01	−0.29	−0.18	−0.25	−0.42
CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE U.S. POLICY								
The U.S. is likely to operate with a more limited conception of the national interest as a result of the outcome in Vietnam ($F = 2.1$)	0.43	0.46	0.34	0.44	0.47	0.38	0.44	0.37
***The memory of Vietnam will prevent the U.S. from using force even when vital American interests abroad are threatened ($F = 14.3$)	−0.05	0.19	0.05	0.07	−0.05	−0.05	−0.13	−0.25

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TABLE 5 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
TYPES OF FUTURE U.S. UNDERTAKINGS								
***As a result of the Vietnam experience, the U.S. is likely to keep military assistance to anti-Soviet factions in Angola to a minimum ($F = 6.4$)	0.76	0.81	0.77	0.82	0.81	0.71	0.76	0.64
***As a consequence of the Vietnam episode, American policies toward the "Third World" will emphasize humanitarian rather than military aid ($F = 9.7$)	0.09	0.23	0.14	0.18	0.06	0.07	0.05	−0.09
***As a result of events in Vietnam, the U.S. is likely to engage in high risk ventures in order to re-establish its credibility ($F = 7.1$)	−0.64	−0.71	−0.59	−0.70	−0.71	−0.53	−0.65	−0.50

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TABLE 5 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
DAMAGE TO AMERICAN SOCIETY								
***The real long-term threats to national security—energy shortages, the environment, etc.—have been neglected as a result of our preoccupation with Vietnam ($F = 51.5$)	0.36	−0.02	0.18	0.20	0.11	0.65	0.48	0.72
***The American people have lost faith in the honesty of their government as a result of the Vietnam War ($F = 25.9$)	0.33	0.13	0.23	0.17	0.13	0.56	0.38	0.61
***The foundations of the American economy were seriously damaged by our involvement in Vietnam ($F = 27.9$)	0.22	−0.07	0.08	0.07	−0.02	0.65	0.29	0.54

* The mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as −1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as −2.00. The resulting scores were then divided by two to create a scale ranging from 1.00 to −1.00.

** Includes 9 respondents who failed to state their positions on Vietnam and thus could not be classified among the seven groups.

*** Differences among groups significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (*chi*-square) statistics. *F* ratios (given in parenthesis immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

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the Supporters. With but a single exception, the same pattern manifests itself on the issue of American credibility.

ADVERSARIES ENCOURAGED

Whatever the merits of the much-debated and often-derided "domino theory," two-thirds of our respondents predicted that the outcome of the war in Vietnam would in fact encourage communist nations to seek other triumphs. Table 5 also reveals that, while many respondents believed that the American defeat in Vietnam would provide an impetus for communist expansion, they were unwilling to regard détente as a policy based on false premises. Perhaps it is useful to speculate why this is so. At least three possible explanations may be offered. First, there may be a good deal of variation (if not confusion) in interpreting the term "détente." The fact that an unusually high proportion (over 10 percent) of the respondents selected the "no opinion" alternative on this item may be of some significance. Second, perhaps some respondents understood the first item to refer primarily to competition in the Third World, and the second to Soviet-American relations only. A third explanation is closely related: during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era, administration spokesmen frequently warned about domino effects arising from certain outcomes in Southeast Asia while at the same time expressing support for a policy of détente.

When the data are disaggregated for the seven groups, substantial support is revealed for the hypothesis that the Supporters would be most likely to predict threatening actions by adversaries in the aftermath of Vietnam. The range of mean scores for both items is exceptionally wide, the differences among the groups are statistically significant, and there is a consistent if not perfect decline in scores from the groups in the columns on the left to those on the right.

CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE U.S. POLICY

"No more Vietnams" may be merely a slogan that summarizes the frustrations of many who opposed American involvement in Southeast Asia as well as those of many others who, while not opposed to the undertaking itself, were critical of the conduct of the war. But the Nixon Doctrine made official that the United States would in the future be very selective in deciding whom it would defend. The era that began with the Truman Doctrine and that reached a peak, at least at the rhetorical level, in John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, had come to an end. As a consequence of the Vietnam War, debate often focused less on the issue of whether there were limits on Ameri-

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ca's vital interests abroad than on the question of whether future administrations would go to excessive lengths—even to the neglect of those vital interests—to avoid "another Vietnam."

The data in Table 5 reflect some ambivalence on this question. Four-fifths of the respondents agreed that in the future the United States would be likely to conduct its foreign relations with a narrower conception of the national interest.[15] At the same time, respondents were almost equally divided over the proposition that the memory of Vietnam would serve as a constraint against the use of force even when vital American interests were in jeopardy.

Earlier we predicted that those who supported the war effort would be more inclined to perceive the Vietnam experience as constraining the future conduct of American foreign policy. This is only partially the case, however. All seven groups are clustered in a very narrow range, each having recorded agreement with the prediction that the Vietnam episode will result in a more limited conception of the national interest. On the other hand, the data on the future use of force support the hypothesis at a statistically significant level.

TYPES OF FUTURE U.S. UNDERTAKINGS

This section examines the likely consequences of the Vietnam War on specific types of future foreign policy undertakings. The respondents agreed almost unanimously that there would be a limited American role in Angola despite the manifest Soviet-Cuban intervention in the civil war there. This finding is not surprising: the questionnaire was not mailed until after the debate in Washington on the issue had resolved that the Ford Administration would not be able to play an active role in that conflict.[16] Far less agreement is evident on the prediction that foreign aid would be redirected from military to humanitarian programs. And our respondents rejected by an overwhelming margin the prediction that the United States would seek to re-establish its lost credibility by engaging in high-risk adventures abroad.

The line of reasoning developed earlier suggested that the more respondents supported the American effort in Vietnam, the more would they be inclined to see (but not applaud) the war as the cause

[15] It should be noted, however, that a much smaller proportion of the respondents (56%) believed that the United States *should* operate with a scaled-down conception of its leadership role (see Table 7).

[16] On January 26, 1976, two hundred members of the House of Representatives signed a resolution opposing American aid to Angola, and on February 18 the Senate passed a foreign aid bill that included a prohibition of covert military aid to any forces in Angola. The Senate vote was 60-30. Our questionnaires were distributed during the first week of February.

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of a weakened and constrained America with a reduced ability to play a leadership role in the international system. The differences among the seven groups of respondents are statistically significant, with a tendency toward support of our hypotheses. That is, fewer Supporters than Critics were inclined to believe that the United States would play an active role in Angola or to re-establish its credibility, and more Supporters predicted a shift away from military aid to Third-World countries. However, the pattern across the other groups is a mixed one, and somewhat inconclusive.

DAMAGE TO AMERICAN SOCIETY

Three items in our questionnaire dealt with the impact of Vietnam on American society and institutions. The results, presented at the end of Table 5, reveal support for the propositions that the war effort resulted in neglect of more serious, non-military threats to national security; in a loss of faith in the honesty of the government; and in structural damage to the economy. At least three-fifths of the respondents expressed some degree of agreement with each of these three items.

According to our hypotheses, those who consistently favored withdrawal from Vietnam would be more inclined to focus on the negative domestic consequences of the war than those who supported the search for a military victory. The figures in Table 5 affirm the hypotheses. All three items yielded a wide range of responses, and the differences among the seven groups are statistically significant.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIETNAM: CONCLUSION

Table 6 summarizes the results for the data pertaining to the perceived consequences of the Vietnam War by ranking the predicted consequences within each group. This procedure highlights several key aspects of our hypotheses. First, the three groups of Supporters all cited damaging international effects as the most important consequences of Vietnam. Indeed, the rankings for these three groups are identical (although the underlying scores on which they are based are not). Second, the Ambivalents cited the same damaging international consequences, but not in the same order as the three groups of supporters. Third, the three groups of Critics perceived the most important consequences of the Vietnam experience as being completely different from those cited by the Supporters; the consequences cited by the Critics are almost uniformly focused on the domestic rather than the international effects of the war.

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TABLE 6: RANKING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIETNAM RECEIVING HIGHEST AGREEMENT FROM EACH GROUP*

Supporters	*Converted Supporters*	*Ambivalent Supporters*	*Ambivalents*	*Ambivalent Critics*	*Converted Critics*	*Critics*
Communists will seek other triumphs	Communists will seek other triumphs	Communists will seek other triumphs	U.S. will limit conception of national interest	U.S. economy damaged	Long-term threats neglected	Long-term threats neglected
American credibility damaged	American credibility damaged	American credibility damaged	Communists will seek other triumphs	Long-term threats neglected	U.S. will limit conception of national interest	Lost faith in U.S. government
U.S. will limit conception of national interest	U.S. will limit conception of national interest	U.S. will limit conception of national interest	American credibility damaged	Lost faith in U.S. government	Lost faith in U.S. government	U.S. economy damaged
				American credibility damaged		U.S. will limit conception of national interest
				U.S. will limit conception of national interest		

* This table lists all the "consequences of Vietnam" that received at least an average rating of 0.30 on a scale of 1.00 (Agree Strongly) to −1.00 (Disagree Strongly). Consequences are listed in order of decreasing importance for each group. This table does not include data for the item stating: "As a result of the Vietnam experience, the U.S. is likely to keep military assistance to anti-Soviet factions in Angola to a minimum." Congressional action had settled that issue before some respondents returned their questionnaires.

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IV. Prescription: The Lessons of Vietnam

The Vietnam War is not the first event to inspire postmortems aimed at teasing out lessons for the future conduct of policy. But it is doubtful that any previous episode in American history has given rise to such an extensive and conscious effort to learn from the past. Politicians, soldiers, pundits, editorial writers, and many others—as if guided by the dictum that men and nations are capable of learning only from failures—have offered a continuing stream of advice about what Americans should learn, not learn, or unlearn from the Vietnam experience. We sought to capture this variety in 34 items of our questionnaire.

BIPOLARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A variety of interpretations that were central to the debate during and since the Vietnam War revolved around the following basic question pertaining to the structure of the international system: Is the system essentially bipolar in nature, or have its structure and characteristic patterns of interaction changed in ways that challenge the premises of bipolarity? Five items dealt with this question; the aggregate responses to them depict considerable ambivalence (Table 7). On the one hand, the respondents indicated very strong support for the validity of the domino theory and for the proposition that failure to honor alliance commitments will result in heavy costs. Moreover, they were decidedly skeptical about the permanence of divisions among communist states. On the other hand, substantial if not overwhelming majorities questioned some core premises of the cold-war period—the assumption of a zero-sum relationship between communist gains and U.S. national interests, and the domination of revolutionary forces in the Third World by Moscow or Peking.

Although the results for the entire sample are somewhat mixed, disaggregation of the data into the seven groups yields discernible support for our hypothesis. Respondents who persisted in favoring military victory in Vietnam exhibited strong agreement with items that are consistent with a bipolar international system, and they expressed disagreement with items that seem to challenge the core premises of bipolarity (the third and fifth in Table 7). Conversely, those who favored withdrawal from Vietnam responded in ways that call into question the premises of a bipolar international system. The differences among the seven groups are statistically significant for all five lessons, and they form a consistent if not perfect pattern corresponding to the hypothesis.

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TABLE 7: LESSONS OF VIETNAM

(Mean scores for each of seven groups of respondents classified by their positions on Vietnam during the early and late stages of the war)*

This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
BIPOLARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM								
***A nation will pay a heavy price if it honors its alliance commitments only selectively ($F = 41.6$)	0.48	0.77	0.63	0.61	0.59	0.31	0.41	0.17
***There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path ($F = 135.6$)	0.24	0.73	0.54	0.62	0.38	−0.12	0.12	−0.41
***Revolutionary forces in "Third World" countries are usually nationalistic rather than controlled by the U.S.S.R. or China ($F = 55.9$)	0.19	−0.24	0.04	−0.05	0.26	0.49	0.30	0.54

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents (*n* = 2,282**)	*Supporters* (*n* = 363)	*Converted Supporters* (*n* = 128)	*Ambivalent Supporters* (*n* = 346)	*Ambivalents* (*n* = 128)	*Ambivalent Critics* (*n* = 63)	*Converted Critics* (*n* = 867)	*Critics* (*n* = 378)
BIPOLARITY (Continued)								
***Any communist victory is a defeat for America's national interest ($F = 86.1$)	−0.14	0.42	0.08	0.12	−0.08	−0.49	−0.28	−0.61
***American foreign policy should be based on the premise that the Communist "bloc" is irreparably fragmented ($F = 29.1$)	−0.25	−0.52	−0.47	−0.44	−0.18	−0.04	−0.18	0.04
THREATS FROM ADVERSARIES								
***The Soviet Union is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals ($F = 29.3$)	0.58	0.78	0.74	0.70	0.63	0.42	0.54	0.30
***Détente permits the U.S.S.R. to pursue policies that promote rather than restrain conflict ($F = 46.6$)	0.15	0.55	0.38	0.29	0.06	0.03	0.06	−0.19
***China is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals	−0.25	−0.01	−0.11	−0.11	−0.23	−0.33	−0.31	−0.49

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER								
***If foreign interventions are undertaken, the necessary force should be applied in a short period of time rather than through a policy of graduated escalation ($F = 47.0$)	0.55	0.85	0.72	0.72	0.43	0.36	0.51	0.21
***The U.S. should never try to get by with half-measures; we should apply necessary power if we have it ($F = 100.6$)	0.07	0.68	0.44	0.37	−0.09	−0.10	−0.10	−0.48
***Rather than simply countering our opponent's thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of the opponent's power ($F = 56.1$)	0.01	0.48	0.38	0.18	−0.12	−0.24	−0.10	−0.42
***When force is used, military rather than political goals should determine its application ($F = 52.4$)	−0.21	0.28	0.16	−0.05	−0.39	−0.50	−0.31	−0.59

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents (*n* = 2,282**)	*Supporters* (*n* = 363)	*Converted Supporters* (*n* = 128)	*Ambivalent Supporters* (*n* = 346)	*Ambivalents* (*n* = 128)	*Ambivalent Critics* (*n* = 63)	*Converted Critics* (*n* = 867)	*Critics* (*n* = 378)
REDUCING U.S. INVOLVEMENT ABROAD								
***The best way to encourage democratic development in the "Third World" is for the U.S. to solve its own problems (*F* = 4.2)	0.27	0.28	0.32	0.22	0.07	0.41	0.26	0.38
***Stationing American troops in other countries encourages them to let us do their fighting for those countries (*F* = 9.0)	0.15	0.05	0.16	0.07	−0.10	0.22	0.20	0.30
***America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down (*F* = 49.5)	0.04	−0.37	−0.17	−0.17	−0.15	0.30	0.15	0.45
***Military aid programs will eventually draw the United States into unnecessary wars (*F* = 48.5)	−0.11	−0.40	−0.10	−0.34	−0.40	0.30	−0.07	0.29
***It was a serious mistake to agree to locate American technicians in the Sinai	−0.47	−0.52	−0.36	−0.59	−0.57	−0.32	−0.47	−0.32

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents (*n* = 2,282**)	*Supporters* (*n* = 363)	*Converted Supporters* (*n* = 128)	*Ambivalent Supporters* (*n* = 346)	*Ambivalents* (*n* = 128)	*Ambivalent Critics* (*n* = 63)	*Converted Critics* (*n* = 867)	*Critics* (*n* = 378)
COPING WITH CONFLICT UNILATERALLY								
***The U.S. should avoid any involvement in the Angolan civil war (*F* = 103.4)	0.25	−0.32	0.07	−0.11	−0.01	0.62	0.45	0.75
***It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes (*F* = 19.6)	0.20	−0.08	0.10	0.14	0.17	0.34	0.22	0.53
***The U.S. should undertake military intervention in the Middle East in case of another oil embargo (*F* = 43.3)	−0.49	−0.11	−0.25	−0.31	−0.58	−0.64	−0.59	−0.78

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT								
***Americans have relied too much on Presidents to define the national interest ($F = 34.5$)	0.22	−0.05	0.21	−0.02	0.01	0.43	0.29	0.56
***The press is more likely than the government to report the truth about the conduct of foreign policy ($F = 68.9$)	0.15	−0.35	−0.05	0.11	−0.01	0.40	0.28	0.61
***The conduct of American foreign affairs relies excessively on military advice ($F = 91.3$)	0.02	−0.49	−0.28	−0.26	−0.14	0.39	0.14	0.57

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY								
***An effective foreign policy is impossible when the Executive and Congress are unable to cooperate ($F = 12.7$)	0.47	0.62	0.55	0.61	0.46	0.49	0.41	0.28
***The American people lack the patience for foreign policy undertakings that offer little prospect of success in the short run ($F = 13.4$)	0.39	0.54	0.46	0.55	0.41	0.44	0.35	0.19
***Americans lack an understanding of the role that power plays in world politics ($F = 22.8$)	0.36	0.59	0.55	0.52	0.36	0.27	0.28	0.14
***Limited war cannot be conducted successfully because of constraints imposed by the American political system ($F = 29.4$)	0.23	0.53	0.41	0.41	0.03	0.16	0.15	−0.03

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS (Continued)								
***The freedom to dissent at home inhibits the effective conduct of American foreign policy ($F = 32.3$)	−0.43	−0.12	−0.18	−0.28	−0.40	−0.58	−0.52	−0.74
FORGETTING THE PAST								
***If officials would treat each new crisis on its own merits, rather than relying on past experience, they would usually make better foreign policy decisions ($F = 6.4$)	−0.06	−0.13	−0.06	−0.09	−0.28	0.06	−0.08	0.13
***It is best to forget the foreign policy mistakes of the past as quickly as possible ($F = 4.3$)	−0.57	−0.45	−0.49	−0.49	−0.65	−0.53	−0.61	−0.66

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	All Respondents ($n = 2{,}282$**)	*Supporters* ($n = 363$)	*Converted Supporters* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Supporters* ($n = 346$)	*Ambivalents* ($n = 128$)	*Ambivalent Critics* ($n = 63$)	*Converted Critics* ($n = 867$)	*Critics* ($n = 378$)
OTHER "LESSONS" OF VIETNAM								
***Vital interests of the U.S. are largely confined to Western Europe, Japan, and the Americas ($F = 3.63$)	−0.19	−0.31	−0.16	−0.20	−0.25	0.11	−0.16	−0.18
Limited wars should be fought primarily with air power so as to avoid introducing American ground troops ($F = 3.02$)	−0.17	−0.15	−0.21	−0.09	−0.35	−0.29	−0.15	−0.23
The efficiency of military power in foreign affairs is declining ($F = 2.54$)	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.13	0.12	0.35	0.18	0.25
Weak allies excessively influence U.S. foreign policy ($F = 2.52$)	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.01	−0.14	0.07	0.07	0.04

* The mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as −1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as −2.00. The resulting scores were then divided by two to create a scale ranging from 1.00 to −1.00.

** Includes 9 respondents who failed to state their positions on Vietnam and thus could not be classified among the seven groups.

*** Differences among groups significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (*chi*-square) statistics. *F* ratios (given in parenthesis immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

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THREATS FROM ADVERSARIES

The war in Vietnam coincided with some highly visible changes in relations between Washington and its most powerful adversaries—at least at the symbolic level. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and the exchange of visits between Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev seemed to indicate that, despite conflicting interests in Southeast Asia, the hostile relationships of the cold-war period were undergoing some basic transformations. But the nature of the changes, if any, are hardly free from controversy.

Beliefs about the international system are closely related to images of the adversaries and their intentions. Table 7 reveals some ambivalence about the adversaries and their foreign policy goals. Most interesting are the sharply divergent views of Soviet and Chinese goals. Only a few years ago, American involvement in Vietnam was often justified as an exercise in containing China. The rhetoric of senior officials in the Johnson Administration rarely failed to portray the leadership in Peking as aggressive and not altogether predictable with respect to foreign affairs. Yet less than 30 percent of our sample agreed with the proposition that China is expansionist in its foreign policy goals; less than 7 percent expressed "strong" agreement.

Perhaps one explanation for the radical shift lies in the political adage that "my enemy's enemy is my friend." Certainly an overwhelming majority of the respondents regarded the Soviet Union as an expansionist power. This view of Soviet motives also manifested itself in the decidedly skeptical stand toward détente; a clear majority of the respondents expressed some degree of agreement with the proposition that the U.S.S.R. is using détente to promote rather than to limit conflict.

The hypothesis that the Supporters would be more inclined than the Critics to regard cold-war adversaries as expansionist and threatening is sustained when the data are disaggregated into the seven groups. The differences between the groups are statistically significant, and in the predicted direction, for all three items. All the groups were inclined to agree that the Soviet Union is expansionist and that China is not, but the degree to which they did so ranges rather widely. An even wider range of beliefs is found in assessments of détente: the Supporters expressed agreement with the proposition that détente is abused by the U.S.S.R., whereas the Critics tended to disagree with that appraisal.[17]

[17] The Supporters appear to have been more consistent than the Critics in appraising Soviet goals and Soviet uses of détente. As noted earlier, however, this may be the result of ambiguities about the meaning of the term.

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UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER

In the search for usable lessons of the Vietnam experience, few topics have generated more attention than those concerning the utility and proper deployment of military forces. Many observers have noted an American tendency to place strong, and perhaps inordinate, faith in the employment of advanced military technology to bring victory. If World War II seemed to provide the ultimate confirmation of that belief, the Vietnam experience has stimulated some serious second thoughts about its applicability to certain types of contemporary conflicts.

The responses to four items centering on the use of military power are summarized in Table 7. Of the 34 items appearing in our questionnaire, the lesson that received the strongest support from the entire sample of respondents was that in any future foreign intervention, force should be applied quickly rather than through a policy of graduated escalation.[18] Although almost 10 percent of the sample expressed "no opinion" on this subject, more than three-fourths of the respondents agreed, and most did so "strongly." The next two items—on avoiding half-measures and striking at "the heart of the opponent's power"—elicited more agreement than disagreement, but by narrow margins and with "no opinion" at a high level on the latter issue. The twelfth item in Table 7 focuses on a controversial question that recurs during every war: Should military operations be conducted to maximize military goals or political ones? Most of the respondents favored the latter rather than the former option.

When the data are disaggregated into the seven groups, they reveal a striking range of views. These results provide consistent and substantial support for the hypothesis that the military lessons drawn from the Vietnam War would be systematically related to positions on the proper course of U.S. action in that conflict: those at or near the Supporter end of the spectrum tended to believe that military power should be used more quickly, with fewer self-imposed restraints, and with greater efficiency; those at the Critic end of the spectrum were less inclined to accept these lessons.

REDUCING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT ABROAD

In the wake of the Vietnam disaster, many questions have been asked about when, where, and how the United States should become involved in future situations abroad: How active a role should it play

[18] The overwhelmingly favorable response to this proposition perhaps confirms, in part, another of the lessons (discussed below): "The American people lack the patience for foreign policy undertakings that offer little prospect for success in the short run."

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in the international system? What lessons, if any, can be learned from Vietnam about opportunities for exerting leadership? What are the constraints against taking on various leadership roles? Five items were addressed to such questions; although the responses to them reveal a general lack of consensus, on the whole they exhibit preferences toward a somewhat reduced global role for the United States. A slight majority of the respondents agreed that the U.S. should scale down its international role, and a somewhat larger majority was in accord with the proposition that America's ability to influence the course of events in the Third World may be limited to the power of example.

Two other items are of special interest in light of President Carter's avowed goal of withdrawing American troops from South Korea and reducing arms sales abroad. By a margin of approximately 3 to 2, the respondents agreed that stationing troops abroad encourages the host countries to let the United States do their fighting for them. But by a roughly comparable margin, they rejected the proposition that military assistance programs will draw this country into unnecessary wars. Finally, a very substantial majority disagreed with the view that deployment of American technicians in the Sinai was a mistake.

Mixed results were uncovered with respect to the hypothesis that those toward the Supporter end of the spectrum would adduce lessons from Vietnam that recommended a more active American role in the world, whereas those on the Critic side would draw the opposite lesson. The data on the conception of the American leadership role and on military aid programs are strongly in accord with the hypothesis. The differences among the groups are statistically significant, and generally in the predicted direction. Although the differences among the groups for the other three items are also statistically significant, the distribution of scores across each item follows a somewhat less regular pattern.[19]

COPING WITH CONFLICT UNILATERALLY

In addition to eliciting views on the appropriate global role for the United States, we also included three items about the wisdom of unilateral responses to conflict situations abroad. Two of the items focused on issues of current interest at the time the questionnaire was mailed—the appropriate role in the Angolan civil war, and the advisability of

[19] A preliminary analysis of responses to the sources of failure and the lessons of Vietnam according to occupational groups also revealed a somewhat mixed pattern on the items dealing with the proper role of the United States in the world. See Holsti and Rosenau, "The Meaning of Vietnam: Belief Systems of American Leaders," *International Journal*, XXXII (Summer 1977), 471.

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intervening militarily in the Middle East in case of another oil embargo. The third dealt with the question of the extent to which the United Nations should be used to deal with international conflicts. The results, as summarized in Table 7, indicate a general consensus against unilateral action to cope with conflict issues. Solid majorities indicated a preference for avoiding involvement in Angola and for enlisting the cooperation of the United Nations in settling international disputes, and three-quarters of the respondents rejected the proposition that military intervention would be an appropriate response to any future oil embargo.[20] In short, although these three items do not represent the full range of potential conflicts that the United States may face in the years ahead—and it is therefore necessary to be wary of generalizations—the findings appear to reflect at least a mood of caution and skepticism about the use of unilateral action to cope with future conflicts.

The disaggregated data reveal a strong and consistent relationship between positions on U.S. policy in Vietnam and on how best to cope with other conflict issues. Differences among the seven groups are significant, and they are in the direction predicted by our hypotheses. None of the groups, on balance, favored intervention in the Middle East in the event of another oil embargo; the Critics were overwhelmingly opposed to such action, whereas the Supporters were almost evenly divided on the issue and the other five groups were arrayed between them. The responses to the other lessons also reveal a wide range of beliefs across the seven groups. Four of the seven groups favored total abstention from the Angolan civil war, while the other three took the opposite position—albeit by rather narrow margins in two cases. The range between the Supporters and the Critics on the question of Angola is especially large. Only a slightly smaller disagreement marks the responses of the groups to the question of the appropriate role of the United Nations in settling international disputes.

PERFORMANCE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

The process of foreign policy making was a major focus of the lessons to be derived from the Vietnam experience. Indeed, in its reaction

[20] A number of prominent academic observers had proposed that such an intervention would be feasible, as well as necessary to avoid the costs of any future oil embargo. See Robert W. Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention," *Commentary*, Vol. 59 (January 1975), 21-31; Tucker, "Further Reflections on Oil and Force," *Commentary*, Vol. 59 (March 1975), 45-56; Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Great Détente Disaster: Oil and the Decline of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books 1975).

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to the Watergate scandal as well as to the failure in Vietnam, the public has repeatedly been found to share a widespread skepticism—if not a cynicism—about the performance of the government in Washington. Three items in our questionnaire focused on governmental performance in foreign affairs; they yielded results which reveal that, on balance, members of various leadership groups are rather critical of Washington. More than 60 percent of the respondents agreed that, in defining the national interest, there has been excessive reliance on the President; a clear majority supported the proposition that the press is more likely than the government to report the truth about the conduct of foreign affairs. Beliefs were almost evenly divided on the issue of military advice in foreign policy.

But these overall indicators of dissatisfaction with the performance of the American government do not begin to hint at the strong and systematic differences in outlook that emerge when the data are disaggregated. The hypothesis is upheld that those who consistently supported the goals of military victory in Vietnam would be the least critical of the government, whereas those who advocated withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be the most critical. The range of mean scores is high for all three items, especially on the issue of excessive military advice in the conduct of foreign affairs. The differences among the groups are statistically significant and, with a few exceptions among the middle groups, they follow a general pattern of increasing criticism of the government from the left- to right-hand columns of Table 7.

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY

The war in Vietnam has been called the most unpopular in American history. Although draft riots, dissident movements, and jailings of protesters have accompanied virtually every previous war, none was accompanied by such widespread disaffection with the government's policies and its conduct of military operations. In light of the subsequent failure of U.S. policies in Vietnam, what lessons do American leaders believe should be derived from the experience with respect to the impact of domestic constraints on the effective conduct of foreign relations?

Table 7 reveals consistent support for a series of propositions about the deleterious effects of various domestic constraints on the quality of foreign policy. The one exception to this generalization is strong disagreement with the proposition that freedom to dissent inhibits the effective conduct of foreign relations. Substantial majorities, however—

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ranging from over 60 to nearly 80 percent—agreed that lack of cooperation between the White House and Congress negates the possibilities of an effective foreign policy; that the American political system is poorly suited to conduct a limited war; and that the American people are lacking in two important requisites for a sound foreign policy—patience and an understanding of the role of power in world politics.

The absence of an even division of beliefs on any of these issues does not reflect a consensus among the seven groups of respondents. The hypothesis that the Supporters would be more likely than the Critics to find in the Vietnam experience a set of lessons about the damaging consequences of domestic constraints is strongly sustained. On balance, all seven groups agreed with the items on executive-legislative cooperation, on the lack of patience and of appreciation of power realities among Americans; but the strength of agreement varies widely and in the predicted direction. All but the Critics agreed that the American political system is poorly suited to conduct a limited war, and all seven groups rejected the lesson that freedom to dissent is incompatible with a sound foreign policy. The range of mean scores is the highest for the latter two items.

THE USES OF HISTORY: FORGETTING THE PAST

Our project is to a large extent founded on the assumption that the propensity to look to the past for guidance and decision rules is spread widely throughout the society's leadership structure. Some leaders may be more likely than others to seek guidance from specific historical episodes; we would expect, for example, that Supporters of the war effort in Vietnam would be more likely than Critics to look to the 1938 Munich Conference for decision rules on how to cope with aggression. However, there is no reason to believe that persons in any group would be more, or less, inclined to accept the general proposition that one may profitably look to the past for guidance. Hence the hypothesis that there will be *no* significant differences between the Supporters, the Critics, and the other five groups in this respect.

Results for two items relating to the uses of history are summarized near the end of Table 7. There is qualified support for our core premise on the pervasiveness of the propensity toward historical analysis. The respondents rejected overwhelmingly the proposition that it is best to forget past foreign policy mistakes; but their reactions were much more evenly divided on the wisdom of treating each crisis on "its own merits" rather than "relying on past experience." Contrary to our hypothesis, the seven groups do in fact differ in their propensities to

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look to the past, but they do so in ways that are not easily interpreted. The scores for the Supporters and the Critics are virtually identical, and most of the variance appears to be accounted for by the Ambivalents, who most strongly rejected the belief that one should avoid looking to history for insight into dealing with contemporary issues. The evidence does not negate our core premise that reliance on past experience is a pervasive tendency, but it is not sufficient to determine whether there is a systematic propensity for some persons to adduce lessons from history and for others to avoid doing so.

OTHER LESSONS OF VIETNAM

Of the 34 lessons of Vietnam on which we solicited responses, four did not meet our substantive and statistical criteria for inclusion in any of the clusters discussed above. They are considered separately in this section.

The identity of primary American interests in the world was a major focus of the postmortems on Vietnam; accordingly, our questionnaire offered for evaluation the lesson that the "vital interests of the U.S. are largely confined to Western Europe, Japan, and the Americas." This proposition reflects the perspective of the Trilateral Commission; responses to it are perhaps especially significant since one of the Commission's members was subsequently elected President of the United States, and its former Director, Zbigniew Brzezinski, now serves as National Security Adviser to the President. Our sample of leaders, however, rejected this formulation of America's vital interest by a margin of about 3 to 2, with nearly 30 percent expressing strong disagreement. The hypothesis that this item would elicit strongest agreement among the Critics and strongest disagreement among the Supporters is only marginally upheld. Differences among the seven groups are significant, but within a very narrow range; they form only a moderately consistent pattern across the seven groups.

Some observers have commented that public opinion ultimately turned against the war effort because of the heavy casualties among ground troops, combined with an unpopular draft. In response, it has been suggested that, in any future limited war, greater use be made of air power in order to avoid heavy ground casualties. Less than one-third of the respondents agreed that this was a useful lesson to be drawn from the war; about one-half disagreed; and a high proportion expressed no opinion on the issue. The hypothesis that this lesson would attract more favorable reaction among those who supported the effort in Vietnam must be rejected.

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That the failure of a military effort costing some fifty thousand lives and 150 billion dollars should give rise to sober second thoughts about the role of military power in contemporary foreign affairs is scarcely surprising. By a margin of 2 to 1, the respondents agreed with the lesson that "the efficiency of military power in foreign affairs is declining." But the hypothesis that agreement would be weakest among the Supporters and strongest among the Critics must be rejected. Although there is a tendency toward greater disagreement with the proposition among the three groups on the left-hand side of Table 7 (as predicted by the hypothesis), the differences across the groups are not significant at the .001 level.

The proposition that "weak allies excessively influence U.S. foreign policy" received agreement from a plurality—but not a majority—of the respondents. Considerable uncertainty is reflected in the finding that almost as many answered "no opinion" as "agree strongly" or "disagree strongly." The hypothesis that Critics would express stronger agreement with this proposition is not supported.

THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM: CONCLUSION

The data on the lessons of Vietnam suggest two major conclusions. First, a pattern of deep and profound division among the respondents was uncovered. While there is general agreement that Americans *should* learn from past mistakes, this consensus breaks down once attention focuses on specific substantive lessons. Disagreement pervades all levels of thinking about how the lessons of Vietnam should guide the future conduct of American foreign policy, from the broadest questions of "grand design," through "grand strategy" and "tactics."[21] Second, with only a few exceptions, the patterns of response correspond closely to those suggested by our hypotheses.

We can gain a somewhat different perspective on the data by ranking, for each of the seven groups, the lessons that received the strongest support. Table 8 provides added confirmation for the conclusion that there is a noticeable absence of consensus among our sample of American leaders. Although the criterion of inclusion was only moderately stringent (an average rating of 0.40 on a scale of 1.00 to −1.00), not one of the thirty-four lessons appears in all seven rankings. Only two appear in six rankings ("the Soviet Union is expansionist in its foreign policy goals"; "disagreement between the executive and the Congress hinders the effective conduct of foreign policy"); three other lessons

[21] The terms "grand design," "grand strategy," and "tactics" are borrowed from Alexander L. George of Stanford University.

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TABLE 8: RANKING OF THE "LESSONS OF VIETNAM" RECEIVING HIGHEST AGREEMENT FROM EACH GROUP*

Supporters	*Converted Supporters*	*Ambivalent Supporters*	*Ambivalents*	*Ambivalent Critics*	*Converted Critics*	*Critics*
Avoid graduated escalation	U.S.S.R. is expansionist	Avoid graduated escalation	U.S.S.R. is expansionist	Avoid Angola involvement	U.S.S.R. is expansionist	Avoid Angola involvement
U.S.S.R. is expansionist	Avoid graduated escalation	U.S.S.R. is expansionist	Must honor alliance commitments	Third-World revolutionaries nationalistic	Avoid graduated escalation	Press more likely to tell truth on foreign policy
Must honor alliance commitments	Must honor alliance commitments	Domino theory is valid	Exec.-Congress cooperation is vital	Exec.-Congress cooperation is vital	Avoid Angola involvement	Excessive reliance on military advice
Domino theory is valid	Exec.-Congress cooperation is vital	Must honor alliance commitments	Avoid graduated escalation	Americans lack patience	Exec.-Congress cooperation is vital	Rely too much on President to define national interest
Avoid half-measures militarily	Americans don't understand role of power	Exec.-Congress cooperation is vital	Americans lack patience	Rely too much on President to define national interest	Must honor alliance commitments	Third-World revolutionaries nationalistic
Exec.-Congress cooperation is vital	Domino theory is valid	Americans lack patience		U.S.S.R. is expansionist		Scale down U.S. international role
Americans don't understand role of power	Americans lack patience	Americans don't understand role of power		U.S. should solve own problems		Enlist U.N. cooperation
Soviets abuse détente	Avoid half-measures militarily	Americans can't fight limited war		Press more likely to tell truth on foreign policy		
Americans lack patience	Americans can't fight limited war					
Americans can't fight limited war						
Strike at heart of enemy power						
Communist victory antithesis of U.S. interests						

* This table lists all "lessons of Vietnam" that received at least an average rating of 0.40 on a scale of 1.00 (Agree Strongly) to −1.00 (Disagree Strongly). Lessons are listed in order of decreasing importance for each group.

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may be found in five rankings. If we took into account the place accorded each lesson in each ranking, the dissensus would be even greater. One final observation further illustrates the sharp cleavages among the groups. For the Supporters, twelve lessons met the criteria for inclusion in Table 8; the comparable figure for the Critics is six. Yet *no one lesson appears on both lists*!

V. Summary and Conclusion

Table 9 summarizes the fit between our hypotheses on the sources of failure, the consequences, and the lessons of Vietnam on the one hand, and the data provided by our sample of 2,282 leaders on the other. The first two columns of Table 9 identify the hypotheses, and the third indicates the number of relevant questionnaire items for each hypothesis. The fourth and fifth columns summarize the results of the statistical tests used to determine whether there were significant differences among the seven groups of respondents. These tests do not, however, indicate whether or not the seven groups were arrayed in the order predicted by each hypothesis. The sixth column presents rank-order correlations between the predicted and actual ordering of the groups.

Table 9 indicates the full extent to which our hypotheses were consistently supported by the data. The differences among the seven groups of respondents were significant for 61 of the 66 questionnaire items, and virtually all the differences were in the predicted direction. Moreover, the correlations between the predicted and actual group rankings satisfied rather demanding standards: correlation coefficients exceeding .85 resulted for 50 of the 66 questionnaire items.

Consensus, Vietnam, and Belief Systems

Earlier we indicated that our analysis would center around three basic propositions: the post-World War II consensus on U.S. foreign policy has been shattered; the Vietnam experience has been a critical event in this respect; and the resulting views on foreign policy could appropriately be designated as competing belief systems. To what extent do the findings support these propositions? Surely they uphold the first proposition. The existence of deep cleavages among the seven groups of respondents has been confirmed repeatedly, and these differences extend across a broad spectrum of questions, ranging from beliefs about the international system to issues of strategy and tactics.

In order to test the second proposition—that Vietnam was a watershed experience with respect to basic American beliefs about interna-

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TABLE 9: SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESES ON THE SOURCES OF FAILURE, CONSEQUENCES, AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM TESTED WITH DATA FOR 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS CLASSIFIED INTO SEVEN GROUPS ACCORDING TO THEIR POSITION ON THE WAR

Hypothesis Number	*Hypotheses*	*Number of Questionnaire Items*			*Correlations between the Predicted and Actual Rankings of the Seven Groups (r_s)***
		Total	*Significant Differences**		
			ANOVA	X^2	
	SOURCES OF FAILURE (TABLE 3):				
A.1a	Domestic constraints	5	5	5	.96, .96, 1.00, .96, .96
A.1b	Military factors	4	4	4	.89, .96, .89, .93
A.1c	Actions of others	3	3	3	.86, .93, .89
A.1d	No clear goals	1	1	1	.32
A.2a	Lack of knowledge and understanding	3	3	3	.93, .96, .89
A.2b	An unsound undertaking	2	2	2	.96, .96
A.2c	Inadequate intelligence	1	0	1	.12
A.2d	Excessive reliance on air power	1	1	1	.86
A.2e	Opposition of world opinion	1	1	1	.82
	CONSEQUENCES OF VIETNAM (TABLE 5):				
B.1a	Impact on the international system	3	3	3	.96, 1.00, 1.00
B.1b	Adversaries encouraged	2	2	2	.96, .89
B.1c	Constraints on future U.S. policy	2	1	1	.24, .95
B.1d	Types of future U.S. undertakings	3	3	3	.74, .93, .63
B.2	Damage to American society	3	3	3	.86, .71, .75

TABLE 9 (Continued)

Hypothesis Number	Hypotheses	Number of Questionnaire Items: Total	Significant Differences*: ANOVA	Significant Differences*: X^2	Correlations between the Predicted and Actual Rankings of the Seven Groups (r_s)**
	LESSONS OF VIETNAM (TABLE 7):				
C.1a	Bipolarity of the international system	5	5	5	.96, .93, .93, .93, .96
C.1b	Threats from U.S. adversaries	3	3	3	.96, .94, .96
C.1c	Utility of military power	4	4	4	.88, .99, .89, .89
C.1d	Coping with conflict unilaterally	3	3	3	.86, .96, .96
C.1e	Domestic constraints on foreign policy	5	5	5	.93, .86, .96, .89, .96
C.1f	Limited war and air power	1	0	1	.35
C.2a	Reducing U.S. involvement abroad	5	5	5	.25, .71, .95, .64, .51
C.2b	Performance of the U.S. government	3	3	3	.86, .93, .96
C.2c	U.S. vital interests limited	1	1	1	.47
C.2d	Efficiency of military power declining	1	0	1	.82
C.2e	Influence of weak allies excessive	1	0	1	.01
C.4	Forgetting the past***	2	2	2	.57, .88

* Of the total number of items relevant to each hypothesis, the number for which differences among the groups were significant at the .001 level, as measured by analysis of variance (ANOVA) and *chi* square (X^2).

** Spearman rank-order correlation between the hypothesized rankings of the groups and the actual group scores. The correlations for individual questionnaire items are given in the same order as in the tables presenting the group scores.

*** This hypothesis predicted no significant differences among the groups.

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tional politics and foreign policy—we classified the respondents into seven groups *solely* on the basis of their policy preferences during the early and late stages of the war. Admittedly, this is a rather simple classification scheme, but it serves our purposes well because it isolates views on the war from other variables such as age, occupation, and party identification.[22] Indeed, it is precisely because the classification scheme described in Table 2 is simple and based purely on the Vietnam issue that the results are so striking. Stated differently, knowing how a person reacted to the Vietnam War provides a good start toward describing many of his or her foreign policy beliefs. In turn, this enhances our confidence in assessing the impact of Vietnam on the beliefs of American leaders.

The third proposition postulated that responses to four clusters of issues—policy preferences on Vietnam, diagnoses of the sources of failure, prognoses of the consequences of the war, and prescriptions about the lessons of Vietnam—would form coherent and internally consistent belief systems. The hypotheses that guided our analysis of the issues within each cluster represented, in effect, our conception of the beliefs that logically seemed to form a coherent system of thought. The data yielded strong support for this line of reasoning; strikingly different, almost mutually exclusive, belief systems were uncovered.

Is the fact that respondents in the groups at the ends of the spectrum hold sharply divergent views sufficient evidence from which to draw broad conclusions about a breakdown of agreement on the bases of U.S. foreign policy? Even the bipartisan, center-of-the-road coalition that supported the main outlines of American foreign policy during the late 1940s and the 1950s did not lack critics on either end of the political spectrum. Does an emphasis on the groups at either end of the scale overlook the possibility of broad consensus *within* the area bounded by those who consistently favored a military victory in Vietnam and those who were just as undeviating in their demands for a complete withdrawal? The answer seems clear: the data do not support the existence of a broad consensus among the five middle groups. In the first place, the Supporters and Critics are not merely insignificant fringe groups; between them, they constitute approximately one-third of the entire sample. Second, and just as important, is the fact that divisions among the middle groups are almost as deep as between

[22] We do not wish to imply, however, that analyses of these and other background attributes would not contribute to an understanding of policy preferences toward Vietnam, as well as of other isssues. Presumably such analyses would enhance comprehension, but perforce they must await treatment in future papers.

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those at the ends of our scale. Both the Converted Critics and the Converted Supporters differed significantly from the groups adjacent to them on the scale on more than three-fourths of the 68 questionnaire items. Likewise, the differences between the Converted Supporters and Converted Critics are highly significant on well over half of the items, and the same number of differences also divide the Ambivalent Supporters from the Ambivalent Critics. In short, there is not much sustenance for the theory that the middle groups constitute a consensus that effectively bridges the chasm between the groups at each end of the scale.

As indicated earlier, analysis of the respondents' attributes, other than their policy preferences during the Vietnam War, is beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be useful to anticipate one question that will almost certainly be raised about these findings. Do the present results merely mask cleavages that are essentially generational in origin? Elsewhere we have undertaken multivariate analyses that include age as a variable.[23] The results provide only limited support for the generational hypothesis. Space limitations preclude a detailed discussion, but two summarizing points may be worth making. First, although some generational differences are found in responses to this survey, they consistently tend to account for *less* of the variance than the categories of "Vietnam policy position" described here. Second, differences between generations do not always fall into the neat pattern sometimes suggested by the thesis of "the Munich generation versus the Vietnam generation." Thus, the often-articulated argument that the basic cleavages on foreign policy issues in this country pit the world views of an older generation of "cold warriors" against those of their "dovish" offspring is an oversimplification and, in some important respects, inaccurate.

If the data and our interpretations of them are valid, the findings of this article may have significant implications for the task of rebuilding a workable consensus in support of American foreign policy.[24] The consensus may have crumbled quickly as a result of Vietnam; our data suggest that it will not be easily reconstructed. Indeed, they help to explain why Presidents Nixon and Ford failed in their explicit efforts

[23] Holsti and Rosenau, "Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation on Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, forthcoming.

[24] For a similar conclusion based on different kinds of data, see James Chace, "Is a Foreign Policy Consensus Possible?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57 (Fall 1978), 1-16.

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to rebuild a shared, nationwide perspective in which détente was to serve as a unifying concept in much the same way that the Truman-Acheson-Kennan policy of containment served earlier generations. Moreover, the split that occurred over the meaning of détente in both major political parties during the election campaign of 1976 is not surprising in the light of our findings. For it is not just that we found deep cleavages among our respondents; the more significant point is that these differences appear to be embedded within and sustained by well-defined clusters of supporting beliefs that extend from conceptions of the international system to the most effective means by which the United States should pursue its foreign policy goals.

Coherent and internally consistent belief systems tend to be self-perpetuating. Because of the ambiguity and uncertainty that characterize so many important issues in international relations, leaders with competing belief systems are likely to see what they expect and want to see in the course of world affairs. Those who maintain that the domino theory is a fact of international life, for example, will find that events in Southeast Asia or Africa sustain their beliefs, whereas those who doubt its validity point to developments elsewhere as evidence. Such illustrations could be multiplied many times over. The point is that these competing conceptions of international politics are unlikely to change soon or casually. It may well take some dramatic international developments—on the scale of another Pearl Harbor or Vietnam War—to bring about rapid convergence of a new set of unifying beliefs about international relations and American foreign policy.[25]

[25] That is not to say that belief systems only change suddenly and as a result of great calamities. Alexander L. George has shown that the beliefs of Harry Truman and many of his advisers during the early postwar years changed gradually, and initially at the level of beliefs about tactics—for example, on how best to secure Soviet postwar cooperation. It was only many months after the end of the war that Truman and his advisers came to question and then discard some of the more optimistic elements of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "grand design" for postwar cooperation among the United States, Russia, England, and China. See Alexander L. George, "The Role of Cognitive Beliefs in the Legitimation of a Long-Range Foreign Policy: The Case of F. D. Roosevelt's Plan for Postwar Cooperation with the Soviet Union" (paper presented at the Conference on Approaches to Decision-Making, Oslo, August 9-12, 1977).

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AGENDA SETTING AND BARGAINING POWER:

The Mexican State versus Transnational Automobile Corporations

By DOUGLAS C. BENNETT and KENNETH E. SHARPE*

I. Introduction

IN this paper, we will explore the often conflictual bargaining relations between transnational corporations (TNCs) and the host governments of less developed countries (LDCs). Our attention will focus on the issues of agenda setting and the sources of bargaining power in a specific case—the conflict that surrounded the creation of the Mexican automobile industry (1960-1964).[1]

When the administration of Adolfo López Mateos took office in December 1958, there was no significant automobile industry in Mexico. All cars sold in Mexico were either imported whole or as CKD (completely knocked-down) kits that needed only to be assembled. The new government considered the industry to be an important candidate for import substitution, one that—through the manifold forward and backward linkages of auto manufacture—could help to reinvigorate a growth strategy that was showing signs of having exhausted its "easy stage." When the automobile firms that did exist in Mexico showed no inclination to increase the scope of their operations, the government of López Mateos sought to use the state's power to compel the local

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[1] Much of the data in this paper are drawn from personal interviews with executives of the automobile industry and with government officials (in Nacional Financiera, Banco de México, and the Ministries of Finance and of Industry and Commerce) who were active in the bargaining during period under discussion. The article is concerned only with automobile policy; truck policy, however, raises similar considerations and in some cases was regulated in a similar way. A number of the issues discussed here will be more fully developed in a larger work now in progress.

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manufacture of a substantial portion of each vehicle. In view of the size of the Mexican automobile market and the prevailing economies of scale in the industry, the government wanted to limit the domestic industry to very few firms. Because of the intense competition for new markets in the international automobile industry, however, the issue of limiting the number of firms—a matter of the structure of the industry—became a particularly controversial one in the bargaining that ensued between the Mexican Government and the major transnational automobile firms. Other proposals put forward by the Mexican Government—among them certain restrictions on the behavior of the firms that would constitute the industry and on the ownership of these firms—also became issues of contention because the firms believed them to be a threat to their global strategies. Other proposals were not so open to dispute, however. The transnational firms mobilized their power to resist the more uncongenial proposals; on some issues, including the key issue of limiting the number of firms, they succeeded.

In what has become the classic formulation, Charles Kindleberger conceptualized the relationships between transnational firms and the governments of the host countries with regard to direct investment as one of bilateral monopoly: one buyer and one seller of a foreign investment project. "In a typical situation, a company earns more abroad than the minimum it would accept and a country's net social benefits from the company's presence are greater than the minimum *it* would accept . . . with a wide gap between the maximum and minimum demands by the two parties."[2] Thus viewed, the outside limits of acceptability could be located by means of economic theory but the precise terms of the investment would be a function of the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties. Equilibrium analysis must give way to power analysis; economics to political science.

This balance-of-bargaining-power approach has proved to be a useful conceptualization in studies of relations between TNCs and the governments of their host countries,[3] but it is marred by certain recurrent

[2] Charles Kindleberger and Bruce Herrick, *Economic Development* (3d ed., New York: McGraw-Hill 1977), 320.

[3] Among recent literature on this subject, see Theodore H. Moran, "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas," *International Organization*, XXXII (Winter 1978), 79-100; Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975); Edith T. Penrose, *The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry* (London: Allen and Unwin 1968); Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises* (New York: Basic Books 1971), chap. 3; Raymond F. Mikesell, ed., *Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-Host Country Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1971), chap. 2. For one of the few case

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weaknesses that show its kinship with the pluralist approach to power in American political science. We will focus our attention on two key issues in particular:

(1) Studies utilizing the balance-of-bargaining-power framework have tended to take the *agenda of bargaining* as given. They have concentrated solely on those issues that happen to be topics of conflict and have failed to ask how this agenda was set. Which actors and which interests have been included in the bargaining, and which have been excluded? Why are some issues and not others contested by the parties to the bargaining?

(2) There are weaknesses as well in explaining the *outcomes* of bargaining encounters. Sometimes there is a failure to distinguish between *potential* power and *actual* power, and thus a failure to explore obstacles to the full utilization of potential power. Of equal importance is a tendency to conceptualize potential power as consisting simply in each actor's possession of certain resources. That approach gives little consideration to the relationships or circumstances that may allow a particular attribute to serve as a source of potential power.

II. Agenda Setting

Like the behavioral/pluralist approach to the study of power (to which they perhaps owe unwitting allegiance), studies of bargaining conflicts between TNCs and the LDCs' governments have tended to overlook questions of agenda setting. These studies have accorded consideration solely to overt, "visible" conflicts. They have ignored the question of why some issues and not others became subjects of bargaining and conflict. Bachrach and Baratz's discussion of the "other face of power" first called the attention of political scientists to the questions of agenda setting; they were concerned with the utilization of power to prevent some *issues* from ever forming part of the bargaining agenda.[4] There are other considerations in agenda setting that are equally important, however. Instead of excluding certain issues from the bargaining agenda, some key *actors* may be excluded. As a consequence, their particular concerns and interests may not be articulated unless some other actor has reason to put them forward. In cases where the state is involved in a bargaining situation, it may—for reasons that

studies of a manufacturing industry, see Gary Gereffi, "Drug Firms and Dependency in Mexico: The Case of the Steroid Hormone Industry," *International Organization*, XXXII (Winter 1978), 237-86.

[4] Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56 (December 1962), 947-52.

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have to do with its social foundations—speak only for certain classes. In Mexico, for example, labor and national entrepreneurs both had interests that were deeply affected by the policy toward the automobile industry. Nevertheless, the bargaining over that policy principally involved only the Mexican Government and the major transnational automobile firms that were based in the United States. The voice of labor was completely excluded, and national entrepreneurs played only a minor role. The exclusion of these actors did not necessarily entail the exclusion of their interests, however: in the bargaining, the Mexican state did articulate some of the interests of the bourgeoisie, though the interests of labor went largely unrepresented.

Noting how and why certain actors (and their interests) are excluded from the bargaining provides one kind of insight into the formation of the bargaining agenda, but there is a further important point to be made about agenda setting. In focusing strictly on overt, visible conflicts—and in taking these issues as the given agenda of bargaining —studies using the balance-of-bargaining-power approach have tended to understate the areas of agreement between TNCs and the LDCs' governments. In studies that concentrate solely on points over which there is conflict, the two actors are often presented as if they were antagonists across the board. The bargaining agenda can be more fully and deeply understood if we attend to areas of agreement (over which there is little or no need to bargain) as well as to areas of disagreement. All the interests of the actors included in the bargaining must be explicated in order to locate points of *conflict* and of *convergence* among them.

In so proceeding, we regard interests as having an objective (or "real") basis. A careful examination of the goals and circumstances of each actor will reveal its fundamental interests. By contrast, the standard procedure of the pluralist approach to power considers interests to be merely subjective: an actor's interests are whatever it says they are, and no further analysis or explication is sought.[5] In basic outline, the interests of our two central actors seem straightforward: the automobile TNCs wanted to maximize broad international earnings, while the Mexican Government sought to promote industrial growth. But there were a number of strategies by which each could have pursued its central goal; thus, subjective considerations entered into the formation of these interests as well. The adoption of particular strategies was not

[5] For a discussion of the concept of "interest" in analyses of power, and a critique of purely subjective conceptions, see Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan 1974).

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a matter of purely voluntary choice by the actors; rather, it was shaped by the national and international contexts in which the actors found themselves. An examination of the bases of the interests of these actors will not only allow us to locate the points at which these interests converge and conflict (constituting the bargaining agenda), but also to anticipate how changes in the contexts of action prompt changes of strategy and interest.

THE INTERESTS OF TNCS AND THEIR RELATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

Two of the central characteristics of the international automobile industry in the late 1950s and early 1960s were its high (and increasing) concentration and the internationalization of competition among the surviving firms.

In the very earliest years of the automobile industry, literally hundreds of firms were producing cars in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and other industrialized countries. The assembly line and other scale-of-production economies, however, and the substantial degree of risk in the industry, served to promote steadily increasing concentration.[6] In the United States, the number of firms producing automobiles dropped from nine to four in the two decades following World War II. In Europe, a similar process of concentration was taking place; each major producing country tended to have one national firm that competed against a number of smaller foreign (usually American) subsidiaries.[7] The Japanese automobile industry was later in developing, coming to maturity only very late in the 1950s; but here, too, four firms accounted for 82 percent of production by 1961; further concentration was actively promoted by the government. By 1973, the worldwide process of concentration had reached the point where two firms (General Motors and Ford) were responsible for over 40 percent of total automobile sales; the eight largest firms produced about 85 percent.[8]

Changes in the shape of competition among the major automobile producers have been both a cause and a consequence of this increasing concentration. Prior to World War II and extending into the 1950s, firms sought to take advantage of economies of scale through longer

[6] On the role that risk plays in the automobile industry, see Lawrence J. White, *The Automobile Industry Since 1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), 7-9, 44-49.

[7] Rhys Owen Jenkins, *Dependent Industrialization in Latin America: The Automotive Industry in Argentina, Chile and Mexico* (New York: Praeger 1977), 20.

[8] The largest eight, in order, were G.M., Ford, Chrysler, Fiat, Volkswagen, Toyota, Nissan, and Renault. "New Strategies for a World Auto Market," *Business Week*, November 24, 1973, p. 38.

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production runs in order to lower costs. Subsequently, non-price forms of competition have predominated. In the United States in particular, annual model changes and the need to supply a full range of models have been important factors in increasing concentration.[9] Until the mid-1950s, furthermore, the major producers enjoyed a well-protected market in their home base and competed internationally only to the extent of exporting assembled vehicles to less developed countries. The American firms, whose home market was not as protected and who had substantial foreign assembly and manufacturing operations (particularly in Europe), constituted a significant exception to this pattern. Since the mid-1950s (i.e., since the return of a buyer's market), however, there has been a substantial interpenetration among the leading producing countries. In Europe, it was facilitated by the E.E.C., while in the United States it manifested itself by the invasion of the market by European and Japanese small cars.

In the developing countries, this internationalization of competition signaled the end of the geographic division of markets among the major producers (the U.S. firms having previously concentrated on Latin America, and the French and British firms on their former colonies, and so forth). The slowdown in growth of the major industrialized markets led first the European firms (spearheaded by Volkswagen) and later the Japanese firms to begin a worldwide export drive. U.S. hegemony in Latin America was threatened, and this area "became a battleground in the competitive struggle within the automobile industry."[10]

As it turned out, the new interest of European and Japanese firms in Latin America coincided with the decision of a number of Latin American governments, including Mexico's, to promote domestic manufacturing of automobiles.

THE STATE'S INTERESTS AND THE MEXICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

The problem of the interests of the state is particularly difficult conceptually, especially in view of the prevailing tendency (following Weber) to identify the state in terms of means rather than of purposes. A full theory of the state is beyond our scope here, but such a theory would need to view the state as having distinct and discernible interests. These interests can not simply be deduced *a priori* (from the "nature of the capitalist state," for example), but must be explained

[9] White (fn. 6). See also J. A. Menge, "Style Change Costs as a Market Weapon," *Quarterly Economic Journal*, Vol. 76 (November 1962), 632-47.
[10] Jenkins (fn. 7), 49.

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by the historical manner in which a state comes to rest on particular social class foundations and by the manner in which it institutionalizes solutions to problems in the domestic and international political economy.[11] What, then, were the outlines of the Mexican state's interests?

By 1958, the policy of import substitution was firmly entrenched in Mexico's strategy of economic growth. It had started with the insulation of its domestic market during the Depression and World War II; following the war, a policy apparatus (import licenses, tariffs) was instituted to maintain the protection of the domestic market. Between 1940 and 1960, Mexico's G.N.P. increased at an annual rate of 6.3 percent, with the manufacturing sector (at an average annual growth rate of 7.7 percent), setting the pace.

The particular character of Mexico's strategy of import substitution was conditioned by the changing social foundations of the Mexican regime—especially its attitude toward the domestic private sector, labor, and foreign investment. Despite the strains of social radicalism in the Mexican revolution, primary reliance for investments for economic growth had been placed on the private sector. Lacking a national bourgeoisie that could undertake the necessary entrepreneurial activities, the state deliberately created such a class (one which, as it grew, became increasingly capable of influencing governmental policy).[12] Official policy encouraged private investment in a number of ways: corporate and personal income taxes were kept low; an orthodox monetary policy (*desarrollo establizador*), adopted in 1954, allowed the government to finance its expenditures in an essentially non-inflationary manner through the use of complex reserve requirements and selective credit controls that applied to the private banking system; the state provided long-term, low-interest loans through state investment banks and made investments in infrastructure and basic industries (steel, petroleum refining); and government policies allowed for the emergence of a skewed pattern of income distribution through which an affluent upper middle class of sufficient size spurred import-substituted consumer-goods industries despite low per capita income. Labor peace was maintained politically through the corporatist organization of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the co-optation of labor leaders, and occasional repression. The resulting low wages and relative docility of urban and rural workers helped to encourage con-

[11] For a fuller elaboration, see Bennett and Sharpe, "The State as Banker and as Entrepreneur: The Last Resort Character of the Mexican State's Economic Interventions, 1917–1970," *Comparative Politics*, forthcoming.

[12] For a more detailed discussion, see *ibid*.

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tinued high rates of investment.[13] Thus, while the national bourgeoisie was becoming an increasingly important actor whose interests had to be taken into account by the state, labor and its interests were usually excluded; this pattern was to characterize the bargaining in the auto industry in the early 1960s.

The Mexican state served domestic business interests in another important way: the revolutionary heritage had made economic nationalism a hallmark of government policy for more than fifty years. In some sectors—natural resources, banking, insurance, transportation, communications, and so forth—foreign investment was excluded altogether. Such was not the case in manufacturing: import substitution, particularly as it moved into more sophisticated goods (such as automobiles), required the technology, management capabilities, and marketing skills of transnational corporations. Since 1950, however, the official emphasis toward foreign investment in manufacturing has increasingly been on Mexicanization. Foreign investment is required to be associated with a firm the majority of whose capital is Mexican; this policy allows the participation of TNCs in the economy while preserving a role for the national bourgeoisie.[14]

THE MEXICAN STATE AND THE AUTO TRANSNATIONALS: CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The reliance on private investment, the political control of labor, and the expanding middle class of consumers proved attractive to foreign investment, Mexicanization notwithstanding. After the Second World War, as the policy of import substitution coincided with the expansionary thrust of U.S. transnational corporations, direct foreign investment in manufacturing increased rapidly—from $32 million to $602 million between 1940 and 1960. In the automobile industry and other manufacturing, there was a particularly strong convergence of interests between the government's economic policy and the corporate strategies of the transnational firms.

The government had encouraged the *assembly* of vehicles from im-

[13] Details may be found in Roger D. Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1971): Susan Eckstein, *Poverty of Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977); William P. Glade, Jr. and Charles Anderson, *The Political Economy of Mexico* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1968).

[14] On Mexican policy toward foreign investment, see Harry K. Wright, *Foreign Enterprise in Mexico* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1971); and Douglas Bennett, Morris Blachman, and Kenneth Sharpe, "Mexico and Multinational Corporations: An Explanation of State Action," in Joseph Grunwald, ed., *Latin America and World Economy: A Changing International Order* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1978).

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ported CKD kits as early as 1925. Ford took advantage of the modest tariff reductions offered and began assembly in 1926; General Motors followed suit in 1937; and a Mexican firm, Fábricas Auto-Mex, started assembling Chryslers in 1938. When import substitution was adopted as a conscious strategy after World War II, import quotas and additional tariff advantages promoted the creation of a number of other assembly operations. There was little conflict of interest here: shipment of parts in CKD kits still allowed the longer production runs (and lower per-unit costs) in the TNCs' home plants which the stiffened international competition required. In auto manufacture, economies of scale are very much lower in assembly operations than they are in the fabrication of motors or in body stamping. In addition, domestic (Mexican) assembly resulted in some economies in transportation costs.[15] When the government's policy moved from a concern with assembly toward an interest in the manufacture of vehicles, however, the convergence of interest between the Mexican state and the transnational automobile firms began to disintegrate.

The policy started to change when the López Mateos Administration came to power in December 1958. The growth "miracle" that had been sustained for nearly twenty years was in serious difficulty. The "easy stage" of import substitution was facing exhaustion: Mexico had already initiated the domestic manufacture of many simple consumer goods, and investments were needed in certain industrial sectors if growth was to continue. The attention of economic policy makers focused on a number of candidates, among them the automobile industry.

The Mexican automobile industry in 1958 consisted of eleven firms that were operating assembly plants. In addition, a small number of assembled vehicles were imported by a few other companies. The Mexican consumer could choose from among 44 makes and 117 models. Ford, General Motors, and Fábricas Auto-Mex dominated the industry; between them, they accounted for three-quarters of the automobiles sold. Ford and G.M. were 100 percent foreign-owned subsidiaries; Fábricas Auto-Mex, long wholly owned by the Azcárraga family, sold one-third of its equity to Chrysler in 1959. The other assembly plants were smaller and wholly Mexican-owned; they operated under licenses from foreign manufacturers.

A number of considerations suggested that the automobile industry be a candidate for the implementation of the new policy. Domestic manufacture of automobiles (as opposed to their mere assembly) would

[15] Jenkins (fn. 7), 39-40.

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stimulate a broad array of other industries through backward and forward linkage; it would be expected to further not only an auto-parts industry, but also the sectors that would serve it: machine tools, forgings, paint, glass, steel and aluminum, plastics, and so forth. Automobile manufacturing would thus create a large number of new jobs. There would be savings in foreign exchange: imports of parts and finished vehicles accounted for approximately 11 percent of Mexico's total import bill during the 1950s; foreign ownership of the major firms (with resultant profit remittances) tended to exacerbate this problem. The fact that Argentina and Brazil had already moved to start up their own automobile manufacture set an example, but also constituted a threat; if Mexico did not follow suit, these countries might pressure Mexico to open its markets to their auto exports under the terms of the Latin American Free Trade Area agreements.[16]

The groundwork was done by the Committee for Planning and Development of the Automobile Industry, an interministerial technical body constituted in 1959 and headed by the state's principal development bank, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). Represented were the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the Bank of Mexico. Final responsibility for formulating and administering the policy rested with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

On the basis of considerable staff research and visits to a number of countries (including several that had recently initiated the manufacture of automobiles), but without much consultation with the transnational automobile firms—the bargaining came later—the Committee prepared and approved a report.[17] It constituted the initial policy position of the government's economic *técnicos*.

Because there were a number of these proposals, we will divide them into three types: proposals concerning the *structure* of the industry, proposals concerning the *behavior* or *conduct* of the firms, and proposals concerning the *ownership* of the firms.[18]

[16] See the statement of López Mateos's Minister of Industry and Commerce, Raúl Salinas Lozano, in *Comercio Exterior*, August 1964, pp. 547-48; and Salinas Lozano's introduction to Héctor Vázquez Tercero, *Una década de política sobre la industria automotriz* (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Tecnos 1975), 5-10.

In interviews, a number of officials of the Ministry of Commerce maintained that the balance of payments was not a primary concern (since domestic manufacture would create its own imports for machinery and raw materials). In their view, industrial growth and employment were the principal concerns.

[17] Nacional Financiera, *Elementos para una política de desarrollo de la fabricación de vehículos automotrices en México* (Mexico, D.F.: Nacional Financiera 1960).

[18] The concepts of industry structure and firm behavior are drawn from industrial organization theory: see Joe S. Bain, *Industrial Organization* (New York: Wiley 1959). The presumption underlying the theory is that structure affects firm behavior, and

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A. PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE INDUSTRY'S STRUCTURE

1. Limitation of the number of firms in the terminal industry (production of finished vehicles) to three to five firms
2. Limitation of the terminal firms to motor machining and final assembly (other manufacturing to be reserved for a supplier or auto-parts industry)
3. Creation of a central body-stamping plant.

B. PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE FIRMS' BEHAVIOR

1. Production of at least 60 percent of the content of vehicles (measured by direct cost) in Mexico
2. Limitations on the number of acceptable makes and models produced by each firm
3. Limitations on frequency of model changes (freezing of model years)
4. Standardization of certain parts.

C. PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE OWNERSHIP OF FIRMS

1. Mexican majority ownership of firms in the terminal industry
2. Mexican majority ownership of firms in the supplier industry.

These proposals followed from the government's conception of what was required to sustain economic growth, but the transnational automobile firms saw a number of the proposals as threatening their corporate strategies. The bargaining that followed the emergence of this conflict of interests unfolded in two stages. The first stage encompassed the various discussions between the firms and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce prior to the promulgation of the Manufacturing Decree of August 1962, and concerned the terms of the Decree; the second stage consisted in the submission and approval of applications by various firms to manufacture under the terms of the Decree. Issues of ownership and firm behavior were contested in the first stage. Ford, General Motors, and Fábricas Auto-Mex were the major actors: they were the only transnational auto firms who had already invested substantial capital in Mexico; together, they dominated the Mexican market. The number of firms to be admitted—the principal issue of industry structure—was discussed in both stages; consequently, all firms applying for entry (whether U.S.-based or not) participated in the negotiations.

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behavior in turn leads to performance (the type of contribution that an industry makes to the functioning of an economy) that can be judged against certain standards. I.O. theory, like economic theory more generally, considers ownership to be irrelevant, assuming a rational actor to be directing the firm. A different presumption has underlain the policies of the Mexican Government (among others) toward direct foreign investment: that the nationality of the ownership does make a difference in the firm's behavior, and thus in performance.

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The bargaining involved four closely related issues.

(1) *The requirement of 60 percent local content.* The government's interest here was clear: this requirement was to move the Mexican auto industry from *assembly* to *manufacture*, and thus to stimulate further import substitution.

The TNCs, however, were not eager to commence manufacturing operations on this basis. The new investments would be far greater than those already in assembly plants. (The TNCs who merely licensed Mexican-owned assembly operations had yet to commit any capital investment to Mexico.) The Mexican market was still quite small—only 65,000 autos and trucks in 1962; manufacturing in Mexico would mean the surrender of important economies of scale. Finally, there were serious difficulties of supply, since the existing auto-parts industry had been limited mainly to the manufacture of simple replacement parts. The creation of an adequate parts industry would be a substantial undertaking, involving considerations of quality and availability as well as of cost. In some cases, the necessary raw materials were not available at acceptable prices or levels of quality.

Surprisingly, however, the TNCs did *not* take a position in bargaining that was totally set against auto manufacturing in Mexico; the explanation lies in the emergent dynamics of internationalized competition among the firms in the world automobile oligopoly. As Knickerbocker has shown, direct foreign investment in competitive, product-pioneering, manufacturing oligopolies tends to conform to a follow-the-leader pattern of defensive investment. "Rival firms in an industry composed of a few large firms counter one another's moves by making similar moves themselves" as a risk-minimizing strategy.[19] When one firm in the oligopoly makes an investment, other firms defend their positions by making similar investments. In the present case, the Mexican Government (rather than an independent investment decision by one of the firms) triggered the process; as soon as one of the firms agreed (early in the policy-making process, Ford had expressed a willingness to commence manufacturing under the right conditions), the other firms were quick to follow. Eighteen firms submitted applications when the final Decree stipulating automobile manufacturing was promulgated in August 1962.[20] Thus, although it may not have

[19] Frederick T. Knickerbocker, *Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise* (Boston: Harvard University School of Business Administration 1973), 1. Cf. Jenkins (fn. 7), 40-42. For a discussion of oligopolistic reaction in another industry in Mexico, see Gary Gereffi (fn. 3), 271-72.

[20] The same pattern of oligopolistic reaction is to be seen all over Latin America. When Brazil imposed its manufacturing requirements in 1956, 11 firms commenced

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been in the interests of the individual firms to commence manufacturing operations in Mexico, they were prepared to do so rather than risk the possibility of that market's being conceded to a competitor.

Consequently, the requirement that, on average, 60 percent of each vehicle be manufactured in Mexico never became an issue of contention in the bargaining between the Mexican state and the transnational automobile firms.[21]

(2) *Limiting the number of firms—the central issue of the industry's structure.* Strictly limiting the number of firms to no more than five was a key provision of the Nacional Financiera Report; it became the most important one in the bargaining. This proposal constituted the Mexican Government's attempt to learn from the mistakes of unrestricted entry of automobile manufacturers in Brazil and Argentina (eleven and twenty-one, respectively). The Mexican market was not expected to exceed a few hundred thousand vehicles annually within the next decade. Allowing the market to become fragmented among many firms, each with a multiplicity of makes and models, would result in overcapitalization and excess capacity in the industry, and would lead to higher consumer prices and thus lower demand. The industry could achieve the significant economies of scale available in automobile manufacture only if the number of firms could be limited.[22]

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manufacturing operations; when Argentina announced its policy in 1959, 22 firms made the necessary investments; in Chile, 20; in Venezuela, 16; in Peru, 13. Jenkins (fn. 7), 56.

[21] It is worth mentioning that this requirement was made palatable by being considerably lower than the mandatory levels of local content that had been required by Brazil and Argentina a few years earlier, as well as certain attractive tax exemptions. On the latter, see Jenkins (fn. 7), 54-55. Jenkins takes pains to argue, however, that these tax incentives themselves were not responsible for the large number of firms that were willing to commence manufacturing. With regard to the 60 percent of local content, it was the intention of the Mexican policy makers to start at this lower level in order to minimize the inflationary consequences of the transition to domestic manufacture (a low level of inflation being an important goal of the government's policy). With the industry's growth in size and efficiency, a gradual increase to higher levels was expected.

[22] On these economies of scale, see White (fn. 6), 38-53, and Jenkins (fn. 7), 265-71. Even such otherwise staunch defenders of free trade as I.M.D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott advocate the use of investment controls by developing countries in order to limit the number of firms in an industry with significant economies of scale; they single out the automobile industry as an example. *Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study* (London: Oxford University Press 1970), 342.

Another proposal put forward in the Nacional Financiera Report—the establishment of a single, central body-stamping plant—was aimed at the same goal. The plant, to be developed by Altos Hornos, the state's steel firm, would make it possible for all the manufacturers to use the same body stamping presses, with only the stamping dies needing to be changed for each firm. If models were extended for several years each, these dies could be used to nearly full efficiency.

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In view of the gains in efficiency, none of the automobile producers opposed such a limitation on the number of firms in principle, though perhaps the American manufacturers were made uncomfortable by a governmental stipulation of this sort. What worried each of them was the prospect that *it* might be one of the excluded ones—a prospect that was of particular concern to the American firms which already had a major stake in the Mexican market. If the Mexican Government were to provide a place for its state-owned auto firm (Diesel Nacional), favor producers of small cars, attempt to diversify the country's sources of foreign investment, and give preference to Mexican-owned firms—all measures that the government had indicated it was inclined to pursue—then a limitation on the number of firms would surely spell exclusion for one or more of the American producers. Consequently, the issue of exclusion became a highly disputed one in the bargaining. In the first stage of the negotiations, the American firms lobbied in order to remove from the Decree any specific limit on the number of firms that would be permitted. In the second stage, a large number of firms took steps to insure that *they* would not be excluded.

(3) *The issues of firm behavior.* Like the proposed limitation on the number of firms, various measures—standardization of parts, freezing of models, limitations on acceptable makes and models—were proposed in the Nacional Financiera Report to insure greater efficiency. Each of them would increase the volume of each part or unit manufactured, and thus allow greater economies of scale. These issues became controversial in the first stage of the bargaining because they threatened the dominant competitive strategies of the U.S. firms. By contrast with European and Japanese companies (whose competition was just becoming a threat to them at home and in Latin America), the U.S. firms favored a strategy of product differentiation based on annual model changes. They also stressed the differences in performance characteristics of their motors; the latter were leading candidates for standardization.

(4) *The issue of ownership.* The proposal by the Nacional Financiera Report that all of the firms be more than 50 percent Mexican-owned reflected the longstanding nationalist orientation of the Mexican state and its desire to encourage and protect Mexican private investment. Furthermore, participation of Mexican investors might help to ensure that the interests of the TNC's subsidiary in Mexico would not be sacrificed to the global rationality of the parent company when the two were in conflict.[23] This issue, too, was negotiated in the first stage

[23] On the sometimes dubious logic of equity participation as a means to control TNC

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and came into sharp contention because it threatened a basic operating procedure of two of the American firms—one hundred percent ownership of foreign subsidiaries. Ford and General Motors had adopted a worldwide policy of not entering into joint ventures with foreign nationals; an exception in Mexico might lead to a similar insistence on joint-venture status by other developing countries.

Although technically an issue of industry structure, the proposed restrictions on vertical integration of the terminal firms (limiting them to assembly operations, machining of engine blocks, and any manufacturing operations in which they had been engaged prior to the Decree) were also aimed partly at ownership. Such restrictions would reserve a place for the national bourgeoisie in the manufacture of auto parts,[24] particularly important if the American TNCs prevailed on the issue of ownership. The transnational firms opposed this limitation as well, though with much less vehemence. It would make them dependent on the quality, price, and availability of Mexican-made parts, but it did not threaten their entrenched worldwide competitive strategies. The proposed requirement would limit them to approximately the same array of activities in which they were engaged in the United States (where, because of risk-sharing considerations, a large number of parts are supplied by independent manufacturers).

The interests of the TNCs and the Mexican state conflicted most sharply over the proposals that concerned limiting the number of firms, certain issues of firm behavior (standardization of parts, freezing of models), and ownership restrictions. Consequently, these issues formed the major items on the bargaining agenda. Answering the questions of who prevailed, and why, requires attention to the bases of potential power and to the factors that influence an actor's ability to utilize its potential power fully in a particular contest. We will focus our attention on the issue of limiting the number of firms. Not only was this the point on which the interests of the actors diverged most sharply; it was also the one that would most seriously affect the course of the industry and the success of future governmental regulatory policy.

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behavior, see Bennett and Sharpe, "Controlling the Multinationals: The Ill Logic of Mexicanization," in Lawrence V. Gould, Jr. and Harry Targ, eds., *Global Dominance and Dependence: Readings in Theory and Research* (Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communications, forthcoming).

[24] Restrictions on vertical integration would have two other effects as well: they would encourage economies of scale by avoiding the duplication of parts manufactured in each separate terminal firm, and they would allow better regulation of the requirement of 60 percent local content by making it more difficult for the terminal industry to manipulate percentages through transfer pricing.

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III. Bargaining Power

When the Automobile Manufacturing Decree was promulgated in August 1962, it was evident that the bargaining of the U.S. transnationals had succeeded in changing considerably the proposals that had first been put forward in the Nacional Financiera Report.[25] While automobile firms producing for the Mexican market would be required to incorporate at least 60 percent of locally manufactured content in each of their vehicles, and limits were placed on the vertical integration of the firms, the Decree required nothing in the way of Mexicanization of the terminal firms. The other proposals regarding firm behavior had been dropped. Most importantly, the Decree set no explicit limit on the number of firms that would be allowed to operate in Mexico: 10 of the 18 firms that had applied were approved. (See Table.)

What had transpired in the bargaining? What was the relative power of the actors? How and why did they exercise (or not exercise) the potential power at their disposal?

SOURCES OF POTENTIAL POWER

The relative power of actors ought not to be gauged merely from the outcome of a conflict. Such a *post hoc* analysis of power tends to exclude any meaningful analysis of *why* a particular outcome occurred, and forecloses the possibility that one actor had potential power it did not exercise.[26] In the pluralist approach, potential power is generally conceptualized as consisting in the actors' possession of certain *resources*. The following passage from a distinguished work in the balance-of-bargaining-power literature illustrates the approach:

> The foreign investor offers capital, know-how (technological and managerial), some opportunities of commercialization, and, among other possibilities, that of a certain structure of industrial development. The host country offers access to the home market (particularly in the manufacturing sector), access to natural resources (as in extractive industries), and access to special comparative advantages (such as cheap labour).[27]

Variations in these resources may well explain differences in bargaining power. In the Mexican case, the automobile companies had capital,

[25] For the full text of the Decree, see *Diario Oficial de la Federación*, August 25, 1962.

[26] For a recent employment of these concepts of potential and actual power in a general approach to international relations, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 11, 53, and passim.

[27] Constantine V. Vaitsos, *Intercounty Income Distribution and Transnational Enterprises* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1974), 119.

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Name of Firm and Date of First Approval	*Make*	*Ownership at Time of First Approval*	*Subsequent Changes in Status*
DIESEL NACIONAL (December 1962)	Renault	100% domestic (Mexican State)	1978: 40% equity sold to Renault
FÁBRICAS AUTO-MEX (December 1962)	Chrysler	33% foreign 67% domestic	1970-1971: Chrysler increased its holdings to 99%; name changed to CHRYSLER DE MÉXICO
FORD MOTOR CO. (December 1962)	Ford	100% foreign	None
GENERAL MOTORS DE MÉXICO (December 1962)	General Motors	100% foreign	None
PROMEXA (December 1962)	Volkswagen	100% domestic	1963: 100% equity sold to Volkswagen A.G.; name changed to VOLKSWAGEN DE MÉXICO
VEHÍCULOS AUTOMOTORES MEXICANOS (December 1962)	American Motors	100% domestic	1963: 40% equity sold to American Motors; remaining 60% acquired by Mexican state (SOMEX)
IMPULSORA MEXICANA AUTOMOTRIZ (January 1963)	Borgward	100% domestic	1963: name changed to FÁBRICA NACIONAL DE AUTOMÓVILES 1969: ceased operations
REO DE MÉXICO (January 1963)	Toyota	100% domestic	1963: ceased operations
REPRESENTACIONES DELTA (Mid-1963)	D.K.W.	100% domestic	1964: ceased operations
NISSAN MEXICANA (Late 1964)	Datsun	100% foreign	None

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technology, and administrative and marketing know-how; the government controlled access to the domestic market, and could (through tax policy, its control of the labor force, and so forth) influence the price of various factors of production. An additional resource that strengthened the hand of the government was its increasing technical expertise, which had been gained by careful study of automobile manufacturing in other countries.[28]

It is not an adequate approach, however, to conceive of potential power simply in terms of the possession of certain resources. What is needed as well is an understanding of how an actor's potential power is shaped by the complex web of relationships—relationships with actors not directly party to the bargaining—in which each actor is enmeshed.[29] The relationships in which we are interested in the present case are conceptualized somewhat differently in world system theory,[30] in dependency theory,[31] and in models of the international power structure and of international organization[32]—to mention a few of the more prominent contemporary analyses. There are important issues separating these approaches, particularly with regard to how asymmetries in global relationships are conceptualized and made subject to empirical analysis. For the purposes of the present investigation, we intend to avoid entering the lists on behalf of any one approach by limiting our attention to the particular set of international and transnational relationships that bear on the case at hand. Most of them have been introduced in Part II (Agenda Setting). We will be especially interested in the relationships among the transnational corporations in the international automobile industry, the relationships of these transnational firms to domestic firms in Mexico, the relationships between the Mexican state and the home governments of the TNCs, the relationships

[28] It is important to note that this resource was different in kind from the other resources since it could not (as the other resources could) be used or withheld as a sanction. It was an infra-resource rather than an instrumental resource; it allowed other resources to be utilized to better advantage. On the notion of infra-resources, see Mary F. Rogers, "Instrumental and Infra-Resources: The Bases of Power," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79 (May 1974), 1418-33.

[29] This myopia arises partly from the strictly dyadic character of the standard pluralist conception of power ("*A* has power over *B*," etc.). Such an approach abstracts the actors from all other significant relationships in which they are engaged, and thus seeks to locate potential power apart from these other significant relationships.

[30] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press 1974).

[31] See, among others, Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60 (May 1970), 231-36; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1979).

[32] On these, see Keohane and Nye (fn. 26), 42-49 and 54-58.

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between the Mexican state and certain domestic social classes—especially the bourgeoisie, and the relationships among various ministries and agencies of the Mexican state.

We will argue that the structure of these particular relationships (1) defines what constitutes a power resource, (2) determines when such resources can be employed or withheld, and (3) determines the potential for the entry of new actors into the conflict as allies or as antagonists.

(1) *The structure of relationships defines what constitutes a power resource.* One danger of regarding potential power as consisting simply of the possession of certain resources is the tendency to an easy but dangerously misleading supposition that power resources are "fungible"—that the possession of power resources gives one a generalized capacity which can be employed whenever and wherever one pleases.[33] Power resources are not entirely interchangeable from context to context, or from contest to contest. What serves as a basis of power in one situation may be worthless, perhaps even a liability, in another. This lack of fungibility of power resources is commonly paid due obeisance: what constitutes a power resource depends on the context—on who is trying to get whom to do what; the scope and domain must be specified.[34] Quite obviously, the TNCs' control over automotive technology gave them potential power only in a context where it was *desired* that automotive products be domestically manufactured. But it is not sufficient (though power discussions rarely go further) merely to stipulate the context-dependency of power resources. Rather than delimiting the appropriate context by fiat, we need an analysis that shows how and why certain resources come to serve as bases of power in particular circumstances. Such an analysis will have to feature the specification of relationships of dependency and interdependency in which the

[33] The phrase is from Talcott Parsons, whose suggestion that power be seen on the analogy of money leads to the erroneous supposition of the fungibility of power. See Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," in *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press 1967). For a corrective, see David Baldwin, "Money and Power," *Journal of Politics,* XXXIII (August 1971), 578-614.

[34] Thus, for example, Robert Dahl: "The domain of an actor's influence consists of the other actors influenced by him. The scope of an actor's influence refers to the matters on which he can influence them. . . . Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless." Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1976), 33.

For a recent and thorough review of the power literature that pays particular attention to the questions of the fungibility and context dependency of power resources, see David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics,* XXXI (January 1979), 161-94.

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actors are enmeshed, and which serve to constitute certain resources as bases of power.

To return to our example, if we say that Mexico's need for automotive technology is what made the TNCs' possession of such technology a basis of power, we need to ask the further question how and why Mexico's need arose; we must not take it for granted. Over several decades, the Mexican state had committed itself to rapid economic growth; its continuation had become a central basis of the regime's legitimacy. Once industrialization of import substitution had been adopted as the growth strategy, it had requisites of its own. When the strategy was threatened with exhaustion in the late 1950s, the state decreed that the automobile sector should commence domestic manufacture. These are important features of the context, but they do not explain why the transnational corporations were needed for technology (and investments). A functional, if not stylish, car of Mexican design was probably not beyond the bounds of feasibility.[35] In order to understand Mexico's need for the TNCs, it is necessary to be aware of the nature of the class structure that had evolved under import substitution, and particularly of the relationship between the Mexican state and the national bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie had been nurtured for thirty years to pace economic growth; its increasing size and power and its centrality to the growth project made it one of the prime social foundations of the state. Import substitution had been impelled by the burgeoning consumer demand of this national bourgeoisie and of the middle classes (professionals, managers, petite bourgeoisie, and so forth) that had been spawned with it. However, these classes wanted what they had become accustomed to: modern, U.S.-style products. A Mexican car would not have been acceptable. The relationship of the Mexican state to its national bourgeoisie thus demanded that Mexico needed the sort of automobile industry that only the transnational firms could provide.

If the context established Mexico's "need" for the technology of the automobile TNCs, we may then ask how easily the Mexican state could have changed those features of the context that defined the need and thus constituted the technology as a power resource. Clearly, not very easily: fundamental changes in the strategy of economic growth and in the domestic class structure would have been required.[36]

[35] It is noteworthy that the state-owned Diesel Nacional S.A. had already begun work on a medium truck of its own design. Some of its components were imported, some were manufactured under license, and a Detroit engineering firm had been consulted; but it was nonetheless a Mexican truck and proved to be a successful venture.

[36] In Keohane and Nye's terminology, Mexico was both "sensitive" and "vulnerable"

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(2) *The structure of relationships determines when power resources can be employed or withheld.* Relationships of dependence and interdependence in which the actors are enmeshed affect the choice of their possessions and attributes that may serve as power resources in a particular conflict, but other relationships may serve to limit the actors' freedom to commit or to withhold their resources at will. The structure of relationships defining Mexico's place in the global political economy and the Mexican state's relationship to its domestic class structure decreed the need for a certain kind of automobile industry; the resources of the transnational automobile firms thus became sources of potential power. On the other hand, the pattern of competitive relationships among these transnational automobile firms (in their worldwide competition) served to constrain them from deploying these resources to their own best advantages in bargaining with the Mexican state. More precisely, the follow-the-leader pattern of defensive investment that made the firms so eager to produce for the Mexican market weakened their potential to withhold their participation if conditions and terms were not precisely to their liking. Knickerbocker has called the TNCs' proclivity to defensive investment a "trump card for the LCD": "When one member of the club makes a move, the others pant to follow; and by realizing this, the LDC is in a position to demand a high entrance fee."[37] Since the move to auto manufacture in Mexico coincided with heightened international competition, the potential power of the Mexican state was enhanced as the ability of the TNCs to withhold their resources was weakened. Had the industry been differently organized—had it, for example been characterized by collusion and strategies of mutual forebearance, the Mexican Government would not have had such substantial potential power.

In view of the pattern of competition in the international automobile industry, the Mexican state's control over access to the Mexican market was the most potent power resource available to it in the bargaining, but certain relationships constrained its ability to play this "trump card" to its fullest advantage. Most importantly, in its pursuit of industrial development by way of import substitution, Mexico had come to be dependent upon certain industrialized countries, particularly the United States, for trade and capital inflows. These relationships shaped

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to this power resource of the TNCs. "Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework" or context, and vulnerability refers to the "relative availability and costliness of the alternatives the various actors face." Keohane and Nye (fn. 26), 12-13.

[37] Knickerbocker (fn. 19), 197, 198.

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a set of needs for continued flows of trade and capital in a number of sectors that limited the state's power in the automobile sector: a favorable investment climate had to be maintained if growth was to continue. The Mexican Government was forcefully reminded of this limitation just when the automobile policy was first being formulated. In 1960–1961, relations with the United States took a turn for the worse with Mexico's refusal to submit to U.S. pressure to support the trade sanctions against the Castro regime. The U.S. Government and press criticized the "left-wing" tendencies of the López Mateos government —a perception that was reinforced by a variety of new policies toward foreign investment. Since taking office, the López Mateos Administration had nationalized the electric power industry and implemented important new policies in the petrochemical and mining sectors, which were branded as socialist by certain transnational corporations and conservative Mexican business interests. The effect was felt in a flight of capital of about $200 million between 1960 and 1961.[38] The Mexican Government thus had to be cautious in its treatment of the foreign (especially U.S.) automobile corporations, lest its policy in this sector threaten the wider growth strategy.

The Mexican state's relationship with its own national bourgeoisie also limited its ability to play this trump card of market access to fullest advantage. If some wholly foreign-owned firms were to be approved, it would have been politically disadvantageous not to show a measure of favoritism to some domestically-owned firms that were also requesting approval.

(3) *The structure of relationships determines the potential for the entry of new actors into the conflict as allies or as antagonists.* Having already established themselves in the Mexican market through their assembly operations, the three major U.S.-based firms (Ford, General Motors and Fábricas Auto-Mex) could draw on support from their consumers and employees, but more importantly from their distributors and from the suppliers of replacement parts and what few parts were procured in Mexico for original equipment. In bargaining, these major U.S. firms could (and did) call attention to the disruption that would attend their exclusion: replacement parts and service would become hard to find; the value of existing vehicles would decline; their distributors would be put out of business; and their Mexican employees would be out of work. The distributors and parts-supply firms made separate representations of these same points, but they were weak and

[38] Miguel Wionczek, *El Nacionalismo y la Invérsion Extranjera* (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo xxi Editores 1967), 240-41.

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disorganized. It was also impossible to muster a wider alliance between the transnational firms and the national bourgeoisie—for example depicting the attempt to exclude certain TNCs from the market as a general attack on private investment. This strategy had been effective in other cases of LDC-TNC bargaining,[39] but the Mexican state's clear intention to accord its national bourgeoisie special treatment in the automobile industry through the proposals for Mexicanization and for reservation of the supplier industry forestalled such an alliance.

A more formidable set of allies on which the TNCs drew were their home governments. This article is not the place in which to explore the relationships between the transnational automobile firms and their home governments.[40] However, the resources of the latter should no more be taken as given than those of the other central actors in the bargaining. They resided precisely in the ability to influence the trade and capital flows between Mexico and the industrialized countries on which Mexico had become dependent. In order to understand the potential power of these home governments we must, therefore, return to our first two points: the interdependent relationships in which Mexico was enmeshed defined the need for resources over which the home governments had a measure of control, and which thus constituted bases of potential power; and the asymmetric character of these trade and investment (inter-)dependencies meant that the home governments were likely to be more free to commit or withhold those resources than the Mexican Government was to choose whether to do without them.

FROM POTENTIAL POWER TO ACTUAL POWER

How did the two major actors—the TNCs and the Mexican Government—transform (or fail to transform) their potential power into actual power? As Keohane and Nye point out, "political bargaining is the usual means of translating potential into effects, and a lot is often

[39] For such an alliance in the bargaining over copper concessions in Chile, see Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile* (fn. 3), 190-97; for such an alliance in Venezuela in the bargaining over oil concessions, see Franklin Tugwell, *The Politics of Oil in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1975). For a general discussion of the conditions under which such alliance between TNCs and the national bourgeoisie may form, see Moran in *International Organization* (fn. 3), 93-95.

[40] For one discussion of these relationships that especially concerns European automobile firms, see Louis T. Wells, "Automobiles," in Raymond Vernon, ed., *Big Business and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974). For a discussion that illuminates certain aspects of the relationship of the U.S. and Japanese Governments toward their automobile industries, see William Chandler Duncan, *U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. 1973).

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lost in translation."[41] Our concern will remain focused on the central issue of industry structure: How did the firms prevail over the Mexican Government's efforts to limit the number of enterprises in the industry?

The mobilization of corporate power. The U.S. firms began early to mobilize their power to influence the terms of the Decree. As the NAFIN committee was preparing its report, Ford was already working on a detailed, two-volume proposal of its own. In frequent discussions with officials of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (SIC), the firms attempted to use their superior know-how to convince Mexican policy planners of the unreasonableness or impracticality of their proposals. However, on the issues of exclusion and ownership (mandatory Mexicanization would have been tantamount to exclusion of Ford and General Motors), and even on certain questions of the firms' behavior, the government *técnicos* were unmoved.[42] Distributors and parts suppliers also provided little leverage. Instead, a major key to the success of the TNCs was the support they could mobilize from the U.S. Government.

The Minister of Industry and Commerce was informed by the United States Ambassador that the Department of State would look unfavorably on the exclusion of the U.S. firms. Other high officials of the Ministry were told that any such exclusion would be viewed as a "not very friendly act."[43] Precisely *what was said*, however, is not as important as how anything said on this issue by the U.S. Government *would be understood*. Its explicit backing of the interests of these transnational firms meant that automobile policy would be linked with, and would affect, what happened in other spheres of the bilateral relationship, and that sanctions might be employed beyond those strictly under the control of the three firms.[44] In view of the strained relations over Cuba and the recent capital flight, the President, Ministers and other officials of the Mexican Government had to be particularly sensitive to the pronouncements of high corporate executives and U.S. Government officials.

[41] Keohane and Nye (fn. 26), 11. Cf. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence* (fn. 3), 169-215.

[42] It does seem, however, that they did not fully appreciate how much the pattern of oligopolistic competition strengthened their hand, nor how zealously the firms would press their cases in their eagerness to be included.

[43] A well-publicized visit by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Mann to the plant of Fábricas Auto-Mex in August 1961 made it clear that the United States was interested in the treatment of this firm (which was majority Mexican-owned), as well as of Ford and G.M.'s wholly U.S.-owned subsidiaries.

[44] Another case of U.S. Government intervention on behalf of Ford, G.M., and Chrysler over somewhat similar issues is documented in Duncan (fn. 40).

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Pressure may also have been forthcoming from the West German Government to ensure that at least one German manufacturer was approved. In any case, the desire of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to include at least one manufacturer of a small inexpensive car (*auto popular*), their unwillingness to rely wholly on the state-owned Diesel Nacional (Renault) for this purpose, and the Mexican ownership of Promexa (Volkswagen) at the time of approval were probably sufficient to assure the acceptance of Volkswagen as a licensee. (The Mexicans sold out to the German parent company a few months later.)

The acceptance of Nissan's application two years after the legal deadline for approval, however, can only be explained by looking at another relationship between a TNC and its home government.[45] The Japanese Government utilized an additional and unlikely power resource to gain approval for Nissan: cotton.

In 1963, cotton was the single most important source of foreign exchange for Mexico, accounting for earnings of US$196 million—over 20 percent of Mexico's total foreign exchange earnings.[46] In addition, taxes on cotton exports brought in about US$15 million per year.[47] About 70 percent of cotton exports went to Japan, Mexico's most important trade partner after the United States. The balance of trade between the two countries ran strongly in Mexico's favor. In 1962, for example, while Mexico's exports to Japan were valued at US$127.8 million, Mexico's imports from Japan totaled only US$22.6 million. For a number of years, the Japanese Government had been pressuring Mexico to increase its imports; it even offered a loan of US$100 million if there were some improvement in this regard.[48] The Japanese Government was therefore able to use its position as Mexico's major cotton buyer as a lever: it threatened to cut cotton imports if Nissan's application were not approved. The threat worked.

Because of its historical commitment to the national bourgeoisie, the Mexican state's capitulation in approving some wholly foreign-owned firms weakened its ability—and perhaps its resolve—to turn down applications by some firms that were wholly or majority Mexican-owned. State-owned Diesel Nacional (DINA) had been assured of a place in

[45] An application from a wholly Mexican-owned venture to manufacture Datsuns had been turned down during the normal period of application, though the approval of Reo allowed the manufacture of one Japanese make (Toyota). Since Reo failed during the first year, however, no Japanese makes were initially included in the Mexican market.

[46] Lic. Raúl Salinas Lozano, *Memoria de Labores, 1963* (Mexico, D.F.: Secretaria de Industria y Comercio 1963), 136-37.

[47] *Comercio Exterior*, May 1961, p. 287.

[48] *Comercio Exterior*, March 1963, p. 167.

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the industry from the beginning. Vehículos Automotores Mexicanos (VAM) was a well-established venture of Sociedad Mexicana de Crédito Industrial, one of the country's largest industrial development banks. Fábricas Auto-Mex's hand was strengthened by its being majority-owned by a wealthy and well-connected Mexican family. In the cases of Impulsora Mexicana Automotriz, Reo, and Representaciones Delta (all private firms, 100 percent Mexican-owned), political favoritism and perhaps bribes rather than technical competence or financial clout were responsible for their being approved when other domestically owned ventures were rejected.

In all, ten firms were approved to manufacture in Mexico, far more than the NAFIN Report had recommended and far more than the size of the Mexican market warranted. When the government realized that it would not prevail in limiting the number of firms, it pinned its hopes on competition to winnow the industry down over the next few years. To some extent, that was a vain hope: the NAFIN Report had correctly predicted that competition would not drive out subsidiaries of the transnational firms, because of the ability of these firms to cross-subsidize their various international operations. Also, steps were taken to protect the national firms (both public and private) from the size and superior resources of the foreign firms. A system of production quotas limited the output of all firms and thus ensured a share of the market for the Mexican firms—thereby further reducing the possibility of elimination through competition.

On some issues, the Mexican Government did succeed in accomplishing its goals. The firms that had been approved would be required to manufacture 60 percent of each vehicle in Mexico. Further, these firms would be limited to the machining of the motor and the final assembly of vehicles. Other manufacturing activities would be reserved for a supplier industry that needed to be created—and the burden would fall squarely on the transnational firms in the terminal industry to assist in this development.[49]

The opposition of the American firms and their allies proved sufficient to have removed from the auto decree the other key requirements concerning product differentiation—freezing of models, standardization of parts, and limits on the number of acceptable makes and models. The question of the exclusion of these firms had been a particularly sharp issue in the bargaining, and when they prevailed on

[49] In later bargaining, some of the terminal firms secured approval for more vertical integration. A number of firms now have approval to cast their own engine blocks, Volkswagen is permitted to make its own body stampings, and so forth.

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this, they won as well the right to manufacture automobiles in their accustomed manner—with product differentiation and annual model changes.

Organizational constraints on the exercise of state power. The government's proposals for rationalizing the auto industry had been undermined on certain fundamental issues—the number of firms, the ownership of the terminal industry, product differentiation. In view of the potential power of the state, it is important to ask why the state's trump card—the pattern of oligopolistic competition in the automobile industry—was largely un- or under-played.

At first glance, there is a simple and plausible answer: certain characteristics of the structure of dependence—particularly political and economic relations with the United States and Japan—allowed the TNCs to muster the support of their home governments and change the game to one in which Mexico's card was no longer trump. But it is possible that the Mexican state could have acted differently. There were alternative strategies (recognized by at least some high officials at the time) that it might have pursued to take better advantage of its potential power.

In the case of the U.S. firms, a divide-and-rule strategy could have been tried, playing one of them against the other two. Alternatively, the government could have yielded on the question of limiting the number of firms, but insisted that these firms submit to much stiffer regulations on firm behavior, such as limits on product differentiation and on ownership. In the case of Nissan, the state might have responded to the Japanese Government's pressure by negotiating for the entrance of substantial Japanese investment in some other industrial structure, or even by calling its bluff: as some Mexican officials were aware (particularly in the Finance Ministry), Japan could not easily have found suitable alternatives for the long-fibered Mexican cotton needed for its textile industry.

The point is not that these strategies would necessarily have succeeded, but rather that the Mexican state had potential power and alternative courses of action that it did not employ. Why not?

When an actor in a power conflict is a collectivity rather than a single person, there may be organizational constraints on the utilization of potential power. For *internal* reasons, the actor may not be able to draw on all of the potential power that is theoretically available to it. With a complex entity like the state, such internal constraints may stem from a lack of the organizational coordination that is necessary

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to wield its potential power to full effectiveness. In the case at hand, we must examine the relations among specific agencies and departments and the bureaucratic politics of policy formation inside the Mexican Government.[50] We will confine ourselves to three aspects of internal lack of unity.

1. Not only did the two ministries that were centrally concerned with industrial policy (the very powerful Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce), fail to coordinate their automobile policy; they were seriously at odds during much of the planning period. Prior to the López Mateos Administration, the Finance Ministry had controlled the two principal policy instruments for industrial planning—tax policy and import tariffs and quotas. Such steps as were taken to encourage greater local content in the automobile industry were the work of the Finance Ministry's capable Department of Financial Studies. When the Ministry of Industry and Commerce was reorganized in 1959, it was given control (among other measures to strengthen it) over import tariffs and quotas; questions of automobile policy became principally its concern. The Finance Ministry resisted the diminution of its control over import policy, however, and the conflict between the two ministries became quite sharp, at times requiring presidential mediation. The Director of the Department of Financial Studies (who had been in his post a number of years, and had considerable experience with the automobile industry) supported a much stronger automobile policy along the lines of the original NAFIN Report. Had there been effective coordination between these two ministries, Industry and Commerce would have had powerful support for taking a tougher line. However, Industry and Commerce proceeded alone, using import controls as its only tool. (Tax policy toward the industry was not negotiated until after the 1962 Decree, and the Finance Ministry flatly refused to grant the firms any fiscal incentives.) The making and implementing of automobile policy became a means by which Industry and Commerce established a sphere of autonomy, but the cost was a diminution of the state's effective power.[51]

[50] Cf. the discussion of divisions within the Mexican state as weakening its bargaining position vis-à-vis foreign drug companies, in Gereffi (fn. 3), 279-84. Organizational constraints *within* the TNCs themselves, while beyond the scope of this paper, are also important to a full analysis of the transformation of potential into actual power. See Gereffi, *ibid.* For a broad general discussion, see also Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1962).

[51] Parallel to this lack of coordination was the failure of Industry and Commerce to make use of the state's own automobile firm, Diesel Nacional, nominal control over

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2. There were also serious divisions inside the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The Director and Sub-Director of Industries had been deeply involved in the technical studies that preceded the bargaining. Like their counterparts in the Department of Financial Studies with whom they had developed close informal relationships (the antagonism was chiefly at the Ministerial level), they believed that a much stronger policy could be successfully carried forward. Their superiors, however, the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary, felt that moderation, and compromise with the companies, was necessary. It is difficult to know for certain why these top officials were reluctant to take a tougher position, but interviews with officials in and out of the Ministry indicate that there were several factors. For one, there was a difference of goals. While there was broad agreement in the Ministry that limiting the number of firms was important, these top officials also placed a high priority on diversification of the sources of foreign investment; hence, they were inclined to look favorably on the applications of, for example, Promexa (Volkswagen) and Nissan.

Moreover, the political situation of the Secretary and Assistant Secretary made it somewhat difficult for them to assume a tougher position in the face of corporate pressure. In the Mexican political system, the change of President every six years brings with it changes in all major policy-making posts. Although a person is unlikely to retain the same position, many move to new positions of importance.[52] Cabinet Secretaries are typically the strongest candidates for selection as the next President. Among other factors, a politician's future will depend on the immediate political consequences of his decisions in the previous sexennium—the friends and enemies he has made, the controversies in which he has been involved. Thus, the incentive to pursue risk-minimizing strategies and to judge policies narrowly in terms of their short-run political consequences is strong. Since the deleterious effects of admitting too many firms to the industry would not be felt immediately, only an unusual person would have risked a full-scale confrontation with Ford, General Motors and the U.S. Government, or with the Japanese Government—unless he had the support of the President.

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which lay with yet a third ministry, National Properties. DINA could have been a valuable source of technical and financial information about automobile manufacturing; it could have been allotted a place in the industry which would have made it a tool of industrial policy (a competitive check on the other firms). DINA's earlier troubles, however, hardly inspired confidence.

[52] Peter Smith, "Does Mexico Have a Power Elite?" in Richard S. Weinert and José Luis Reyna, eds., *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications 1977).

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Finally, there was a close connection between the Ford Company and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It was not simply a personal relationship between the manager of Ford de México and the Minister: from the very beginning of the López Mateos Administration, Ford had openly supported the Ministry's goal of moving toward the manufacturing of automobiles. In 1960, following a strategy he had recently employed in Argentina, Ford's manager put his staff to work on a lengthy feasibility report and an accompanying proposal of what Ford itself would be willing to do in Mexico. He reckoned—quite rightly—that such early cooperation would give Ford an inside track on approval and policy input that would result in a policy that the company would find amenable. How much Ford's influence was responsible for the divisions within the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and how much it was made possible by divisions already there, is difficult to determine.

3. Because of the centralization of power in the hands of a Mexican President, it is possible that his explicit direction and firm support could have forged the inter- and intra-Ministerial unity necessary to act more forcefully in putting forward a stronger automobile policy. Indeed, interviews show that a lack of direction left key officials on their own (and thus made it rational for them to pursue risk-minimizing strategies), and that specific directives to "ease up" on the transnational firms, and to give favorable consideration to applications from certain Mexican-owned firms, filtered down from the President himself at crucial points in the bargaining. In the context of the Mexican political system, only resolute guidance from the President could have fended off the pressures that were being brought to bear, and this guidance was not forthcoming.

IV. Conclusion

The bargaining conflict between the Mexican state and the transnational automobile corporations between 1960 and 1964 was only the first round of what has proved to be an ongoing struggle. There have been a number of new negotiations, the most important of which took place in 1968–1969 and again in 1976–1977; but the initial round was the most decisive encounter because it set the terms for all subsequent bargaining.

Studies of bargaining power in natural resource industries have shown that the power of the state is lowest at the time of initial bargaining because of uncertainties about the amount, quality, and costs

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of extraction of the natural resources. Once the large initial investments have been made, however, the balance of power swings dramatically in favor of the state: the uncertainties are reduced and the fixed investments are "hostage" to the LDC.[53]

In a high-technology, consumer-goods manufacturing sector such as the automobile industry, the situation is often reversed. Access to the domestic market is the state's principal basis of bargaining power, and can be used most effectively at the point of initial investment. After that, the firms are entrenched in the host country through their relationships with suppliers, distributors, labor, and consumers. Because such manufacturing enterprises are integrated into the local economy to a far higher degree than resource extractors, they establish relationships within the host country which significantly enhance their bargaining power, both by reinforcing the host country's needs for their kind of production and products and by being able to mobilize domestic allies. And so long as the industry is dependent upon external sources of technology, the possibility of nationalization by the host country is not a credible threat.

Other things being equal, then, the balance of bargaining power in such a manufacturing industry may with time shift toward the transnational firms rather than toward the LDC. The first bargaining encounter between the Mexican state and the automobile TNCs was therefore of paramount importance: here, the structure of the industry was first laid down; the state never again had the power to restructure the industry, and each subsequent renegotiation of policy occurred within the bounds set down in the first bargaining encounter. Both the problems and the alternative possibilities are defined within this structure.

The theoretical approach taken in this paper could be employed in the analysis of these subsequent bargaining encounters in the Mexican automobile industry, as well as in the analysis of bargaining between TNCs and the governments of other less developed countries, and in other industries. We have been concerned with two central issues: agenda setting and bargaining power.

Agenda setting. Understanding the bargaining agenda requires a knowledge of the actors (or interests) that obtain access to the bargaining arena and of those that are excluded. The character of Mexico's political institutions explains not only the exclusion of labor from the

[53] On this argument, see Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence* (fn. 3), 157-62.

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bargaining table, but also the promotion of certain interests of the national bourgeoisie by the Mexican state (despite the rather small role played by Mexican entrepreneurs in the bargaining). Once it is clear which actors and interests are to be included, the points of conflict and of convergence of interest among the major actors must be analyzed. It should not be supposed that the interests of TNCs and LDC governments conflict across the board: the points of convergence of interests simply do not become bargaining issues. In the case of Mexico after World War II, a strategy of import substitution laid the basis for substantial convergence of interests among the government and TNCs in a range of manufacturing industries. The convergence of interests in the automobile industry—given its worldwide dynamics of competition—went no further than assembly operations, however. The exercise of state power was necessary to induce the auto firms to commence domestic manufacture. The state's requirement for local content was not the most controversial proposal, however, because it merely propelled the firms further along a competitive trajectory on which they were already engaged worldwide. But other proposals—a strict limitation on the number of firms, ownership restrictions, and constraints on product differentiation—did become major points of conflict in the bargaining: they threatened the established competitive strategies of the firms in the industry (particularly of the U.S.-based firms, which were the most active in the bargaining because of their prior penetration of the market).

Bargaining power. The potential power available to each actor to settle the contested issues cannot be understood as consisting simply of its possession of certain resources. Whether a resource can serve as a source of potential power depends on the context—particularly on the structure of domestic and international relationships in which each actor is enmeshed. Such relationships help in defining which resources can serve as bases of potential power. It was, for example, the relationship between the Mexican state and certain domestic classes that established Mexico's "need" for a domestic automobile industry and thus allowed the TNCs' control of automobile technology to serve as their power resource. Such relationships also determine when power resources can be employed or withheld, as demonstrated in the pattern of competitive relationships in the world's automobile oligopoly that made each of the firms eager to gain access to the Mexican market. Finally, such relationships define the potential for the entry of new actors into the conflict as allies—as shown by the firms' mobilization of domestic suppliers and distributors and of their home governments.

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Potential power must be carefully distinguished from actual power: an actor may have sources of power upon which it does not draw effectively. In this conflict, the TNCs drew more effectively upon their potential power than did the Mexican state. The potential power that accrued to the Mexican state from the pattern of oligopolistic competition in the world's automobile industry was an advantage which it did not utilize fully. In order to understand the reasons, we must realize that the host government is not a single unified entity. Conflicts within and especially between various agencies, and the lack of central direction from the President weakened the Mexican state's ability to draw fully upon its potential power.

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Research Notes

OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY IN STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

By STANLEY SIENKIEWICZ*

I. Introduction

ONCE again we find ourselves engaged in a debate over strategic nuclear forces—largely as a result of the need to make potentially expensive choices in SALT and in our defense programs. Much of the public debate, however, does little to inform us on the choices that we face. Although the issues are not easy to simplify, most of the confusion probably stems from the fact that what is at issue in the debate is often only implicit in the arguments we hear. Disparate criteria and assumptions underlie the views that are put forth, but they are rarely made explicit. Thus, SALT is often criticized not because it has failed to reach a set of objectives on which we have all been in agreement, but because the critics would have us pursue other objectives—objectives that either were not intended by those who have shaped SALT policy, or were not considered to be achievable. The same may be said for unilateral strategic force decisions by the United States.

In this essay, our first objective is to review in some detail the criteria —and their logical underpinnings—against which strategic forces are normally evaluated. Public discussion of SALT has necessarily been preoccupied with the so-called static indices central to the public debate —that is, with measures that lend themselves to counting.[1] A better measure of strategic nuclear capabilities, however, can be derived from a variety of hypothetical wars, or "exchange calculations."[2] These mod-

* This paper represents a portion of a broader study of strategic force planning and arms control issues undertaken while the author was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and a Research Fellow at Harvard's Program for Science and International Affairs.

[1] The utility and disutility of static indices is discussed at length in Thomas A. Brown, "Numbers Mysticism, Rationality and the Strategic Balance," *Orbis*, XXI (Fall 1977), 479-96.

[2] This point, of course, is not particularly original. It has been clearly argued by, among others, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith in *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1968–1969* (New York: Harper & Row 1972), 179.

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els reflect in calculable form the ideas about deterrence that have shaped U.S. defense planning at least since the tenure of Robert McNamara. We should remind ourselves, however, not only that static measures cannot be precisely related to the outcomes of such calculations, but also that even these more sophisticated assessments are an imprecise and only partial measure of deterrence. They reflect only the technical, or "capabilities," component of a deterrent posture. (We leave aside, for this essay, the equally important issues of political and psychological deterrent credibility.) Nevertheless, such calculations are the central calculable element in the process of designing the strategic nuclear forces; thus, we need to pay increased attention to their logic, and to understand their limitations.

The central problem in strategic analysis is to deal with the pervasive uncertainty that is an unavoidable element in the link between "real-world" deterrence and the hypothetical wars by means of which we evaluate our deterrent posture. So far, this uncertainty has not received the analytical attention it deserves. Our second objective, therefore, is to explore the character of that uncertainty in order to arrive at a better understanding of its implications for deterrence and for strategic force planning.

II. Assessing the Strategic Posture

Static measures such as numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or warheads, or their aggregate "throw weight," are at best imperfect proxies for the criteria that are in fact used to assess and design our strategic forces: the outcomes of particular kinds of hypothetical wars or exchange calculations. Such models, using projected U.S. and Soviet forces, can be varied over a wide range of assumptions and conditions in order to test for a variety of strategic nuclear capabilities and sensitivities. The basic calculation has usually been designed to test the so-called "assured destruction" or "assured retaliatory capability": whether, after a very effective Soviet surprise attack against U.S. retaliatory forces, we could still mount a response sufficiently destructive to feel confident that such a Soviet attack is deterred in the first place. Just what is "sufficiently destructive" must remain a matter of subjective judgment.

A somewhat different exchange calculation is more prominent in the contemporary debate. It is intended to focus on the problem of deterring limited nuclear attacks, and has to do with the survival of particular elements of the U.S. retaliatory force, notably the land-based

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intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). If a limited Soviet attack could deprive the United States of appropriate limited response capabilities and leave the Soviet Union with much larger residual forces, would such an attack become more likely in a crisis? Might such a "military advantage" be seen by the Soviets as conferring some kind of political advantage short of actual conflict? This scenario would, of course, be affected by problems of uncertainty in much the same way as the overall disarming first-strike scenario that is the principal focus of our discussion. Hence, conclusions about the impact of uncertainties in the latter case may be applied to the former as well.

Before examining exchange calculations in more detail, we should remember that our objective is to deter real Soviet political and military leaders from a range of actions that we view as inimical. We seek to influence decisively how another country's leaders will calculate their risks with respect to a specific class of actions which we fear they may be contemplating. We attempt to do so in the face of difficult and largely unpredictable *future* circumstances, by demonstrating that such actions may well lead to grossly undesirable consequences. But since we can neither ensure the "rationality" of these leaders, nor preclude disastrous consequences to ourselves in the event (and thus may be seen as "self-deterred"), we can never be completely confident about the efficacy of our deterrent. Here lies perhaps the most basic source of the strong tendency to hedge our bets by what is sometimes pejoratively labeled "worst-case planning."[3] But there are still other sources of uncertainty in strategic planning.

A. ALERT LEVELS

To calculate the outcome of a projected nuclear exchange, we must specify in some detail the numbers, capabilities, and deployments of the Soviet and U.S. forces to be used. Our intelligence about Soviet forces for this purpose is is quite good; about U.S. forces, it is of course even better. We can vary the U.S. forces across a range bounded by what is generally referred to as a "day-to-day" alert posture at one extreme and a "generated alert posture" at the other. These postures can be precisely specified in terms of such characteristics as the readiness of the manning personnel to respond to an attack order; the proportion of the bomber force that is fueled, loaded with weapons, and ready for rapid takeoff; and the proportion of the strategic submarine force that

[3] Actually, contemporary strategic planning in the Defense Department is more aptly described as "best-estimate" planning. Though it is conservative in the broad sense, quite optimistic assumptions are sometimes made.

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is at sea. Additional measures can affect vulnerability to surprise attack and responsiveness to an attack order. Aircraft can be dispersed to a larger number of airfields or even put on airborne alert, for example; given the short time within which the current bomber force can be launched if it is on alert, the alert level that is assumed for any particular calculation can determine whether most or only a few bombers are expected to survive the attack. The outcome of any such calculation largely depends, therefore, upon the alert level assumed for the victim's forces—in other words, upon assumptions about how much strategic and/or tactical warning we have, and how we respond to it.[4] This question is usually left implicit. Those who think we have serious problems will assume low alert levels for their analysis, making a Soviet attack quite effective; those who think the opposite will assume high alert levels, thereby showing the United States to be much better off. This issue bears upon an important connection between our strategic calculations and real-world deterrence, for it has to do with how we think the war might actually start. What is almost never done in strategic analysis is to develop a scenario in detail from some postulated crisis, producing realistic alert levels not only for the strategic forces, but for all the other kinds of forces—nuclear, conventional, and allied—that would probably bear upon the resolution of the crisis. The point is that, despite the necessary worst-case tendencies in defense planning, we don't in fact hedge against all of the worst imaginable cases. We cannot afford to. Instead, we make judgments about what is "most likely" and what is "unlikely." It is these judgments, as compared to the strategic arithmetic, that could stand more systematic attention. In this instance, debating how a nuclear war might actually start, rather than leaving it as an implicit but critical assumption, could help us reach more sensible judgments about how much nuclear capability is enough.

B. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The second major set of assumptions in any such calculation concerns the capabilities and operational performance of the respective forces. With respect to the major dimensions of Soviet capabilities—the numbers, yields, and accuracies of weapons—our uncertainties are not very great, particularly if we are not too concerned about attaching precise

[4] Strategic warning refers to indications of preparation for war or attack, such as the deployment of bomber forces to Arctic bases, the evacuation of cities, and so forth. Tactical warning refers to the indication that an attack has been launched, *e.g.*, by picking it up on the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar.

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capabilities to precise points in time. Our intelligence in this area has been quite good, and Soviet capabilities are by now so great that the net impact of remaining uncertainties is not all that important. More generally, there is the background of our own experience against which we can peg our intelligence. We are familiar with the historical picture of improvement in the accuracy of ballistic missiles. Furthermore, we understand the nature of the technological process from which such improvement is derived, and we can draw inferences from monitoring Soviet missile testing about the Soviets' approximate position on this particular "learning curve." We may not necessarily be able to predict with high confidence the year in which the Soviets will demonstrate a particular missile accuracy; but we can quite plausibly assume that, if they are sufficiently interested, the Soviets can achieve that accuracy within a specific time (or that they cannot). Because of the long periods involved in the development, testing, and deployment of major modern weapons systems (sometimes as long as a decade) and the large and diverse nuclear forces currently deployed by both sides, it is not especially important that we be able to pinpoint such developments more accurately than we can at present. Changes of strategically significant magnitude can not be achieved rapidly.[5]

Uncertainty about operational performance of the forces is a somewhat different matter. For a variety of reasons—centered largely upon the inability to test such enormously complex systems[6] in total or in sufficiently operational conditions—we cannot eliminate important residues of operational uncertainty about our own forces, much less make confident assumptions about the overall operational reliabilities of Soviet forces. While individual missile reliabilities can be predicted on the basis of testing, such predictions are always to a degree uncertain. When one aggregates even reasonably high-confidence reliability estimates across an entire force and in operational conditions, the resulting uncertainty about the operation of the force in any single attack is by

[5] Although we worry, as a matter of prudence, about unanticipated and strategically significant technological breakthroughs (of which there has probably never been a real-world example in the nuclear age), it is difficult to imagine how even a significant breakthrough could be so rapidly and extensively deployed as to rule out the opportunity for appropriate countermeasures. Even where Soviet capabilities are underestimated, such as in missile accuracy, they still take years to incorporate in the entire missile force.

[6] The term "system" here refers not to individual weapon systems but to the entire complex of strategic weapons, means of delivery, command, control, communications, support, and decision-making elements that would have to function precisely together to launch a substantial strategic nuclear attack. It is this total system whose overall operational effectiveness is the central concern of this paper.

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no means trivial. Thus, numerous assumptions of varying and uncertain validity must be made in order to make the problem calculable.

1. *What will the victim do?* At the outset of our calculation, there is the fundamental assumption that must be made as to *whether* some or all vulnerable retaliatory forces will be launched prior to or during the impact of the attack—which, to an important degree, will determine the magnitude of the potential retaliation. (For purposes of our calculation it is an assumption; for someone contemplating an actual attack, it must remain a major and thus far irreducible uncertainty.)

2. *What can the victim do?* Obviously, the answer depends upon the responsiveness of the retaliatory forces relative to the expected warning, which in turn depends upon the effectiveness of the warning systems. Non-alert bombers (which take longer to prepare for takeoff than the flight time of the attacking missiles) obviously cannot be launched before the impact of an attack. ICBMs can, in principle, be launched much more rapidly. These uncertainties are clearly not independent of other uncertainties about the nature of the crisis, the functioning of warning and command and control systems, the location and condition of the political authorities who can direct the launch of nuclear forces, and so on. The result is a probabilistic chain of assumptions, with all of the attendant statistical implications for the magnitude of the possible range of outcomes.

3. *How will the forces work?* There also remain significant technical uncertainties about such questions as the proportion of the retaliatory force that may malfunction during launch or flight-to-target, the proportion that is destroyed by active defenses, and the proportion that arrives with sufficient accuracy to destroy the targets.[7] We have, as do the Soviets, statistical estimates of weapons system reliabilities and other parameters. Although these estimates may be very good, they cannot be statistically perfect. We may be confident that overall weapons system reliability, for example, will be the predicted 80 or 90 percent, but we cannot guarantee it. In any single actual salvo, it may be lower or higher. Here again, it is necessary to make a variety of assumptions in order to deal with our own operational uncertainties as

[7] Operational target hardness, even for our own silos, is in fact an estimate. (Given high yields and accuracies, this is a minor point.) We do not know precisely what overpressure, for example, will "disable" a missile in a silo at the lower end of the spectrum. However, increasing yield and accuracy can produce high confidence about the expected results.

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well as with the absence of sufficient knowledge about Soviet capabilities. In some areas we can make reasonable guesses—based, for example, upon the presence or absence of certain capabilities (such as aircraft-based air defense radar [AWACS], which is more effective against low-level penetrating cruise missiles and aircraft than ground-based radar); in others, some irreducible uncertainty is inevitable (such as the skill of the Soviet personnel operating the radars, ground-based surface-to-air missiles, and tactical fighter forces which constitute such defenses).

C. STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Still other assumptions that can influence the outcome of such calculations have to do with the strategy and tactics of the attack and defense, or with how we might expect the Soviet attack to be targeted and how we in turn would target our retaliatory forces. The penetration of cruise missiles and aircraft through Soviet air defenses, for example, can depend a great deal upon whether the attacking force is allocated indiscriminately against defended and undefended targets, or primarily against the latter, leaving the former to be struck by ballistic missiles. It can also depend upon whether we are able to assume various levels of "mutual support," such as the use of ballistic missiles to attack air defenses in order to improve the penetration probabilities for the cruise missiles and bombers which follow. It is possible to take into account the range of uncertainty here, but by and large we cannot unilaterally reduce it very much, since we cannot control Soviet strategy and tactics.

D. CUMULATIVE UNCERTAINTY

The cumulative effect of the kinds of uncertainties and unknowns suggested makes the assessment of our strategic nuclear forces very much more complicated and contingent than is implied by facile comparisons of static indicators. One implication both of this condition and of the political/psychological basis of deterrence is the impossibility of finding a conclusive analytical basis for determining "how much is enough." Because we face substantially irreducible uncertainties in our calculations, the effectiveness of deterrence cannot be modeled without long chains of critical assumptions. In Defense Department planning, we have generally tended to resolve our uncertainties by assuming higher values for Soviet capabilities and performance, and lower values for our own. Although this is not always the case, such conservatism in strategic force planning is sensible in principle and

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probably unavoidable in practice. However, we must also keep in mind the cumulative effect of such chains of conservative assumptions, and avoid the mistake of regarding our calculations to be accurate reflections of the real world—even in intense crises—as seen by political leaders. Because of the elaborate complexity of this kind of problem (which lends itself to sophisticated computer calculation and, therefore, to a false sense of precision), it is easy to lose sight of its already tenuous analytical connection to the objective of our efforts. We are concerned with deterring a variety of attacks against the United States and its interests, and thus with the maintenance of a certain dominant perception in the minds of real Soviet leaders across a wide range of not very predictable future circumstances. Although we must make the scenarios artificial in order to calculate them, we cannot permit ourselves the luxury of avoiding hard thought about how they are related to real threats in real-world circumstances, and how real political leaders might see them. For example, whether our exchange calculation assumes U.S. forces to be on day-to-day or generated alert will largely determine the fraction that would survive a Soviet attack; but this assumption depends in turn upon whether the Soviets would launch such an attack "out of the blue" or only after a considerable crisis buildup and even a period of conventional warfare.

III. The Effects of Uncertainty

It is useful to distinguish two general effects of uncertainty. One is directly related to the connection between our more-or-less artificial calculus and the real-world problem of deterrence which it is intended to approximate. The other effect of uncertainty has a less direct relationship to deterrence; it results from the absence of sufficient knowledge about some of the important characteristics of the opponent's strategic nuclear capabilities. Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the United States has been interested in pre-emptive first-strike capabilities—that is, in the Soviet Union's capacity to destroy our second-strike forces before they can be launched in retaliation.[8] But we do not usually know precisely, for example, what combinations of yield and accuracy we should today attribute to Soviet ICBM forces available five years from now (our analysis is almost always for future forces, and almost never for current forces), or whether our potential opponent has, or will have, discovered a technique for simultaneously targeting

[8] Soviet nuclear doctrine differs on this fundamental point, at least superficially. See, for example, Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," *International Security*, II (Spring 1978), 84-100.

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all or most of our strategic submarine force at sea. Thus, there is uncertainty in our calculation of *future* Soviet first-strike capability against our future retaliatory forces. This kind of uncertainty arises from the limits of intelligence about current Soviet programs and from the problem of predicting their future evolution. We may refer to this effect as *force-planning uncertainty*. With sufficiently good intelligence, or an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to exchange certain information or to constrain technological innovation in various ways (or, for that matter, some combination of all three), this effect could be substantially reduced. It could also be reduced if the nuclear forces of one side were designed to be insensitive to small changes in the capability of the other side. Gaining added security in this fashion is not cheap, however, for such insensitivity generally derives from large, diverse forces that are supported, paradoxically enough, by a competent research-and-development program. The strategic forces on both sides are today substantially less sensitive to this kind of uncertainty than they have been in the past because they are large, diverse, and technologically competent. In addition, the processes of development and deployment of substantial new capabilities are long and almost always highly visible, thus providing sufficient opportunity for counteraction. At current deployment rates, for example, the modernization of the entire Soviet ICBM force seems to be on nearly a ten-year timetable, the beginning of which could probably be discerned even in the late 1960s. However, the rate at which the Soviets have developed new generations of missiles or major modifications has been quite rapid in recent years.

The second effect of uncertainty in strategic analysis is quite different in character because it is associated with our own forces as much as with the opponent's, and because it is reduced (to the extent that it is reducible) not by better intelligence about the opponent as much as by increased operational testing of our own forces. This effect may be labeled *operational uncertainty*.

Another distinction commonly used in strategic analysis lies between *arms-race or arms-control stability* (the degree of resistance to "destabilizing" change in the strategic balance over time) and *crisis stability* (reflecting the likelihood of nuclear war in a crisis, and based on the technical characteristics of the strategic nuclear balance at a particular time). The relationship between these ideas may, for purposes of the following argument, be briefly put as follows: the greater the operational uncertainty associated with the forces of both sides—particularly

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with those that have first-strike capabilities—the greater the crisis stability of the strategic nuclear balance. (This line of reasoning is the principal "technical" argument in support of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, though the same effect would obtain with a more limited ban specifying a low yield threshold and a low numerical ceiling.) The relationship is the reverse with respect to purely second-strike forces. Ideally, therefore, one would wish for a balance composed of low operational-uncertainty (or high-confidence) second-strike forces and high operational-uncertainty first-strike forces. The point becomes obvious when taken one step further. In the most stable balance, both sides would have purely second-strike forces. Of course, the real world often does not conform easily to our theories: the dividing lines between first-strike and second-strike forces are not always clear. Nor do our partners in SALT necessarily share our views about the virtues of second-strike forces and the evils of first-strike forces. The point to be kept in mind is that the issue is by no means foreclosed by such an apparent difference of view, and that there may well be objectives worth pursuing in SALT even if we have failed thus far to preclude, or even substantially reduce, first-strike forces very much. We would still prefer them to be characterized by high operational uncertainty, and not to be well-tested, high-confidence forces.

A. FORCE-PLANNING UNCERTAINTY

The relationship of force-planning uncertainty to long-run military stability would seem to be inverse. In general, the greater the former, the smaller the latter, though there are anomalous cases. We can be quite certain about the direction Soviet strategic forces are taking and still face an unstable balance, simply because that direction is clearly threatening to our deterrent posture. Similarly, one can imagine the opposite case: large uncertainties about future Soviet forces, yet also a relatively stable balance, because our own forces are seen as substantially insensitive to anything the Soviets might do. (Some might argue that the latter condition characterized the strategic nuclear balance during the 1960s, and the former condition characterizes it today.) We can also rule out uncertainty over some dimensions of Soviet strategic force development entirely. Despite the fact that we may be highly uncertain about what levels or capabilities the Soviets eventually intend for the Backfire bomber, for example, it is clear that it plays a trivial role, if any, in the class of scenarios about which we are most concerned. It is fundamentally a second-strike weapons system.

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B. STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE FACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

The net impact of force-planning uncertainty reflects the straightforward fact that we must do our strategic planning in the face of ongoing technological change.[9] Not only are new weapons systems with improved capabilities introduced and deployed periodically, but deployed weapons systems are subject to virtually constant testing, upgrading, and other forms of technical tinkering that in some instances can significantly enhance their capabilities. Not very easily discernible changes in the command, control, and communications system and in weapons targeting can effectively create new offensive capabilities. Similarly hard-to-see improvements in guidance techniques for missiles can lead to improvement in first-strike capabilities.

Basic research can also have a substantial strategic impact. To cite but two examples: geodetic research (pertaining to the shape of the earth, and thus to its gravitational field) has contributed to the accuracy of U.S. and no doubt Soviet ICBMs, improving their technical capability (operational capability depends upon a number of other factors) to destroy hardened targets. Research on the propagation of electromagnetic waves in the oceans could conceivably lead to a capability for instantaneous remote tracking of many submarines simultaneously; if coupled to a system that continuously feeds this information to one side's ICBM force, it could in principle make the at-sea strategic submarine forces of the other side susceptible to rapid destruction.

The sources of technological dynamism are of two general types. One may be viewed as the result of a kind of rational, strategic policy choice. The other is systemic in character. The rational component derives from the very nature of the problem of deterrence and from the irreducible uncertainties inherent in planning against the future capabilities of a highly secretive opponent. Despite the relative "openness" of American defense planning, there is little reason to doubt that these factors also operate in the Soviet system. Thus, we have the paradoxical situation in which each side's technique for coping with its own force-planning uncertainty tends to generate force planning-uncertainty for the other side. To cope with our uncertainty about future Soviet forces, we pursue a program of research sufficiently vigorous to maintain a good chance of anticipating the most dangerous technical developments by the Soviet Union and to provide prospective solutions should such

[9] This point was elaborated with great insight nearly 20 years ago, by, among others, Hedley Bull, in *The Control of the Arms Race* (2d ed.; New York: Praeger 1961), chap. 12, "The Problem of Continuous Innovation."

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threats actually emerge. There is, no doubt, a similar rationale to much of the Soviet's defense research.

Other, nonrational factors influence (and, some argue, dominate), the development and deployment of the American forces. We may reasonably infer that these factors are present in the Soviet system as well. At bottom, the systemic sources of dynamism derive from the existence of a highly competent, highly competitive scientific-engineering-marketing establishment dedicated to the task of developing more effective military technologies. Virtually all of the rewards and incentives stimulate technological innovation. In principle this is desirable and in fact it is probably unavoidable. It is, of course, necessary to maintain adequate policy-level oversight and control, in order that nonrational forces will not drive us further than we would rationally choose to go.

The impact of these systemic sources of dynamism derives, among other things, from the fact that mechanical-chemical-electronic systems have finite lifetimes. Thus, unless we are prepared to watch the strategic force posture decline through sheer physical obsolescence toward total (and probably unilateral) disarmament, we must accept the fact that replacement systems need to be periodically developed and deployed. This central recurring management issue for defense thus poses such questions as: What nominal operating lifetimes should we assume for any particular system? How much, if anything, should be spent to extend those lifetimes? At what rate should replacement systems be brought into the force? Should we replace the old systems on a one-for-one basis? What should be the capabilities and technical characteristics of the replacement systems? The answers to these questions will ultimately determine the size of the defense budget for any President's tenure, and sometimes well beyond.

For a variety of reasons, replacement systems tend to be more capable than their predecessors. One of these reasons takes us back to the highly uncertain character of the strategic calculus. No solution is ever seen as perfect; even if one is thought to be very good, it is unlikely to remain so indefinitely. In addition, given the high cost of modern weapons systems, there is a growing incentive to make them "multipurpose"—since fewer are likely to be acquired, they should be able to do more—and there may be a growing incentive to increase their planned operating lifetimes. One result is to reinforce the tendency to improve whatever dimensions are available for improvement—a phenomenon sometimes called gold-plating. The term is misleading, however, for it is rarely obvious that some particular improvement is *not*

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worth having—or rather, that it is not worth the added cost. For example, one may be uncertain about the precise character of a future threat to the strategic submarine force, but one cannot rule out such a threat late in the projected operating lifetime of the force (perhaps 15 or 20 years hence). An obvious direction in designing the follow-on submarine would be to improve upon the characteristics *generally* associated with survivability and effectiveness—for instance, to increase the missile range in order to increase the operating area and thereby make the submarines harder to locate; to reduce submarine noise levels in order to make them harder to detect; or to enhance capabilities to detect active trail by Soviet submarines and take evasive action.

We face substantial and probably permanent dynamism in the strategic forces of both sides. It is the source of much of the uncertainty in strategic force planning, and thus, at bottom, of the pressures for prudent (or worst-case) assumptions. This dynamism has stimulated one of the more promising and controversial elements of President Carter's initial approach to SALT—the proposals for constraints upon ballistic missile testing and upon the introduction of new systems. While in principle we might wish to continue unhampered testing of some forces (purely second-strike forces such as aircraft or cruise missiles) in order to be highly confident about their reliability, the fact that we would begin to lay a foundation for challenging the testing of other, more threatening forces would make this direction worth pursuing. The precedent inherent in this approach should not be lost just because the "whole loaf" may not be achievable in the immediate future. Agreement on this principle by our only serious strategic rival could have important and salutary consequences in the long run.

c. OPERATIONAL UNCERTAINTY

In strategic force analysis, we must make numerous assumptions in order to deal with uncertainties about the operational performance of the forces on both sides so as to make the problem calculable. There is a tendency to make conservative assumptions for both operational uncertainties and force-planning uncertainties. We should treat them differently, however, in terms of their relevance to deterrence.

Operational uncertainty may conveniently be explored by dividing the hypothetical strategic exchange into several stages. These could be: (1) the operation of the command-and-control system from the political decision to launch the attack to the actual completed launch; (2) the in-flight operation of the attacking force from launch to its impact and effect upon the target(s); and (3) the nature and effectiveness of

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the retaliation, both in terms of launch and of penetration of the opponent's active and passive defenses. In the first phase, there are uncertainties associated with the behavior of the Soviet leaders in a crisis, with the availability of relevant and timely information on which they will base their actions, with the overall functioning of this decision-making system,[10] with the precisely timed transmission of the firing order through a complex human-electronic system to the operating forces, and finally with the precise execution by a combination, once again, of human, mechanical, and electronic means. In a crisis scenario, the information of central relevance—beyond the course of the crisis itself over which the enormous risks of nuclear war are being contemplated—concerns the status of the forces the attacker intends to use, as well as the condition of the prospective targets (obviously important if they are mobile, movable, or evacuable), and the status of the victim's nuclear forces that can be triggered in pre-emption or retaliation. Unless the contemplated attack is to be a mindless spasm, under modern warning conditions the central calculation must concern itself with what the victim *will do* in response to warning and how rapidly.

From the initial determination to consider a nuclear attack, the transmission of the decision to the operating forces must be rapid and perfectly timed. Because of the great compression of time produced by ballistic missile delivery systems, lags of small fractions of an hour in one element or another can create "time windows" within which additional bombers could be alerted and dispersed, additional SSBNs could be put to sea, forward-based systems could be armed, alerted, and dispersed, and a number of ICBMs could be launched before they are attacked. The object is to minimize the period between the initial tactical warning of the attack and its coordinated (and in most scenarios, as nearly simultaneous as possible) arrival on target. Time lags in any part of this complex process (which has, of course, never been fully tested in realistic conditions), can substantially stretch the arrival interval of the attack, potentially affecting its effectiveness as well as the character of the response in a variety of unpredictable ways.

After the attack has been launched and before the detonation of the attacking weapons, there is a largely technical set of uncertainties. It would appear that they can be reduced by a number of technical measures, though it would be a mistake—given the financial and physical

[10] If we assume a fully premeditated attack, decision making becomes a trivial element. If, on the other hand, we assume crisis recourse to a nuclear attack (seemingly the more likely way in which nuclear war might start), the decision-making segment is important for our analysis.

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limits upon testing (in terms of numbers of tests, tests in operational trajectories, and so forth)—to assume them away entirely. By additional testing, one may be able to improve the precision and reliability of the delivery systems. It is possible to compensate for uncertainties in guidance by increasing weapon yields and by introducing external guidance correction and ultimately terminal guidance.[11] For current Soviet ICBMs (with large yields and rapidly improving inertial accuracies), there is little payoff. For SLBMs, on the other hand, such measures could greatly enhance capabilities. It is also possible to compensate for in-flight failure by techniques for monitoring trajectories and by developing the capability to retarget withheld missiles to replace those that fail in flight, or simply to aim multiple weapons at each target from separate delivery vehicles. There is usually a penalty, however. The delay in retargeting withheld missiles to replace in-flight failures may, if the target is an aircraft or a missile, provide time to launch it before it is destroyed; multiplying the number of weapons per target in order to gain confidence that at least one of them will arrive increases the probability that one of the attacking weapons will damage others (the so-called "fratricide" effect), thus reducing the probability of target destruction rather than compounding it.

It is not possible, therefore—if the expected outcome is 95 percent of the Minuteman force destroyed, for example—to achieve perfect confidence that 95 percent will in fact be destroyed in any single, actual attack. One may get more, but one may also get less. The magnitude of the residual uncertainty, though small and decreasing, may nonetheless be important to the real-world deterrence calculus. Does it matter to the attacker if, for example, even in the ICBM-only scenario the immediate potential for retaliation includes 10 percent instead of 5 percent of the Minuteman force? In this instance, the total number of Soviet targets struck in retaliation with residual Minuteman weapons could range from as few as 50 (assuming the 5 percent surviving to be Minuteman II), to as many as 300 (if 10 percent survived and all were Minuteman III). Both outcomes cited are statistically unlikely, but possible. They do, however, suggest the kind of uncertainty range typical in such problems. This example is unrealistic in a deterrent calculus, for left out of this calculation are all of the other nuclear forces with which a retaliatory strike could be launched.

Uncertainty about the effect of the attack upon its intended targets and upon the victim more generally is largely the result of the cumu-

[11] The major possibilities are clearly and briefly discussed in Kosta Tsipis, "The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles," *Scientific American*, Vol. 233 (July 1975), 14-23.

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lative uncertainty thus far. (What does the victim do after the initial tactical warning? Or even, what is he doing prior to the tactical warning—since we have assumed a crisis sufficiently intense that the attacker is driven to consider, if not to launch, a nuclear attack himself?) The effect of the attack will determine both the information upon which the victim will base his response and the boundaries—in both time and in surviving capabilities—within which his response will be constrained. However, given the limits of the predictability of human behavior, not to mention the complex system within which political leaders must function under such circumstances, we cannot entirely rule out extreme actions. The point to be kept in mind is that, while the strategic nuclear forces remain large, diverse, and—in the aggregate—still survivable (particularly if the scenario involves something less than an attempt to destroy the entire U.S. retaliatory force), there is a significant additional uncertainty associated with the victim's *choice* of response that is entirely independent of the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of the attack.

Here we return to the importance of, among other things, the alert/dispersal condition of the victim's strategic nuclear forces, and whether he chooses to launch any of them upon warning of (or during) the attack. These are, perhaps, the two fundamental (and irreducible) uncertainties that must be assumed away in order to perform the exchange calculations central to the evaluation of strategic forces. For Soviet leaders to actually make such assumptions in a crisis, however, is an entirely different matter.

Finally, the Soviet planners of an attack must be uncertain about the effectiveness and targeting of the victim's retaliation. They cannot be confident about the timing, magnitude, or competence of the victim's counterattack. They do not know how effectively their active defenses will perform against the attacking forces, nor can they be sure about a wide range of other effects, including whether the attacking weapons will be detonated on the ground (thus generating fallout), and how the prevailing weather patterns will distribute that fallout. Furthermore, of course, they can have no more than a vague guess as to the social-psychological, environmental, and other effects of the detonation of many nuclear weapons upon their own society.

Surveying the range of such operational uncertainties in any detail begins to convey a rather different impression about the "ease" with which hypothetical Soviet leaders might turn to a consideration of their nuclear options, notwithstanding the great increase in their strategic nuclear forces or the intensity of any crisis that might be con-

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jured up. It is not the same as the impression conveyed by much of the literature on the contemporary strategic debate.[12] In this line of argument may be found the logical basis for the intuitive conclusion about the substantial stability of the strategic balance reached by commentators such as, for example, McGeorge Bundy in his *Foreign Affairs* essay of 1969.[13]

IV. Deterrence and Uncertainty

In 1959, Albert Wohlstetter published a paper that had substantial impact upon the defense debates of the time and that has subsequently come to be regarded as one of the seminal contributions to the development of American strategic thought.[14] In addition to outlining the basic requirements of the analysis that must underlie our strategic decision making—described above as the exchange calculation—Wohlstetter made a number of other important points. Many have by now become so widely accepted in the strategic community that they are no longer explicitly mentioned (for example, that deterrence does not derive from the matching of first-strike capabilities, but rather from the maintenance of satisfactory second-strike capabilities). The element of Wohlstetter's argument that has perhaps the greatest contemporary relevance is his emphasis upon the uncertainties and imponderables with which we must inevitably deal in attempting to analyze the deterrent utility of alternative weapons systems and force postures. He suggested, with great insight at the time, the kinds of uncertainties—and risks of catastrophic failure—associated with the multiple "successive obstacles to be hurdled by any system providing a capability

[12] See, for example, R. J. Rummel, "Détente and Reality," *Strategic Review*, IV (Fall 1976) 33-43; Rummel, "Will the Soviet Union Soon have a First-Strike Capability?" *Orbis*, XX (Fall 1976), 579-94; Christopher M. Lehman and Peter C. Hughes, "Equivalence and SALT II," *Orbis*, XX (Winter 1977), 1045-54; Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54 (January 1976), 207-32; Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77), 195-210.

[13] "There is an enormous gulf between what political leaders really think about nuclear weapons and what is assumed in complex calculations of relative 'advantage' in simulated strategic warfare. Think-tank analysts can set levels of 'acceptable' damage well up in the tens of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the real world of real political leaders—whether here or in the Soviet Union—a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable." McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXXVIII (October 1969), 9-10.

[14] Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-34.

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to strike second . . . from its peacetime operating characteristics and pre-launch survivability to its operational effectiveness, penetrating capability, and ultimate probability of satisfactory target destruction."[15]

A. COMPETING STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

Wohlstetter's purpose seems largely to have been a strongly felt need to counter the then-emerging view that deterrence was relatively automatic and that satisfactory deterrent forces were quite easy to develop and maintain. As a corrective to this—in his view—dangerous misconception, he demonstrated the wide range of uncertainties attendant upon any kind of substantial retaliation by then-current and projected U.S. forces against plausible Soviet surprise attacks. His goal was not one of pure analysis. Hence, he pursued it, in part, by means of a selective focus. What he did not explore was the issue of uncertainties —the possibilities for catastrophic failure—associated with a *Soviet surprise attack* that would be facing rational Soviet planners. That the gloomy prospects which Wohlstetter showed to be possible did not in fact come to pass may be attributed in part to the persuasiveness of his arguments. But his selective focus—in effect the necessary perspective of U.S. defense planners—has contributed to our failure to recognize the transformation in strategic postures which has taken place since 1959, substantially increasing the stability of the deterrent balance.

Among the most important elements of this transformation are (1) the advent of near "real-time," high-confidence warning of the launch of large nuclear attacks; (2) the dominance of the ballistic missile delivery system and its implications for the relative ineffectiveness of defenses as well as for the greatly foreshortened time frame within which the successful surprise attack must inevitably occur; and (3) the great increase in numbers and diversity (as well as in some individual survivability characteristics) of strategic forces, which contributes to the increased complexity of the problem of surprise attacks. These changes, on balance, have greatly increased the importance of *operational uncertainty* in the calculation of a surprise attack. In the strategic conditions of two decades ago, Wohlstetter could spin quite plausible scenarios for highly effective Soviet surprise attack capabilities, but that is no longer possible. The operational uncertainties that are today associated with such an attack can easily dominate the outcome of the scenario. Rational Soviet planners cannot easily compensate for operational degradation in order to produce reasonable levels of confidence that the attack will succeed. On the contrary, they must

[15] *Ibid.*, 216.

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face the possibility that a surprise attack may fail catastrophically. The strategic balance, while it was perhaps never as "delicate" as Wohlstetter's work has been taken to imply, is now even less delicate.

Wohlstetter correctly focused upon the potential effectiveness of Soviet capabilities for a surprise attack in the near term (the early 1960s), and the substantial uncertainty they created for even minimal U.S. retaliation. At present, it is important to consider whose uncertainty, and what aspects of the calculation, are most directly related to deterrence in the contemporary context. The dominant uncertainties now reside with the aggressor in the strategic nuclear calculus; given the possible consequences of large nuclear exchanges, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which rational Soviet leaders would choose to run such risks.

The most comfortable situation from our perspective is to have high confidence that, after any feasible Soviet attack, we can retaliate in virtually whatever form and at whatever magnitude we might see fit. This condition would seem to be the surest way to deter the widest range of possible Soviet attacks across the widest range of possible circumstances. This is as close to a sufficient physical condition for deterrence as we are likely to find. But the question is whether it is also a minimal necessary condition.[16] Since we are resource-constrained, we must choose among available deterrent forces, and thus also among the hypothetical attacks against which we design those forces. Further, given the manifest capability and willingness of the Soviet Union to increase its strategic nuclear forces, we must also take care that our own strategic weapons programs not prove to be counterproductive to our objectives in the longer run.

B. THE CHANGING STRATEGIC CALCULUS

The U.S. retaliatory force about which Wohlstetter wrote in 1959 consisted entirely of bombers; it was a force slow to react and vulnerable to surprise attack, even though (largely in response to Wohlstetter's earlier path-breaking "systems analysis"),[17] it had been withdrawn from European bases by the end of the 1950s. Furthermore, the warning capabilities of the United States left a great deal to be desired. The force itself was relatively "soft," thus requiring no great attack preci-

[16] The difference is between a *goal* toward which we strive, at reasonable levels of effort and with the entire range of tools at our disposal, and a *minimum standard*, falling short of which can have critical implications for the U.S. deterrent.

[17] A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, *The Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, R-266* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, April 1954).

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sion. It was deployed among a small number of airfields, vulnerable to a small number of attacking aircraft, and slow to respond to warning—thus providing a relatively long period during which a successful attack could be carried out. (The uncertain warning capabilities meant that warning could be late, ambiguous, or even conceivably entirely absent.) Given these uncertain warning and communication capabilities as well as the relatively concentrated location of the airbases, there was even speculation about the possibility of a "trucking operation," in which very small numbers of aircraft could penetrate undetected, each attacking more than one U.S. airbase.[18] Finally, the small fraction of this force that would have survived a reasonably competent Soviet attack would have had to fly a difficult intercontinental mission and penetrate extensive Soviet air defenses. Thus, it was easy to imagine a plausible chain of events resulting in an effective Soviet surprise attack. Although there were many uncertainties for Soviet planners even in this scenario, all were within the reach of readily available solutions. The numbers of aircraft in such an attack could be small, perhaps well under one hundred; the Soviet Air Force was certainly capable of navigating to U.S. targets; and finally, the timing of the operation and the accuracy of the bombing simply did not need to approach perfection in order for the attack to be successful.

The prospect of operational Soviet ICBMs by the early 1960s made the threat appear even worse, by destroying virtually all hope of getting any aircraft aloft before the attack arrived. In the worst case, a few dozen ballistic missiles, followed by a "mopping up" attack with bombers, could conceivably have disarmed the United States. An increase in the level of Soviet ICBMs to a hundred or more would have made the bombers entirely superfluous.

Today's second-strike forces are larger, more diverse, and constitute an enormously more complex and difficult system of targets. A large portion are simply no longer simultaneously targetable because they are deployed aboard submarines. Attack warning today is also a great deal more confident and rapid. Although the speed of ballistic missiles has greatly reduced the maximum possible warning time, modern warning systems have made virtually that full time potentially available for a response. Large fractions of the force can, in principle, now be launched very rapidly: the Minuteman was originally developed to provide a "launch-on-warning" capability; only later was it sufficiently "hardened" to permit a policy of actually "riding out" a Soviet

[18] Described to me by Thomas C. Schelling.

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attack before launching a U.S. second strike. An operational capability for a disarming first strike (even against ICBMs alone) thus is potentially a *physical* impossibility. For a successful, disarming first strike a far larger, more complex, and more delicately coordinated attack must be managed in a greatly compressed time period. Even if we grant the assumptions about the victim's behavior which make such an operation theoretically possible, we must be aware that, unlike the simulation of bomber attacks, it has never been and cannot be operationally tested, much less practiced. The capability of removing a large portion of the targets by launching them prior to the impact of the attack, which is a policy or posture choice for the victim, is for the attacker a *condition* which he cannot yet confidently preclude. Whether the United States maintains a formal policy of riding out an attack prior to launching its retaliation is irrelevant if the Soviet planners see that it is fully within America's capabilities to launch on warning. Thus, the minimal condition for deterrence might be stated as the Soviet planners' inability to preclude the possibility that their attack may fail, and fail catastrophically, for reasons entirely beyond their control. At the other extreme, the notion of *assured* destruction implies a substantially more comfortable condition for the United States, for it suggests a *guarantee* that the Soviet attack will fail. There is a significant range of more uncertain conditions between these two, and the differences among them are by no means trivial.

The range of possible outcomes with which any rational planner must cope reflects the effect of operational uncertainty inherent in the contemporary strategic calculus. The point of our argument is that this effect is now quite large; more importantly, it is beyond the capability of unilateral Soviet action to reduce it very much. Given the uncertainties inherent in designing military postures for deterrence in the nuclear age, we cannot forgo continuing efforts to enhance our security. Thus, we do not suggest the effects of operational uncertainty as an adequate standard for the American defense planners' efforts; however, it should help us to distinguish the urgent problems from the less urgent.

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PRACTITIONERS' VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

By GILBERT R. WINHAM*

I. Introduction

IN April 1977, the State Department's Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy devoted a week of study to the subject of negotiation.[1] In addition to the normal routine of lectures and seminar discussions, the Senior Seminar produced a Checklist for Negotiators (see Appendix) which summarized the views of seminar members. The Checklist took the form of a guideline for the actual conduct of negotiation. The main purpose of the Checklist was to achieve and record a consensus in the discussion, rather than—as its form might imply—to contribute a chapter to a manual on government practice. Because the Checklist summarized the observations of senior government officials on an important function of foreign policy making, it warrants the attention of students of foreign policy.

The Checklist represents a relatively unusual source of data about foreign policy behavior. Negotiation could well be described as the most important line function of foreign service establishments, and yet, curiously, there exists little systematic knowledge about how foreign service officers conceptualize this task. One problem is that practitioners normally do not publish writings on the process of negotiation; when reflections on negotiations are included in writings such as memoirs, or in press interviews, they are often too fragmentary to be useful. A more serious problem is that the persons below the most visible senior levels, who do most of the negotiating, never record their views at all. Such persons are an important element in modern complex negotiations, but in the normal bureaucratic processes of government they are not encouraged to put their views on paper. Thus, the difficulty of obtaining practitioners' views boils down to a lack of general-

* I am grateful for critical comment provided by Professors Denis Stairs and Don Munton of Dalhousie University.

[1] The Senior Seminar is conducted by the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State. It is a ten-month program that has been conducted annually since 1958. It is described by the Foreign Service Institute as "the most advanced training program available to selected senior grade officials of United States Government agencies with foreign affairs responsibilities." The 19th Seminar (1976-77) consisted of 26 members.

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ized information on the process of negotiation from individuals who are near the top of the policy-making establishment.

The purpose of this article is to examine the important themes that emerge from the Checklist. This examination will be undertaken from a perspective analogous to that of Herbert Kaufmann in his insightful study of the U.S. Forest Service.[2] Citing Herbert Simon's observation that "in the study of organization, the operative employee must be at the focus of attention,"[3] Kaufmann created a study of administrative organization that pinpointed the *actions* of line officers as being the central variables in understanding organizational behavior, instead of the more commonly studied *policies* enunciated by top management. In a similar vein, the reason for analyzing the Checklist is to investigate international negotiation in terms of the reported actions of senior line officers, rather than in terms of the policies or positions of governments in particular negotiations. This article thus approaches international relations from a bottom-up perspective of the working environment of senior Foreign Service officers, rather than from the more usual top-down perspective of the interaction of national governments in the international system. In keeping with Kaufmann's study of organizational behavior, however, the significance of the present analysis ultimately lies in what can be generalized about the broader system of international relations, of which the actions of government officers at the working level are only one part.

II. Derivation of the Checklist

The week of study on negotiation in the Senior Seminar was directed by three members of the Seminar. These members decided on a "Checklist format" in order to structure the discussion. A preliminary draft was drawn up by this author after consultation with the above troika, and a revised draft was ready for the beginning of the study. The Senior Seminar heard presentations by four senior officials in government and politics who are noted for their negotiating experience, as well as from two academic specialists on negotiation; seminar members asked each of them to criticize the draft of the Checklist. The Checklist was then reviewed by seminar members in working committees; special attention was given to the comments of the outside speakers. A final plenary session was held to integrate the changes pro-

[2] Kaufmann, *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1960).

[3] Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making in Administrative Organization* (New York: Macmillan 1945), 3.

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posed by the committees into a single draft. The final Checklist was compiled by this author serving as rapporteur.

The ultimate version of the Checklist for Negotiators summarized the week's discussion, and was as much as possible a consensus document reflecting the view of a majority of the members. It is obviously not a perfect instrument for assessing the views of practitioners; but it is probably a better guide than an aggregation of individual interviews, the usual way in social science research to determine the perceptions of groups. Interviews, if closed-ended, would not have been sufficiently rich to analyze perceptions of a process as complicated as negotiation. On the other hand, open-ended interviews would have produced an abundance of casual observations, without opportunity for members to cross-examine each other's ideas. As it was, the Senior Seminar debated and weighed most points on the Checklist. Reaching agreement on some points was difficult, and in effect created a negotiation in itself.

In the analysis presented here, the Checklist will be augmented by material from an article by Winthrop G. Brown, which offers further evidence on the practitioner's perspective on negotiation, and fills in some points on which the Checklist is necessarily sketchy.[4] Brown's article is authoritative for this purpose, since it was published by the professional journal of the Foreign Service, and has been used as a standard reference in courses at the Foreign Service Institute on the technique of negotiation.

The Checklist puts information in the form of reminders of what must be done in a negotiation, rather than in terms of principles of how to conduct negotiations. This distinction may be simply semantic, but it reflects the practitioner's disinclination to think in terms of *a priori* principles of negotiation. Practitioners tend to see negotiation as the application of common sense in a situation, and are generally unwilling to commit themselves to principles, even though they will often draw conclusions that sound very much like principles of behavior (e.g., "always coordinate position with allies"). It should also be noted that the Checklist reflects an instrumental approach to negotiation; that is, it defines negotiation as an instrument ("Negotiation is a tool in the management of external relations") for carrying out the broader task of foreign policy making. This formulation suggests that practitioners view negotiation in the context of policy formation, and that they are more concerned with the interface between

[4] Brown, "The Art of Negotiation," *Foreign Service Journal*, XLV (July 1968), 14-17.

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negotiation and foreign policy than with defining negotiation itself.[5] The distinction between policy and negotiation is reminiscent of Sir Harold Nicolson's *Diplomacy*, where the author defined policy as the legislative or political aspect of external relations, and negotiation (or diplomacy) as the executive aspect, which was best left to professional diplomatists.[6]

The relationship between foreign policy and negotiation was one of the main controversial aspects in the creation of the Checklist. Ostensibly, the issue was whether to include in the final Checklist a section entitled "Preliminary to Negotiation," which was not in the initial draft and was proposed in a working committee. In substance, however, the issue was concerned with whether negotiators were merely executors of policy, or whether they were also participants in the *decision to negotiate*, the latter being a preliminary issue and clearly a broader problem of foreign policy making. The discussion turned on simplicity and specialization versus complexity and greater engagement, and it was a serious argument because it touched on the definition of the role of modern foreign service officers. The broader definition was more compelling in the end, and the Checklist thus serves as an interesting update to Nicolson's narrower definition of diplomacy. It would seem that negotiation is being increasingly broadly defined—by governments and by negotiators themselves—to be part of the wider processes of public policy making. Government officials apparently do not think of the negotiating process as a truncated phenomenon divorced from the mainstream of social policy.

Two structural points are prominent in the Checklist. First, negotiation is considered as progressing in phases, or stages, over time. This view has received substantial support in the literature,[7] and there appears to be little serious difference among observers of negotiations on this point. There was lively discussion on how to describe various phases, and how many phases should be included (for example, one high-ranking visitor argued in favor of four phases rather than three). In the end, there was little dissent from the view that "something" changes as a negotiation progresses over time, and that different negotiating behaviors are associated with such changes. A second structural point is the distinction between internal and external aspects of nego-

[5] The Checklist did not provide a definition of negotiation, nor was this fact discussed at the Seminar.

[6] Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (3rd ed.; London: Oxford University Press 1963), 2-3.

[7] For example, see Ann Douglas, "The Peaceful Settlement of Industrial and Intergroup Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (No. 1, 1957), 69-81.

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tiation. The Checklist views negotiation as two-fronted, and enumerates separately those tasks that are required to negotiate within the home government and those required to negotiate with the foreign government. The fact that this delineation does not necessarily correspond to received wisdom on international relations will be discussed in the next section.

III. Examination of the Checklist

The Checklist for Negotiators is useful as a descriptive device in that it points out practitioners' concerns that may not be immediately obvious to students of international relations. For example, one concern is the need to establish a framework for negotiation (included as a task under Phase 1). The term "framework" as used in the Senior Seminar roughly meant a general definition of the issue in question in order to establish the outside limits of the problem, as well as a common understanding of the main points in contention. One outside speaker emphasized the importance of establishing a framework for negotiation (this concept was already included in the draft Checklist), and he proceeded to give examples of this aspect of negotiation from his own experience. A second example is the emphasis on decision making in Phase 3, and the importance that practitioners attach to the concept of control in this phase. Related concerns are internal management in the negotiating team, and staff work and backstopping in the capital. For those who normally view negotiation from the perspective of the nation-state, it is useful to be reminded of the internal mechanisms that are associated with the behavior of large collectivities.

Although the description of practitioners' views is helpful, the most important use of the Checklist lies in raising concerns that are not consistent with the general drift of negotiation theory. There is an extensive literature on negotiation, and on diplomacy more generally, to which former practitioners, diplomatic historians, and (more recently) modern social scientists have contributed. Negotiation theory has taken on the character of a subfield in political science (and other social science disciplines as well), and there is now a rich and interrelated body of literature on this subject.[8] With respect to this litera-

[8] Recent examples of this literature would include the following essays or edited volumes: Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1966), 464-520; Daniel Druckman, *Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social Psychological Aspects of International Conflict* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1973); I. William Zartman, ed., *The 50% Solution* (Garden

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ture, there are three areas where the practitioners' views, as revealed in the Checklist, appear to differ from the received wisdom of negotiation theory. The first is the practitioners' conception that relations with their own government are as important, if not more important, than relations with a foreign government. The second is the tendency of practitioners to view negotiation as a managerial and/or policy problem rather than a strategic problem. And the third is the weight that practitioners give to cognitive variables (e.g., issues) at the expense of affective variables (e.g., personality or culture).

INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL NEGOTIATION

Many government officials who have recently commented on the conduct of international negotiations have asserted that the main portion of their work relates to dealing with their own government. This has been put many ways, but the point is essentially unchanging. Winthrop Brown's article on negotiation starts out with the statement: "Negotiation, like charity, begins at home."[9] Robert W. Barnett states, "I would say about nine-tenths of my time of negotiation was done with my own side."[10] And the inside account of SALT I by John Newhouse describes that negotiation as an "internal negotiation"; this assessment is borne out in the writing of SALT negotiator Raymond Garthoff.[11] Indeed, the point is emphasized so much that it was used initially, after consultation, to structure the entire Checklist. There was no subsequent criticism by members of the Senior Seminar on the distinction between internal and external negotiation; indeed, it was explicitly confirmed by the ambassadors speaking to the Seminar, one of whom summarized succinctly that "the stress on internal is accurate; we are in continued negotiation internally."

The concern of practitioners for internal negotiation contrasts

City, N.Y.: Anchor Press 1976); Daniel Druckman, *Negotiations: Social Psychological Aspects of International Conflict* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1977); and finally, the special volume (ed. by I. William Zartman) on negotiation of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXI (No. 4, 1977).

[9] The article continues, "When you are negotiating for the United States with other governments, this normally involves a whole series of preliminary negotiations inside the United States Government. . . . The techniques that you use in negotiating with your American colleagues within the Government, or the Congress, or indeed the public, are the same as those you use abroad." Brown (fn. 4), 14.

[10] Barnett, *Observations on International Negotiation*. Transcript of an Informal Conference, Greenwich, Conn., June 1971 (Academy for Educational Development 1971), 112.

[11] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1973); Raymond Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," *International Security*, 1 (Spring 1977), 3-24.

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sharply with the theoretical literature, which focuses almost totally on the external aspect of negotiation. Much of the writing on international negotiation and bargaining reflects assumptions that states are unitary actors; that bargaining relations between states are analogous to bargaining relations between individuals; and hence, that the really important focus of negotiation theory should be on a state's external relationships. The focus on the external negotiation is as common in negotiation theory as the rational decision-making model is in foreign policy analysis.[12] Indeed, the assumption that negotiation is an external process has been necessary for the development of rational and strategic theories of bargaining, and it has been a facilitating assumption in other areas of negotiation theory as well.[13]

The modern literature on negotiation covers a remarkable number of aspects of the bargaining process, but usually from the perspective of a bargaining process conducted between unitary actors. Game theory, and particularly the game of prisoner's dilemma, is an obvious example of this perspective. So also are most of the experimental models of the bargaining process, such as games of conflict or cooperation,[14] simulations of international negotiation,[15] and the considerable body of experimental research based on the model of the prisoner's dilemma.[16] Deductive theory on the process of bargaining from the discipline of economics also usually operates on the basis of assumed unitary actors.[17] A similar assumption is explicit in psychological studies of bargaining (which emphasize variables such as personality or perception),[18] and in sociological studies as well (which study effects of differences in cultural norms, sex, or other demographic variables on the bargaining process).[19] The assumption of a unitary actor—that is, the focus on the external negotiation—is also reflected in many

[12] See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

[13] For example, the assumption underlies Thomas C. Schelling's analysis of conflict. See *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press 1963).

[14] For example, Morton Deutsch and R. M. Krauss, "Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (No. 1, 1962), 52-76.

[15] For example, Matthew Bonham, "Simulating International Disarmament Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XV (No. 3, 1971), 299-315.

[16] See, for example, Anatol Rapoport and A. M. Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1965).

[17] See, for example, John Cross, *The Economics of Bargaining* (New York: Basic Books 1969).

[18] For example, Bertram Spector, "Negotiation as a Psychological Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 607-18.

[19] For example, Otomar Bartos, "Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View," *Ibid.*, 565-80.

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empirical studies that emphasize negotiation as a reactive process,[20] as well as in models that seek to trace the flow of influence between parties in a negotiation.[21] In sum, it seems that the literature on negotiation and bargaining has been preoccupied with the relations *between* actors (e.g., states) while the relations *within* the actors has been much less studied.[22]

What is the effect of the prevailing focus on external negotiation? It may be reasonable to argue that, at worst, the literature on negotiation simply misses half of the negotiation process, and that this deficiency can be corrected in time. That is not necessarily the case, at least from the standpoint of making generalizations about *international* negotiation. It is more likely that the failure to take account of internal negotiation while generating propositions about external negotiation may create a conceptual distortion between negotiations in *situ* and negotiations as they are analyzed by theorists. The result could be that the generalizations of theorists may bear little relevance to the behaviors found in real negotiation because they fail to capture the complexity of the process—a point which will be addressed further in the concluding section. At the very least, however, it would appear that ignoring the internal negotiation would lead to the neglect of certain important variables in the negotiation process.[23]

One such variable that affects mainly the internal side of negotiation concerns the activities of special interest groups. These activities are generally given inadequate attention in the literature, in comparison to the importance apparently given to them by practitioners. For example, the Checklist shows practitioners to be concerned with special interest groups in all three phases of the negotiation process; specific references are made to identifying relevant interest groups, maintain-

[20] For example, Lloyd Jensen, "Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in the Post-War Disarmament Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (No. 4, 1973), 522-41.

[21] See, for example, James Tedeschi, "Threats and Promises," in Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict* (New York: Academic Press 1970).

[22] A notable exception is the work of Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which is now coming to have a (deservedly) important influence on the literature in international negotiation: *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1965). Another exception is the recent article by Daniel Druckman, "Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as a Dual Responsiveness," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 639-62.

[23] It should be noted that the importance of internal negotiation is probably determined by the subject of the negotiation, and by the domestic processes in the negotiating states. Thus, one would expect internal negotiation to be more important in the United States when bargaining over international trade (since Congress is involved) than over monetary affairs; generally, one would expect a more intense internal negotiation in a large, pluralist state like the United States than in a small, homogeneous country like Denmark.

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ing the support of such groups, and reconciling those groups that are opposed to the negotiator's policies. It is possible, of course, that interest groups and lobbyists make a larger-than-life impression on practitioners, since they often engage in adverse criticism of government policy, and it is normal to overreact to criticism. What is more likely, however, is that foreign affairs practitioners are simply reflecting a widespread concern among government officials over the activities of special interests. The fact that this concern is manifested by diplomatic officers only demonstrates that international negotiations today deal more extensively with general issues of public policy than they did previously. In any case, more attention to special interests should be given in the negotiation literature—both conceptually, in relaxing the assumption of the nation-state as a unitary actor, and practically, in greater emphasis on data-gathering on interest groups.

A second variable important in the internal negotiation, and reflected in the Checklist, is the formulation of instructions. Negotiators are instructed delegates, not independent players in a bargaining game; a great proportion of their time is spent in organizing the domestic consensus needed to provide flexibility in external bargaining. This point is easily overlooked in a literature that focuses on external negotiation. What is most evident in external negotiation is the interplay between a negotiator's instructions and his bargaining behavior; it is commonplace to describe good negotiators as individuals who can maximize their opportunities within the constraints or limitations of their instructions.[24] In internal negotiation, however, the fabrication of those instructions is at stake, as well as the contingent planning that creates the flexibility needed to permit accommodation (or at least the possibility thereof) with the adversary. Of the two processes, the former emphasizes manipulation and is a classic concern of diplomatic history, as well as of modern theories of interpersonal bargaining. The latter emphasizes political and bureaucratic policy making, and it is quite likely the more creative portion of the act of negotiation. In any future assessment of the role of negotiation in the modern international system, the internal process of redefining the limits of international agreement will probably be more important than the external process of bargaining on those limits. Hence, the way negotiators' instructions get formulated should be more important to theorists than it now appears to be.

[24] For example, Henry A. Kissinger, in *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and Restoration of Peace 1812–1822* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1957), appreciates Metternich's skill in maximizing his position within the constraints of his ruler's wishes, as well as within the limitations imposed by the structure of domestic politics.

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STRATEGIC VERSUS MANAGERIAL CONCERNS

A related problem deals with the importance of strategy in negotiation. Much of the theoretical literature views negotiation in terms of a strategic interaction between parties. Practitioners, however, increasingly seem to regard negotiation as a problem of management. The difference is that the former view emphasizes the competitive aspects of bargaining; it starts from the assumption that cooperation is the opposite of competition, and that parties will plan and undertake those behaviors that will maximize gain and minimize loss. Practitioners, on the other hand, often assume that both competitive and cooperative behaviors are present without making a sharp distinction between the two. They further expect that parties will pursue behaviors that will lead to joint decisions under conditions of complexity and severe constraints.

Most of the literature on negotiation and bargaining is contained within the framework of strategic bargaining.[25] This stems from two sources. The first is the classical literature, which emphasizes cleverness and the capacity to outwit an adversary. The second is game theory, which represents, in pure form, nonviolent competitive interaction between individuals. The concern for strategy has produced many of the most visible subsets of the negotiation literature. For example, a lively debate has occurred on what types of strategies (hard or soft) are most effective in eliciting cooperative behavior from an adversary.[26] This debate is related to the large number of studies that have been done on concessions and concession rates.[27] The concern for utilities and the modification of utilities is also consistent with the model of strategic bargaining.[28] The effect of the opening position on subsequent bargaining and agreement is likewise a strategic concern.[29] The list could be extended; but the point should be obvious that strategy is a major focus of negotiation theory.

It would appear that practitioners are considerably less concerned

[25] Zartman's decision-making approach is one exception to this generalization. See I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 619-38.

[26] For example, W. Clay Hamner and Gary Yukl, "The Effectiveness of Different Offer Strategies in Bargaining," in Druckman, *Negotiations* . . . (fn. 8), 137-60.

[27] Otomar Bartos, "Concession-Making in Experimental Negotiations," in J. Berger, *et al.*, *Sociological Theories in Action* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1966).

[28] Fred C. Iklé and Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (No. 1, 1962), 19-28.

[29] Bennett Ramberg, "Tactical Advantages of Opening Positioning Strategies: Lessons from the Seabed Arms Control Talks 1967–1970," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 685-700.

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with the strategic situation than are most theorists. When practitioners talk about negotiation, they emphasize knowing what it is you want, or searching for overlapping interests, or defining problems, goals, and frameworks for negotiating:[30] all these are reflective of a decision-making rather than a strategic mode of thought. The Checklist for Negotiators gives relatively little play to strategic concerns in comparison to those concerns that are necessary to mount an effective organizational decision-making process. This point was in fact addressed to the senior practitioners who spoke to the Senior Seminar, and the response of one ambassador was instructive:

> Q. The Checklist doesn't emphasize strategy—do you think this is an omission?
> A. To be frank, I don't like an absolute strategy. If you work out a strategy at home, then your government thinks you will carry it out, and that creates restrictions on free movement at the negotiation. I don't worry much about strategy. . . . I think in terms of probing, limits, opportunities.

To sum up, the attitude of practitioners seems to be that negotiations are too diverse one from another, and even too diverse day by day,[31] for any planned strategy to be very useful. Indeed, it is entirely likely that "strategy" represents a kind of encumbrance in the minds of most practitioners, and that it is the antithesis of the flexibility they feel they must maintain to be successful.

Why is there less concern for strategy among practitioners than among theorists? One might expect the opposite, since practitioners are presumably motivated by national interest and personal advancement, and either concern should lead them to drive a hard, calculating bargain. The answer probably lies in the negotiating situations that practitioners find themselves in, which are very different situations from those visualized in many theoretical studies of bargaining. Most real negotiations at the outset are fluid, unstructured, complicated, and noisy (in a communications sense). The first problem for negotiators is to structure the situation; hence, the emphasis on preparatory work and the establishment of a negotiating framework.[32] Negotiators do this more by trial and error than by strategy.

[30] See esp. Brown (fn. 4), 15.

[31] One senior practitioner at the Senior Seminar stated simply, "In negotiation, I'm still not prepared for the surprises."

[32] One senior practitioner commented about preparatory work: "This is the most difficult part of the whole process . . . it is harrowing, more than you realize, and it can be very long."

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If negotiating situations are as unstructured and complex as negotiators often assert,[33] it is fairly obvious why practitioners have little use for strategic thinking. Situations that have to be structured or defined from scratch are usually not ones in which strategy is applicable. Conversely, situations in which strategy is appropriate are usually highly structured. There is a relationship between strategy and rules of conduct: the more structured the rules, the greater the likelihood that a strategy can be applied. Hence, strategic thinking in military affairs is more associated with 19th-century modes of warfare than with modern guerrilla warfare. Similarly, strategy is more applicable in a highly structured game like football than in a less structured game like rugby. Most strategic situations rely on rules to make the competition meaningful for the parties. Where such rules are absent, such as in the situation of structural uncertainty that characterizes most modern negotiations,[34] strategy simply becomes less important to the participants.

One obviously cannot dismiss strategic concerns from the negotiating process entirely. Surely, every negotiation involves strategy at some point, but usually this point occurs after early negotiation has succeeded in defining and clarifying the main outlines of the interaction. The definition of the situation is of greater interest to practitioners than the application of a strategy after the situation has been defined. That would seem to be a useful point of which to take account in negotiation theory. As it now stands, the emphasis on strategy probably does not address the most important concerns of those who conduct negotiations.

AFFECTIVE VERSUS COGNITIVE VARIABLES

Another point of variance between practitioners and the theoretical literature lies in the importance the former attach to substantive information and issues, as compared to the greater concern in the latter for variables involving personality and sociological background. Negotiation theory tends to emphasize the elements of the bargaining situation

[33] Kissinger has stated tersely: "Today, reality is more complex." Speech by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of America's Foreign Policy," Chicago, Ill., July 6, 1976. However, not all negotiating situations are equally complex, and consequently the scope for the application of strategy can also vary. It may be argued that a small state with a less complex diplomacy is more able than a large state to employ strategic calculation in negotiation. Canadian negotiators, for example, appeared to be motivated by an overall strategy in the negotiation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

[34] For a discussion of structural uncertainty, see John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).

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that are similar, regardless of what is being bargained over; practitioners assume that *what* is being bargained essentially shapes the nature of the interaction.

The literature on negotiation especially emphasizes the proposition that *who* the negotiator is will affect the outcome of the bargaining. This interest comprises several main concerns. One of them is what Sawyer and Guetzkow have called the background factors in a negotiation: the attitudes the parties have toward each other, and the roles the negotiators occupy in their own governments or wider societies.[35] Another concern is the national culture of the negotiator. This aspect has, of course, been the focus of classical studies of diplomacy;[36] it continues to be of interest to academics who pursue historical policy-oriented studies,[37] or who conduct experimental research on bargaining behavior.[38]

The psychological makeup of the negotiators is another major concern in negotiation theory. The experimental literature focuses heavily on various aspects of personality, and recent major collections on negotiation have included studies on personality or psychology in bargaining.[39] The variables that are examined in such studies include tension or anxiety, authoritarianism, and attitudes toward risk taking. In general, however, experimental research on psychological factors has not been very promising. Hermann and Kogan state that "to date, experimental research on the effect of personality on negotiation behavior is generally discouraging."[40] Despite the absence of concrete results, some valuable groundwork has been laid—particularly regarding the effect of certain attitudinal states on bargaining behavior,[41] and on the importance of certain interactive aspects of personality, such as face-saving in negotiating.[42]

[35] Sawyer and Guetzkow (fn. 8), 501.

[36] See François de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, trans. by A. F. Whyte (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1963). See also Nicolson (fn. 6).

[37] Kenneth Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1968).

[38] Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Strategies of Negotiation: An American-Japanese Comparison," in Jean LaPonce and Paul Smoker, eds., *Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1972).

[39] See Margaret Hermann and Nathan Kogan, "Effects of Negotiators' Personalities on Negotiating Behavior," in Druckman, *Negotiations* . . . (fn. 8).

[40] *Ibid.*, 247.

[41] See P. Terrence Hopmann and Charles Walcott, "The Impact of International Conflict and Detente on Bargaining in Arms Control Negotiations: An Experimental Analysis," *International Interaction*, II (No. 2, 1976), 189-206.

[42] For example, Bert Brown, "Face-Saving and Face-Restoration in Negotiation," in Druckman, *Negotiations* . . . (fn. 8).

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Regardless of whether academic research on personality or background variables has been successful, the question tends to be ignored by practitioners in favor of other elements in the negotiation process. There was very little discussion about attitudinal or psychological variables in the Senior Seminar; as a result, such variables were not included on the Checklist for Negotiators. Specifically, the Checklist makes no mention of personality as being important either in individual negotiation or in group decision-making processes. The only reference to a personality-type variable concerns the perception of the situation by the other side, and even in this case perception is understood to be dealing more with the issues and substance of the negotiation than with affective components. On the other hand, the Checklist does make frequent references to the cognitive aspects of handling the substance of a negotiation: that is, the need for adequate expertise, staff work, the generation of information, the separation of important from unimportant concerns, and the combining of issues into package deals. To repeat, substance appears to be much more important than the personalities of the negotiators.

The points emphasized by the Checklist are corroborated by Winthrop Brown. His article lists as the first fundamental of negotiation "to know exactly what it is that you want to achieve by negotiating." The second fundamental is "to know your stuff. Thorough homework is absolutely essential. Part of this homework might be to anticipate as far as possible the positions of the people with whom you are going to be negotiating."[43] Brown does take account of the other party's perception ("put yourself in the other man's mind"); but this concern, like that of the Checklist, is motivated more by a desire to know the adversary's position on issues rather than his psychological attitudes or makeup. Again, the substance of the negotiation appears to be the important factor.

There are reasons why one might expect practitioners to discount the importance of personality factors in negotiation.[44] For one thing, they are expected to be professionals, and one mark of professional behavior is that subjective factors like personality ought not to influence objectivity in decision making. The second and perhaps more

[43] Brown (fn. 5), 14.

[44] Practitioners are not consistent on this point. By way of comparison, one should note the statement of Ambassador Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka: "The potential of the individual personality at the (Law of the Sea) Conference to construct or destroy, cannot be overstated." Speech, "The Oceans: National Interest and Global Perspective," delivered before the Colloquium sponsored by the Canadian Group of the Trilateral Commission, Halifax, January 21, 1976.

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important reason is that practitioners see their role as taking action in a situation: they tend to concentrate on the definition of issues (which they can influence), and to discount the importance of personality (which they often cannot influence at all). Theorists, on the other hand, are motivated by a desire to analyze or explain a situation. Thus, the fact that practitioners ignore personality factors may not be sufficient evidence to conclude that theorists overrate the importance of personality in negotiation. In fact, it could be argued that external observers, who are motivated by an objective desire to explain or analyze negotiation, are in a better position to render judgment on the matter.

The issue of the importance of personality in international negotiation probably cannot be answered definitively, given the present levels of knowledge. What appears to be the case, however, is that much of the research conducted on personality or cultural variables has been done under experimental conditions that are substantially less complex than real negotiations. Conversely, as situations become more complex, researchers themselves find that personality variables become less important in affecting negotiation behavior.[45] As a case in point, Davis and Schilling give some indication of the kind of complex material that SALT negotiators must deal with in arranging an arms control agreement.[46] Because of the technical complexity of the subject matter, it seems improbable that idiosyncratic variables like personality or even cultural background would have much bearing on arms negotiations. That is not to say that personality variables are entirely unimportant. Perhaps a useful analogy can be made with the effect of psychological or cultural variables on sport. Personality factors are no doubt important in boxing, for instance, but they are surely less important in assessing who will win or lose a match than are other factors such as size, strength, or training. Moreover, personality variables tend to become important only after these other factors are equalized. The same appears to be the case with international negotiation.

IV. Implications of the Checklist

There are two reasons why an investigation of how senior government officers perceive the task of international negotiation is important to students of international politics. First, their perceptions bear on

[45] See Druckman, *Human Factors* . . . (fn. 8), 72.

[46] Lynn Davis and Warner Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted to Know About MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVII (No. 2, 1973), 207-42.

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the broader question of the nature of the contemporary international system. It is a commonplace today, for example, to describe the international system as being in a state of transition. As one observer puts it, "we are, to use an inescapable cliché, at a moment of transition in world politics, not only in U.S. foreign policy."[47] If that is true, one might assume such change to be reflected in the workplace of international politics. And one might further assume that a better understanding of certain dimensions of that change could be arrived at by examining the perceptions of those "operative employees" who labor in that workplace.

Second, the perceptions of government officers are also important for academic analysis, and have implications for the future research agenda of students of international relations. If what practitioners say they do in negotiation is not being adequately analyzed by scholars of negotiation, it is likely at the least that there are gaps in the literature which ought to be filled. More important, if there are systematic differences between the perceptions of practitioners and the models of theorists, the latter may be generating information about the negotiation process that is inaccurate or even misleading.

On the first point, the Checklist's emphasis on internal negotiation, and on the importance practitioners attach to relations with special interest groups, is consistent with other evidence concerning the increasing politicization of foreign policy. It is undeniable that today many foreign policy issues involve an interplay with domestic groups and special interests that hitherto had not affected relations with foreign nations. As Stanley Hoffmann writes:

> . . . there is literally no substitute (in foreign policy making) for doing at home what must also be done abroad: constant persuasion and bargaining—an appeal, not to patriotic or crusading instincts, but to reason and common sense. Given the nature of the issues, pressure groups of all sorts will not stay out of the process, will demand to be heard, will resent being hurt by this or that "adjustment," will appeal to basic American values, will evoke the sense of insecurity which involvement in the world contest has imprinted on American minds. Congress, as usual, can be expected to reflect these pressures.[48]

The Checklist suggests that the pressure-group activity that Hoffmann has observed at the political, and hence visible, levels of government is also being reflected at the bureaucratic, or working, level of the

[47] Stanley Hoffman, "No Choice, No Illusions," *Foreign Policy*, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77), 97-140, at 102.
[48] *Ibid.*, 131-32.

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foreign policy establishment. This fact adds a new dimension to our knowledge about the politicization of the foreign policy process. For one thing, it suggests that interest-group activity may be having a more profound impact on foreign policy than many observers realize. It is one thing for interest groups to influence Congress, which is a normal locus of lobbying activity, but it is quite another for them to influence the foreign service bureaucracy. Foreign policy making is a more bureaucratic process than domestic policy making, and hence lobbying efforts aimed at the foreign service bureaucracy are more likely to be influential in the long run. Furthermore, bureaucratic lobbying implies that certain traditions of division of labor in government are disappearing. Foreign Service officers, or at least those of them who negotiate, are in theory expected to deal mainly with foreign governments and not with domestic interests. The Checklist would suggest that the professional diplomatic corps can expect to be more fully engaged in domestic politicking in the future. Quite contrary to Tocqueville's observation that "foreign policies demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to democracy,"[49] it would appear that foreign politics is coming to demand the same qualities in diplomats that we generally expect of persons who hold positions of political or bureaucratic leadership in democratic governments.

One may speculate on what causes increasing politicization of the diplomatic function. It is usually assumed (and suggested in the passage from Hoffman), that domestic interest groups are simply more assertive today than they were in the past. Hence, increased politicization may be a result of the *push* of interest groups' demands on the political process. Insofar as such demands exert pressure on the foreign policy bureaucracy, there may be a more persuasive alternative explanation for such activity; namely, the *pull* exercised by a foreign policy agenda that has become more extended in scope. Foreign policy now involves more issues, especially economic issues, of importance to domestic publics than it did previously; consequently the process has become a magnet for interest-group activity. Then, too, foreign affairs bureaucracies are larger today, and have a correspondingly greater capacity to influence the ordinary business and other activities of citizens. A senior Canadian bureaucrat with responsibility for foreign economic policy put it most succinctly: "To me, the extent of the change is that twenty years ago my job didn't exist."[50] Thus, as foreign affairs

[49] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. by Phillips Bradley (New York: Knopf 1945), I, 234.

[50] Personal interview.

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bureaucracies expand in the United States and elsewhere, they themselves create pressures for the increasing politicization of the diplomatic function.

The effect of increasing politicization will most likely be to move diplomacy away from a representative model and toward a mediatorial model, as is implicit in the Checklist's formulation of an external and an internal model. Politicization tends to turn the foreign policy bureaucracy into an arena where domestic interests get reconciled with foreign interests, rather than being—as classical theory has it—a machine to enable decision makers to conduct negotiations with foreign nations. Over a decade ago, Henry Kissinger noted the tendency of foreign policy to become a mediatorial phenomenon: "In internal discussions, American negotiators . . . act as mediators between Washington and the country with which they are negotiating."[51] Kissinger attributed this phenomenon to the legal background of American officials, but the problem may have been more structural than was obvious at the time. Today's foreign affairs officers describe the task of negotiating for the United States as engaging in an external and an internal negotiation, which is similar to the way labor negotiations are often described; it suggests that the negotiator acts as a go-between for both domestic constituents and an external adversary.[52] Thus, what Kissinger noticed about American negotiators may be due more to a fundamental change in the diplomatic process than to the professional background of the negotiators.

The fact that foreign policy, in addition to being more politicized, is also becoming more complex is reflected in the Checklist's focus on managerial problems at the expense of strategy. Such complexity is felt at different levels of government. For the practitioner, the loss of the clear-cut rules that make strategy possible is analogous to the loss, for the top policy maker, of the clear-cut goals that make for consistency in foreign policy. At the level of the President, as Thomas Hughes has stated, foreign policy is indeed the management of contradictions,[53] and seeing policy in such terms is a necessary precondition for the

[51] Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York: Norton 1969), 32; originally published in *Daedalus*, Vol. 95 (Spring 1966).

[52] This observation is supported by a news story on the SALT II negotiation, which describes the Carter Administration as caught in a three-cornered situation: "'the man in the middle between the Russians and the Senate,' as a White House official put it." Hedrick Smith, "Three-Cornered Arms Talk," *New York Times*, April 14, 1979, p. 2.

[53] Hughes, "Carter and the Management of Contradictions," *Foreign Policy*, No. 31 (Summer 1978), 34-55.

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accommodation of problems. If the Checklist is a valid guide, this advice would also seem to be appropriate at the working level. Practitioners themselves are aware of the problem of contradiction in foreign policy management, and hence they emphasize flexibility over consistency, priority setting over calculation, and the establishment of a definition of the situation over a strategy for the situation. Clearly, the forces that militate against simplicity and consistency in foreign policy today are being felt in the workplace as well as at the top levels of government. The "age of uncertainty" appears to affect the bureaucracy as much as it does the Presidency.

This fact may profoundly influence the way in which foreign policy will be made in the future. The classical theory of bureaucracy made a distinction between policy formulation and policy execution, and the determination of the former (symbolized in foreign policy as a negotiator's instructions) was the prerogative of top policy leadership. We are now in an era where the essential task of foreign policy is being defined as reducing uncertainty in the international system,[54] and where the responsibility for managing the increasing complexity of external relations seems to have fallen to the working level of government. In these circumstances, the bureaucracy can create the conditions for foreign policy management long before top policy makers are pressed for action. As Henry Kissinger writes of modern bureaucracy: "What started out as an aid to decision makers has developed a momentum of its own."[55] In negotiations with foreign governments, the expansion of governmental bureaucracy has opened opportunities for societal control of and adaptation to the problems of modern international life, just as it has introduced rigidities into the methods for handling these problems. Either way, it is likely that the bureaucracy will play an increasingly important part in foreign policy making in the future.

Consistent with these conditions is the increasing anonymity of foreign policy making. There are more people making policy at all levels of government today than ever before, and policy issues are becoming more technically complicated all the time. For this reason, foreign policy practitioners are concerned more with issues than with personality or sociological variables in negotiation. Thus, the diplomat's tradi-

[54] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdependence," *Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1975), 46.

[55] Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in Kissinger (fn. 51), 95.

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tional stock in trade—the ability to deal with policy on the level of individual personal relations—is becoming a less important part of modern diplomacy. However, while the human element has undoubtedly been reduced in foreign policy from the standpoint of the individual personality, it has quite likely become more important in terms of group relations. It could be said of the traditional personalized diplomacy of the past that how an issue was put was as important as the issue itself. Curiously, this may be even more true of diplomacy today, although it pertains to the constituents of the negotiation process more than to the negotiators themselves. We are in an age when everyone affected by policy seems to want to be consulted, and such demands place a tremendous burden on the foreign policy establishment to engineer a process that will satisfy all constituents. In modern negotiation, a premium is placed on the intellectual capacity to understand complicated issues and on the bureaucratic ability to organize a team to sell the government's position on those issues both at home and abroad. These conditions emphasize a negotiating team's ability to develop good relations with domestic interests, while de-emphasizing the attitudes and backgrounds of individual negotiators in the external negotiation.[56]

The main relevance that the Checklist for Negotiators has for the future research agenda on negotiation is to remind scholars of the increasing complexity of current practice in foreign policy. A strain toward simplification in theoretical work is usually desirable, since it is often necessary to distill the essence of things in order to generate new information about them. However, simplification can be dangerous when it becomes misleading. In negotiating theory, there is a strong tendency toward simplicity in many of the models used today—to the point where these models are not representative of real processes. Consequently, some current research bears little relevance to the problems faced by practitioners, at least as these problems are revealed in the Checklist.

For instance, an argument can be made that the introduction of an internal negotiation into the negotiation process (a possibility largely overlooked in the literature on international negotiation), profoundly changes the situation for a negotiator, and quite probably changes his behavior as well. Certainly, the negotiating task becomes much more

[56] For a case study of the relationship between negotiators and domestic constituents, see Winham, "Bureaucratic Politics and Canadian Trade Negotiation," *International Journal*, XXXIV (Winter 1978/79), 64-89.

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complicated in theoretical terms. It is difficult to know whether increasing the complication changes a situation in kind rather than just in degree, but this possibility certainly exists. (It apparently is the case in the mathematical analysis of bargaining: Anatol Rapoport points out that moving from a two-person to an *n*-person game changes the nature of the analytical task, with the result that some questions previously dealt with become less "interesting.")[57] Increasing complication thus would seem to call for different analytical procedures.

The changing structure of the situation as one introduces an internal negotiation into the negotiating process can be demonstrated by the analogy of a chess game. If *A* plays chess against *B*, it can be viewed as an external negotiation; it is a perfect strategic situation. If *A* plays chess simultaneously against *B* and *C*, *A* has a more complicated problem, but it is a complication in degree and not in kind. However, if *A* plays "chess" simultaneously against *B* and *C*, such that *A*'s *n*th move against *B* constitutes also his *n*th move against *C*, *A* is no longer playing chess; the strategic situation is changed utterly. One would assume *A*'s behavior to change sufficiently so that an analysis of his previous behavior would be misleading as a predictor of his future actions.

The above example parallels certain international negotiations, and it is fairly representative of labor negotiations. As Walton and McKersie have shown in their analysis of labor negotiation, union leaders face simultaneous internal and external negotiations: actions taken to improve relations with management tend to worsen relations with constituents, and vice versa.[58] The bargaining moves that a union negotiator makes against management will sooner or later have to be cleared with his constituency; hence, the negotiator cannot concentrate solely on his strategic situation in the external negotiation, as the moves he makes there can undermine his position in the internal negotiation. The negotiator (or negotiating team) must focus on both the external and internal negotiation simultaneously and undertake initiatives with an eye on both fronts. Research on negotiation should take this circumstance into account.[59]

It would seem desirable, therefore, for theorists to admit greater

[57] Rapoport, *N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Application* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1970). See esp. chap. 10, "N-Person Theory and Two-Person Theory Compared."

[58] Walton and McKersie (fn. 22); see esp. Part II, "Dilemmas of Intraorganizational Bargaining."

[59] E.g., I. M. Destler's recent article on the Panama Treaties offers an excellent analysis of the difficulty of managing the conflicting demands of an internal and external negotiation. See "Treaty Troubles: Versailles in Reverse," *Foreign Policy*, No. 33 (Winter 1978-79), 45-65.

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complexity and richness into their analysis of negotiation. Thus, they should view negotiation as an adjustment process occurring internally within actors as well as externally between actors; view negotiation as a managerial decision-making process instead of a process of strategic competition; and, finally, view negotiation behavior as determined more by the idiosyncratic material being dealt with in particular negotiations than by the more generalizable aspects of psychology or cultural background. Although such analyses would be more complicated, they would also be more realistic. In short, it would seem that negotiation theory will have to take account of the actual situation in which international negotiators find themselves before that theory will make significant new progress.

If the research efforts of a scientific community can be said to proceed in phases—oscillating from periods when great simplifying models are in fashion to periods when research mirrors the variety found in the environment—then it would seem appropriate for theorists of international negotiations to initiate the latter phase at the present time. The world itself is in transition, and one aspect of this transition is that theoretical knowledge about international diplomacy has become less representative of reality. In the future, negotiation theory should search out new variables in the negotiation process, especially variables based on observation of the real world, and build a new information base from which the next generation of conceptual models can be created.

APPENDIX

Checklist for Negotiators*

PURPOSE

To provide a guideline for persons involved in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with foreign governments.

PRELIMINARY TO NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is a tool in the management of external relations. The *decision to negotiate* should take account of the facts of the situation, objectives (what should be done), and policy alternatives (what can be done). National leaders should weigh the value of the negotiation process in terms of national interest, and should assess the role their nation will have in the negotiation.

* Prepared by Professor Gilbert R. Winham of Dalhousie University, in consultation with the members of the 19th Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy 1976-77.

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PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATION

Nations normally negotiate to reach *agreements*. Agreements can serve four *purposes*: (1) resolve disputes (e.g., boundary agreements); (2) demonstrate values (e.g., non-aggression pacts); (3) distribute resources (e.g., fishing quota agreements); (4) administer relationships (e.g., airlines agreements). Many negotiations involve more than one purpose. The appropriate strategy can vary with the purpose of the agreement.

PHASES OF NEGOTIATION

Most negotiations occur in three *phases* over time. The predominate behavior of each successive phase is: *initiation, bargaining*, and *decision making*. Negotiations are two-fronted, and participants should distinguish between *external* considerations related to the foreign government(s) and *internal* considerations related to the home government (and negotiating team).

PHASE I

Task: Define problems and goals, establish negotiating framework and procedures, prepare opening position.

External Considerations:

1. What *benefit* does your government want from the negotiation; or, what should the process of negotiation accomplish?
2. What is the *other side's (sides') perception* of the situation; is their stated position their actual position; has everything possible been done to establish what the other side(s) want?
3. Have appropriate *negotiating procedures* and a guiding principle or framework been established; do these procedures adequately explore common ground?
4. What *bargaining strategy* will you employ (specifically, fallback position and concession rate); is your bargaining strategy consistent with past and future diplomacy in this area; are you prepared to avoid early stalemate; are you prepared to respond to the issues the other side(s) might raise?
5. Is your position coordinated with *major allies*; have you considered effects on third parties?

Internal Considerations:

1. What *directives*, legislation, or Congressional hearings bear on the negotiation?
2. What *domestic interests* (agencies or interest groups) have a stake in the negotiation; what is their position; have they been adequately consulted and briefed?
3. Do you have appropriate substantive *instructions* which leave you adequate tactical flexibility; have you identified the hard and soft spots in those instructions for later bargaining purposes?
4. Is the *negotiating team* organized to reflect your government's bureaucratic interests; is the team sufficiently prestigious and does it possess adequate expertise to handle the problem; is the

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team well briefed and familiar with the political background of this negotiation, including previous negotiations on the same subject; is the team organized to maintain maximum teamwork?

5. Is the necessary *staff work* underway on the relevant building blocks of a final agreement; have you thought about what legal or other instruments will be needed to support an agreement; is the backstopping machinery in your capital effective?
6. How will *media* relations be maintained; can the media be used to move the negotiation ahead and/or advance your position?

PHASE 2

Task: Conduct day-to-day negotiation (i.e., attend meetings, analyze alternative proposals, liaise with home government, accommodate positions on issues, reach general agreement if possible).

External Considerations:

1. Does the negotiation process isolate *important concerns* from less important ones, and ensure these are communicated; what are your adversary's (adversaries') important concerns?
2. Does the *process* identify areas for trade-offs, concessions, and agreement; does the process *educate* parties?
3. Have you *coordinated* overall bargaining strategy with day-to-day tactics; in multilateral negotiations, is your position coordinated with other nations having common positions?
4. Is day-to-day negotiation *making progress* toward settlement; if not, can you concede further, or can you bring additional pressure on other parties to concede; can the problem be reformulated?

Internal Considerations:

1. Are you *maintaining domestic support* from Congress, agencies, and interest groups; are you in touch with the climate of opinion at home, and are you providing your domestic constituents with the right amount of information on developments?
2. Are your *instructions flexible* enough to permit settlement; can you generate further flexibility at home through persuasion or trade-offs?
3. Is the negotiating team and backstopping *machinery* continuing to operate in an *adequate* and *effective* manner; is it adjusting to new developments?

PHASE 3

Task: Assess negotiation; reach agreement on major issues if possible; conclude negotiation (i.e., decide whether to accept available terms or to discontinue negotiation).

External Considerations:

1. Does the other *party (ies)* want agreement, and on what terms?

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2. Is an agreement worth the *opportunity cost* of continued negotiation?
3. Can outstanding *issues* be integrated to form a package deal; or can issues be separated and dealt with in partial agreements?
4. Would it help to raise the *level* of negotiation on one or more issues?
5. Is there an effective *deadline*; would a deadline be helpful, and could it be convincingly established?

Internal Considerations:

1. Is the agreement as it is shaping up in your *national interest* (i.e., should your position be re-evaluated)?
2. What is the main *opposition* (e.g., Congress, government agencies, interest groups) to agreement; can domestic opposition be reconciled through education and persuasion; can you effectively invoke higher authority (e.g., Presidential) or national interest to overcome opposition?
3. How will negotiation results strike the *media*; have they been thoroughly briefed?
4. Is the delegation working effectively and keeping its cool, and does the delegation have adequate *control*?

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Review Articles

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

By STANLEY J. MICHALAK, JR.*

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977, 261 pp., $11.95; $5.95 paper.

ROBERT Keohane and Joseph Nye have written a groundbreaking work on the politics of international interdependence—a work that will have a long-term impact on the ways in which teachers and scholars conceptualize international phenomena. *Power and Interdependence* is in fact the first book that presents some hypotheses about interdependence and tests them against extensive empirical data. The origin of this collaborative work lies in its authors' skepticism about the utility of political realism for illuminating issues that arise from interdependence. Through their theoretical and empirical research, Keohane and Nye are seeking to provide, and to demonstrate, the validity of an alternative approach for analyzing such issues.

Power and Interdependence begins with an explication of two theoretical models for analyzing international issues: the realist model, and Keohane and Nye's alternative model of complex interdependence. According to political realism, Keohane and Nye argue, international politics is a struggle for power "dominated by organized violence" (p. 23). They attribute three assumptions to realism: (1) "states as coherent units are the predominant [international] actors"; (2) "force is a usable and effective instrument of policy"; and (3) "a hierarchy of issues [exists] in world politics headed by questions of military security" (p. 23-24). Keohane and Nye assert:

* I wish to thank Robert Gray, Solomon Wank, and Eleanor Michalak for their invaluable comments on early drafts of this essay. This review is an expanded version of portions of a paper presented at a panel on "The Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power: Some Critical Reflections" at the Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, on October 21, 1977. Funds for typing various drafts of this essay were provided by a Shell Assistance Grant to Franklin and Marshall College.

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> These realist assumptions define an ideal type of world politics. They allow us to imagine a world in which politics is continually characterized by active or potential conflict among states, with the use of force possible at any time. Each state attempts to defend its territory and interests from real or perceived threats. Political integration among states is slight and lasts only as long as it serves the national interests of the most powerful states. Transnational actors either do not exist or are politically unimportant. Only the adept exercise of force or the threat of force permits states to survive, and only while statesmen succeed in adjusting their interests, as in a well-functioning balance of power, is the system stable (p. 24).

In contrast to realism, Keohane and Nye's model of complex interdependence is based on the assumptions that in a large number of issue areas (1) "actors other than states participate directly in world politics"; (2) "a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist"; and (3) "force is an ineffective instrument of policy" (p. 24). When such conditions exist, Keohane and Nye expect discontinuities between the overall distribution of military power and the outcomes in bargaining situations. They hypothesize that in issue areas so characterized, outcomes will be shaped by the distribution of resources and vulnerabilities within each separate area; issues and agendas will have little relation to traditional security concerns or the overall configuration of power; transnational relations of all types—international bureaucratic coalitions, nongovernmental transnational actors and coalitions —will become crucial factors in decision-making processes; and international institutions, broadly defined, will set agendas, act as catalysts for transnational coalitions, and enable weak states to undertake initiatives and form coalitions.

Each polar model, then, directs an analyst to different variables in a given situation, and leads to quite different predictions about probable outcomes. In lengthy substantive chapters, Keohane and Nye describe and analyze the major events in maritime and monetary affairs between 1920 and 1975, and examine the outcomes of 40 high-level political conflicts between the United States and Canada and 20 such conflicts between the United States and Australia. The goal of their empirical research is threefold: (1) to demonstrate that some important international issues and conflicts adhere more to the assumptions of the complex interdependence model than to the realist one; (2) to isolate those variables that are most salient in determining outcomes when issues conform to the characteristics of complex interdependence; and (3) to increase our understanding of why and how international regimes change.

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As a result of their research, Keohane and Nye draw two major conclusions. One is that "the assumptions of political realists, whose theories dominated the postwar period, are often an inadequate basis for analyzing the politics of interdependence" (p. 23). According to the other, problems of complex interdependence for which traditional assumptions are inadequate "will increasingly characterize world politics" (p. 227).

I

Keohane and Nye have made a great contribution to the discipline by conceptualizing issues arising from international interdependence and isolating a set of variables that will allow us to expand our knowledge about the politics of such issues. As a result of this research, scholars analyzing problems involving conditions of complex interdependence will focus upon the coherence and salience of national positions, the underlying capabilities specific to particular issue areas, the manipulation of vulnerabilities and sensitivities stemming from interdependence, and the organizational contexts within which the problems are considered.

To deepen our understanding of interdependence, further research is now needed to test hypotheses about the interrelationships among these variables by analyzing bargaining situations in major issue areas. Although Keohane and Nye do little postulating about the interrelationships among their variables or the relative weights each might have as determinants of outcomes under various conditions, *Power and Interdependence* is an excellent source for such hypotheses; two of them especially deserve further thought and examination.

The first is the authors' assertion that it will become increasingly difficult for large democratic states to devise and pursue rational foreign policies on issues involving interdependence. Because any attempt to arrive at a rational decision presupposes selecting a primary goal or at least a *rank ordering* of values relevant to a situation, Keohane and Nye argue that the absence of a security dimension to order priorities in matters involving complex interdependence makes determination of a coherent national position extremely difficult.

Since issues involving interdependence usually affect the interests of various domestic groups differently, political leaders find it hard to determine which group's interest is the national interest. Moreover, a political leader who comes to the aid of an interest previously hurt by an interdependency may cause a counteraction that will impose

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costs on those who were formerly satisfied or benefiting from the interdependency. It is also difficult to create a firm position because policy making on issues involving complex interdependence usually involves more than foreign offices and military services. In fact, the number of governmental participants in the bureaucratic decision-making process may be quite large. Finally, *transgovernmental* coalitions with common interests and policy preferences can further complicate and delay the adoption of coherent national policies.

In their study of the various Conferences on the Law of the Sea, Keohane and Nye found almost all of these variables at work. At the Caracas meetings, for example, the U.S. delegation of 110 members contained only 20 representatives from the State Department. Delegates representing various special interests formed surreptitious transnational coalitions with their counterparts in other national delegations. Because of conflicts of interest among different members of the American group, some delegates misrepresented the views of foreign governments within the delegation; others took positions contrary to U.S. policy; and leaks of American fallback positions were fairly common. This conglomeration of internal conflicts of interest and transnational coalitions made it difficult for the United States Government to maintain a coherent position and to bargain effectively. Consequently, the small and poor states—which often had less complicated positions—were able to penetrate and erode the influence of the large industrial states (p. 116).

But issues pertaining to the oceans may present an extreme case. Keohane and Nye found some of the above factors to be less salient in the area of international monetary policy. One might also argue that decision making on traditional national security issues is not as free of these forces as Keohane and Nye assume.[1] Still, their data indicate the difficulty of framing coherent policies under some conditions of complex interdependence. Further research is needed to identify how the different variables that they have isolated affect decision making in different issue areas arising from interdependence.

The second hypothesis that merits further research is Keohane and Nye's argument that on issues involving complex interdependence there will be an erosion of international hierarchy and domination of political processes by "weak states." The authors base their support

[1] See, for example, Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), esp. chaps. 1, 3, 5, and 7; Morton H. Halpern and Arnold Kanter, *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973), esp. the Introduction, 1-43.

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for this hypothesis on four factors. First, for all the reasons mentioned above, developed democracies do have difficulties creating and implementing coherent policies and bargaining strategies (p. 158). Second, with a more limited range of interests and of internal constituencies, small states often have much firmer and coherent policies, and the *saliencies* of the issues may be greater to them than to larger states. Third, issues stemming from complex interdependence are usually dealt with by international organizations, the structure and processes of which usually enhance the power of weak states. Finally, by facilitating the formation of transgovernmental coalitions, international organizations further impair any success on the part of large states. Keohane and Nye argue that, because of these four factors, small states can easily manipulate the sensitivities and vulnerabilities resulting from interdependencies, and turn them to their advantage.

The authors qualify this hypothesis by indicating that the greater the saliency of the issues and the fewer the domestic participants involved, the higher the probability that larger states will dominate bargaining processes and outcomes. This latter pattern of decision making has in fact been prevalent on monetary issues. Only further research can answer which pattern is more typical of the range of issues on interdependence—that pertaining to the monetary or to the maritime areas.

Until such research is forthcoming, one reservation should be noted. Although small states may be able to control the political processes and resolutions adopted by international organizations, their power is limited. Coalitions of underdeveloped states can block objectives of the developed countries, but the former cannot translate *their* resolutions into *operational* policies without the support or acquiescence of the latter. The developed states have the power to ignore resolutions and withhold financial support from the programs they oppose. And in doing so, the Western developed countries can probably exercise a much greater impact on the effectiveness of international organizations than the Soviet Union did when it adopted this course in the 1950s and 1960s.

II

Although Keohane and Nye have opened important areas for further research, considerable analytical thinking about the *concept* of interdependence will still be necessary if that research is to be fruitful. Anyone who reads the literature on interdependence will immediately

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note the vast disparity of phenomena that are gathered together under that rubric: poverty, famine, malnutrition, pollution of the oceans, shortages of resources, the population explosion, oil embargoes, and demands for a new international order. To further our understanding of the politics of interdependence, we shall have to delineate the various kinds of interdependencies that exist, and *determine* through comparative analysis the kinds of political processes and outcomes typical in each area. It is quite likely that interrelationships among the variables that Keohane and Nye have isolated will vary greatly with different kinds of interdependencies.

At least five different contexts of interdependency may be found among the examples listed in the preceding paragraph. First, there are problems that arise in situations where the level of interdependence is quite high, fairly symmetrical, and largely beneficial to all the parties concerned; but fluctuations in one or more country's domestic policies may impose sensitivity costs on the others. Problems concerning monetary and, in some cases, trade relations among the developed countries are examples.

Second, there are problems arising in situations where interdependencies are high, fairly asymmetrical, and conflicts exist over the *relative shares* of the benefits derived from the interrelationships. Some demands of the Third World for changes in the international economic order are of this type—for instance, demands for commodity agreements, price indexing, and restrictions on multinational corporations. Such conflicts, however, do not arise from interdependence *per se*, which has existed for centuries. Rather, the source of conflict lies in the rejection by Third-World countries of the "myth of the international market" as an equitable allocator of benefits resulting from developed/underdeveloped economic interactions. Writers on interdependence often point to the decline of power or the disutility of force as a cause or source of the revolt of the poor. But the problem is much more fundamental than that. It stems from the demise of a myth system that legitimized past inequalities and the occasional uses of force required to maintain those inequalities. The time seems ripe, in fact, for someone to write an international version of Karl Polanyi's brilliant study, *The Great Transformation*.[2] In confronting the demands for a new international economic order, the United States finds itself frustrated not merely because its material power has declined, but because it approaches the demands and problems before it with a

[2] Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press 1957).

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Weltanschauung that is increasingly rejected by most governments as well as by some of its own elites. Consequently, advocates of the new international order view the arguments and "scientific" economic analyses presented by American negotiators as *ideological*.

A third kind of problem arises in situations stemming from negative externalities resulting from largely domestic pursuits that will slowly impose great costs on large numbers of countries; examples are dumping of wastes in the ocean, the use of DDT to control malaria, farming with inorganic fertilizers, and the production and use of aerosol cans. Problems arising from such interdependencies are difficult to deal with for several reasons: the number of actions with such probable consequences is very large; curtailing such actions might have high value-tradeoffs, as in abolishing DDT and inorganic fertilizers; there is uncertainty as to when dangerous levels of these negative externalities will be reached; the contribution of any one state toward the total problem may appear small; and efforts to deal with such problems will have a great many domestic implications.

A fourth type of problem subsumed under the rubric of interdependence might actually be considered as *dependency* problems. Although interdependence is usually defined in the literature in terms of mutuality and symmetry, a number of problems related to interdependence actually involve attempts by states to *escape* situations of dependency by seeking ways to obtain *greater mutuality* or *interdependence*. Efforts by some developed states to build "friendly" relationships with various OPEC countries are actually attempts by the former to reduce their dependency upon the latter. And some of the demands of the Third World can only be understood as an attempt to obtain greater national autonomy and/or mutuality in their relations with developed countries and transnational corporations.

Finally, some problems that are often subsumed under the rubric of interdependence have little to do with interdependence at all. Questions of population growth and famine stem not from mutual dependencies but from the failure of countries to deal with their own national problems. In fact, attempting to deal with such problems internationally may *lead* to international dependencies. In regard to food, for example, countries that are unwilling to undertake the social, economic, and political reforms necessary to ensure equitable internal distribution and greater productivity may actually be seeking a guaranteed *international* solution to a predominantly domestic problem. Seen in this light, the "food crisis" may be an international political question rather than a problem arising from interdependence.

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This typology is presented merely to demonstrate the kind of theoretical work that must be done before we can firmly establish our empirical understanding of the politics of interdependence and provide guidance to policy makers. The interrelationships among the variables that Keohane and Nye have identified, and their relative importance in determining outcomes in bargaining situations, will vary with the contexts of interdependency in which they arise. Bargaining strategies and leadership options should also vary accordingly.

III

Because so much more analytical and empirical research is necessary before we can write with confidence about the politics of interdependence, Keohane and Nye's advice to policy makers in the final chapter of *Power and Interdependence* seems premature. For instance, Keohane and Nye argue that hegemonic and unilateral leadership initiatives by the developed countries are not productive in bargaining situations where the conditions of complex interdependence exist. Thus, they call upon the United States, especially, to adopt a pattern of "multiple leadership"—actions designed to induce other states to help stabilize an international regime (p. 231).

According to Keohane and Nye, multiple leadership requires "leading states [to] forego short-run gains in bargaining in order to secure the long-run gains associated with stable bargaining regimes" (p. 231). They assert that success for the developed countries will depend upon "unilateral initiatives setting good examples" and "cooperation to maintain regimes over the long haul" (p. 231). Multiple leadership also involves "being willing to make the first concessions, to take the most farsighted approach" (p. 232). At the same time, leadership must be shared: "the leader on one issue will need to be a follower on another" (p. 233). The authors conclude that "leadership in these terms does not confer special material benefits, although it may carry high status as well as the ability to shape the agenda for interstate discussions" (p. 231).

Setting aside the *caveat* that much more research is necessary before any firm guidance can be given to policy makers, there are several questions that should be raised about this advice. First, if the hypotheses discussed above are true, one would have to conclude that the developed countries will be increasingly unable to exercise any kind of leadership on issues involving interdependence. How can countries incapable of defining their interests or preventing their own bureaucrats

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from sabotaging adopted policy positions hope to lead in forums where what power they do possess is largely useless and vitiated by the formal legal structures and processes of international organizations? Keohane and Nye assert that "the leaders on any particular issue should be those with large stakes in a regime and a political and economic situation at home that allows them some leeway for leadership on the issue" (p. 233). If the conclusions that Keohane and Nye draw from their research are correct, leaders fitting this job description will rarely be found. The structures and processes of international organizations often preclude states with the largest stakes from exercising leadership; and the nature of interdependence issues makes it difficult for the large democracies to enjoy domestic situations that permit leeway. If international hierarchy is eroding (p. 228), if large states cannot formulate coherent strategies, if small states do dominate international forums, and if the small states are more able to manipulate vulnerabilities stemming from interdependence, why do Keohane and Nye think that these same small states will follow "multiple leadership initiatives"—even if such initiatives are farsighted and self-abnegating?

But let us grant for the moment that the West, and the United States, have the opportunity to lead. How useful are Keohane and Nye's suggestions? What they have provided are not precepts that lead to any immediately obvious operational policies, but merely a restatement of the problems as solutions. Who among the elite of the world's most conservative power could be opposed to "foregoing short-run gains for long-run gains associated with stable bargaining regimes"? Who could be opposed to "setting a good example," "making the first concession," or taking "the most farsighted approach"?

The concrete questions for policy makers of the developed states in regard to the Law of the Sea, for example, are these: What kind of short-run costs are worth what kinds of future bargaining frameworks, and how can one be assured that such frameworks will be stable? What unilateral initiatives would set a good example, and for what? Under what circumstances might unilateral initiatives only lead to more demands? Given the broad range of demands being made upon developed states, which ones should be accepted for what purposes? What *is* the most farsighted approach?

Keohane and Nye write: "The major industrial countries will need to take the initiative in adapting international regimes to the needs of the Third World by offering substantial concessions and entering into a sustained bargaining process" (p. 234). If they include the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe among the developed countries,

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the world will wait a long time before this advice is followed. If they are speaking only to the developed democracies, the opaqueness of this sentence is obvious. How should international regimes be adapted to the needs of Third-World countries? Should the structures and procedures of the General Assembly or UNCTAD be adopted by the International Monetary Fund? And even if one accepts the authors' assertion that "industrialized countries must be willing to transfer significant real resources [to the poor states]" (p. 235), how much should they give, in what ways, and which way would be the most farsighted?

What we need is not advice but extensive empirical studies of the objectives, strategies, tactics, and rates of success of different kinds of states in negotiations arising in different contexts of interdependency. Before conclusions about leadership can be drawn, studies should be made of attempts that states have made at exercising leadership and the results that have occurred within different contexts of interdependence.

IV

The major weakness of *Power and Interdependence* lies in Keohane and Nye's presentation of realism. If they had argued that political realism was inappropriate for analyzing an increasing number of international issues, they would have made a point to which few, including realists themselves, could take exception. But Keohane and Nye have gone further; they assert that realists extend their approach to all interactions and issues in the international system, refusing to acknowledge even the existence of the characteristics of complex interdependence—for instance, the participation of actors other than states in international politics, the absence of a clear hierarchy of issues, and the decreasing utility of force (p. 25).

Keohane and Nye can make such assertions (which any realist would deny) only because they have misrepresented political realism in three fundamental ways. First, they have grossly expanded the *scope* or focus of realist theory, which is largely concerned with the implications of territorial issues for the overall distribution of power. In *Politics Among Nations*, for example, Hans Morgenthau analyzes the various approaches to peace largely in terms of their relationship to one problem that should be of concern to at least some students of international politics: How are the values of order and peace within the international system to be secured in the absence of any authoritative and legitimate mechanism for maintaining them?

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Nowhere, however, does Morgenthau argue that international law, morality, or international organizations are devoid of influence in abating and curtailing international conflict or regularizing relations among states. In fact, he repeatedly makes statements to the contrary: "There is a misconception . . . that international politics is so thoroughly evil that it is no use looking for moral limitations of the aspirations for power on the international scene."[3] On international law, Morgenthau states:

> . . . the nineteenth and twentieth centuries built an imposing edifice, consisting of thousands of treaties, hundreds of decisions of international tribunals, and innumerable decisions of domestic courts. These treaties and decisions regulate, often in minute detail, the relations between nations arising from the multiplicity and variety of international contacts. . . . It is also worth mentioning, in view of a widespread misconception in this respect, that during the four hundred years of its existence international law has in most instances been scrupulously observed.[4]

Nor does Morgenthau deny the utility of international organization in helping to maintain international peace.[5]

None of the three realists cited by the authors (Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and E. H. Carr) would deny that "on some global issues of economic and ecological interdependence" (1) there are multiple channels of contact; (2) "military security does not consistently dominate the agenda" (p. 25); and (3) "military force is not used by governments toward other governments" (p. 25). When Keohane and Nye write that "traditional theories of international politics implicitly or explicitly deny the accuracy of these assumptions," they offer neither evidence nor citation for their assertion.

A second weakness of the authors' "refutation" of realism lies in their comments on the nature and role of power in realist writings. Keohane and Nye list as a second tenet of realism the assumption "that force is a usable and effective instrument of policy" (p. 23). No realist would accept such a stark and unqualified statement. Anyone, in fact, would insist upon the inclusion of a qualifying phrase such as, "under specified conditions." But Keohane and Nye go even further by ascribing to realism the positions that (1) "military power dominated other forms [of power]"; (2) "states with the most military power *controlled* world affairs" (p. 11, emphasis added); and (3)

[3] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (4th ed.; New York: Knopf 1967), 224-25. All citations from this work are taken from the 4th edition because that is the one from which Keohane and Nye draw their presentation and quotations.

[4] *Ibid.*, 264-65.

[5] *Ibid.*; see esp. 448-49, 478-80.

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"using or threatening force is the most effective means of power" (p. 24). With these statements, *which are in no way documented*, realism is distorted into a theory of *Machtpolitik* or *Diktatpolitik*.[6]

Realists such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger have always been careful to underscore the limited utility of force as an instrument of diplomacy or as a predictor of outcomes in international conflict. In discussing typical errors in the evaluation of national power, Morgenthau points out the fallacy of militarism:

> Militarism is the conception that the power of a nation consists primarily, if not exclusively, in its military strength, conceived especially in quantitative terms. . . .
>
> From the militaristic error follows inevitably the equation of national power with material force. . . . The proponents of this method are unaware that it is sometimes wiser to leave the big stick at home where it is available when needed.[7]

On the role of force in bargaining situations, Morgenthau writes, "The means at the disposal of diplomacy are three: Persuasion, compromise, and *threat* of force. No diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both intelligent and peaceful."[8] And in his chapter on the elements of national power, Morgenthau states:

> In the long run, [a nation rich in all the elements of national power but poor in the quality of its diplomacy] must yield to one whose diplomacy is prepared to make the most of whatever elements of power are at its disposal, thus making up through its own excellence for deficiencies in other fields. By using the power potentialities of a nation to best advantage, a competent diplomacy can increase the power of a nation beyond what one would expect it to be in view of all the other factors combined. Often in history, the Goliath without brains or soul has been smitten and slain by the David who had both.[9]

It is important to remember that these passages pertain to instruments of diplomacy to be used by great powers in conflicts involving the highest stakes. Keohane and Nye go much too far when they attribute to realists the belief that force is the most effective instrument of diplomacy in resolving issues such as what rules should govern research in the oceans, the degree of flexibility that should exist in mone-

[6] See Raymond Aron's *Peace and War* (New York: Doubleday 1966), 591-600, for a discussion of the difference between *Machtpolitik* and realism, with a critique of each.

[7] Morgenthau (fn. 3), 156-57.

[8] *Ibid.*, 521; emphasis added.

[9] *Ibid.*, 136.

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tary exchange rates, Canadian taxes on U.S. magazines, or the rights of the Carling Brewery in Maryland.

Because Keohane and Nye's presentation of realist views on the utility of military power and force are inaccurate, the structural model that is "deduced" from realism to predict the outcomes in bargaining situations is highly suspect: "The basic dynamic of the realist structural model is provided by the assertion that as the power of states changes (that is, as the structure changes) the rules that comprise international regimes will change accordingly." This overall structural approach "does not differentiate significantly among issue areas on world politics" (p. 43).

In fact, there is no realist theory of structural change that predicts policy outcomes in, or changes in the rules of, such disparate structures as concerts of great powers, the O.A.S., the Universal Postal Union, or the International Wheat Council. In fact, not one of Keohane and Nye's assertions about the realist model of regime change is footnoted with passages from Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, E. H. Carr, or even Strausz-Hupé.

Any realist theory of regime change or bargaining outcomes would undoubtedly focus upon the interplay of four basic variables: (1) the nature and degree of saliencies to the parties in the situation; (2) the resources of the parties relevant to the issue area; (3) the bargaining skill of the participants; and (4) the existing formal and informal rules of decision making. What Keohane and Nye have presented in *Power and Interdependence* is not a realist model of regime change, but a straw man.[10] Their straw man may well be "parsimonious" and easy to test. But it has little to do with realism. Will anyone accept Keohane and Nye's argument that realism is discredited or "falsified" because the Soviet Union does not participate in and strongly influence the International Monetary Fund or GATT even though its power is greater than that of some members of these institutions, such as Great Britain, France, and Belgium? (p. 132).

V

As a critique of realism, *Power and Interdependence* is a failure at best, and part of this failure may stem from the fact that Keohane

[10] This same criticism of Keohane and Nye was made by K. J. Holsti in his review of *Power and Interdependence* which appeared in *International Organization*, XXXII (Spring 1978), 513-31, under the title, "A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence." The present manuscript was completed before Holsti's review was published.

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and Nye do not ground their presentation of realism in a careful restudy of realist writings. Assertion after assertion about realism is not even documented by page references in footnotes, let alone any direct quotations. When Keohane and Nye quote from realists (see pp. 23 and 43), these quotations are often out of context, largely irrelevant to the tenets imputed to realism, or of dubious validity.

To be sure, realism is an inappropriate theoretical perspective for analyzing issues stemming from interdependence, as realists themselves would readily admit. If Keohane and Nye had wanted to make really telling criticisms of realist scholars in the area of interdependence, they could have raised questions about the rather naive, nonpolitical approach that Morgenthau and Kennan adopt toward such issues as the oceans, the seabed, energy, and pollution. In the spring of 1976, Hans Morgenthau wrote:

> It is one of the earmarks of this age that some of the most important international issues can no longer be handled by the traditional nation-state acting in isolation. Issues such as the use of the oceans and seabed, pollution, energy, the weather, and others will not respect national boundaries. They can only be settled either through a *cooperative arrangement* among several nations or through a *supranational effort* subordinating individual interests to the authority of a supranational agency. The new President will have to persuade the country of the necessity and urgency of these supranational tasks, despite their running counter to the emotional and moral preferences and political practices of centuries.[11]

In an essay published in 1972, George Kennan called for an international authority to govern the high seas, which would consist only of the major industrial and maritime countries.[12]

In such passages one can readily see the weakness of realists in dealing with issues stemming from interdependence, and the important contribution that Keohane and Nye have made in *Power and Interdependence*. Morgenthau and Kennan ignore the extent to which issues stemming from interdependence are considered in organizational structures that have become highly politicized—making cooperation and decision making difficult, if not impossible. For Morgenthau and Kennan, in fact, there seem to be two worlds: one in which issues of the highest stakes are dominated by competition and a struggle for power, and another where political issues are resolved by "cooperative

[11] Morgenthau, "Five Critical Problems: Foreign Policy and the Next President," *The New Leader*, April 16, 1976, p. 8; emphasis added.

[12] Kennan, "After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970's," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51 (October 1972), 226.

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arrangements," "authorities," and "supranational efforts" that subordinate national interests.

Keohane and Nye's *Power and Interdependence* has punctured this simplistic bifurcation by showing the ubiquity of politics across the whole range of international issues. With issues arising from interdependence pervading the agendas of foreign policy makers and scholars alike, the inappropriateness of political realism calls for new theoretical perspectives, and Keohane and Nye have provided an excellent first draft of such a perspective. By isolating a set of crucial variables and setting forth important hypotheses for other scholars to test and refine, Keohane and Nye have pulled together and begun to integrate the scholarly study of interdependence. Its authors may cringe from the analogy, but *Power and Interdependence* may well become the *Politics Among Nations* of the 1970s.

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NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL STATES-SYSTEMS

By DAVID S. YOST

F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System*. London: Faber and Faber, 1976, 336 pp., £3.25.

Martin Wight, *Systems of States*. Edited and with an Introduction by Hedley Bull. London: Leicester University Press in Association with the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1977, 232 pp., £7.00; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, $14.00.

I

PATTERNS of relations among autonomous political units have been described as "systems" since Hobbes and Pufendorf in the seventeenth century. Only since World War II, however, have intense efforts been made to gain theoretical understanding of inter-state relations as systems. These efforts tend to fall into at least three major categories.

First, fairly traditional case studies have been based on modest definitions of the potential of the "systems" metaphor. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, has defined "the concept of the international system" as "a way of ordering data, a construct for describing both the way in which the parts relate, and the way in which patterns of interaction change." The "systems" construct may be helpful, but international relations theory "can do little more than define basic concepts, analyze basic configurations, sketch out the permanent features of a constant logic of behavior. . . ."[1] Hoffmann and his mentor, Raymond Aron, have emphasized the structural configuration of military power and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the system in order to distinguish various international systems—for instance, "the balance-of-power system which lasted from the Peace of Westphalia until the French Revolution."[2] Several other theorists—among them Brecher, Holsti, Modelski, and Rosecrance—have undertaken case studies of historical states-systems in search of generalizations; however, they disagree with Hoff-

[1] Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus*, Vol. 106 (Summer 1977), 51-52.

[2] Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961), 215. Cf. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Praeger 1966), 147.

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mann and Aron as to the features that distinguish specific international systems.[3]

The second category differs from the first in that the "systems" concept is not regarded as a mere metaphor, but as a scientific framework —derived from Ludwig von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory— and capable of describing genuine correspondences between models and realities. Furthermore, scholars who have taken this approach— Charles McClelland and J. David Singer, for example—favor "the transformation of the international system" and seek "tools for fashioning the transformation and for coping with the tradition."[4] McClelland's investigations concerning the anticipation of crises in the current international system, and Singer's research regarding the correlates of war in specific international systems, are representative of a host of projects attempting to specify variables in a scientific manner in order to permit improvements in the conduct of international affairs.[5]

A third category of theoretical efforts has employed various definitions of the term "system"—modest as well as deliberately rigorous types—in attempts to devise heuristic models of hypothetical international systems that may throw light on the long-term future prospects of the contemporary international scene. Morton Kaplan's ten models of international systems, eight of which are hypothetical, fit into this category,[6] as do the case studies that apply his theoretical constructs to specific states-systems of the past.[7] Like Kaplan, George Modelski

[3] Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, XV (January 1963), 213-35; K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1977), 29-101; George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58 (September 1964), 549-60; Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown 1963). Among other relevant studies, see Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960): S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: Free Press 1963); Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press 1953).

[4] McClelland, *Theory and the International System* (New York: Macmillan 1966), 59. Cf. Singer, "System stability and transformation: a global system approach," *British Journal of International Studies*, III (October 1977), 231-32.

[5] McClelland, "The Anticipation of International Crises: Prospects for Theory and Research," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI (March 1977), 15-38; Singer, "The 'Correlates of War' Project: Interim Report and Rationale," *World Politics*, XXIV (January 1972), 243-70. Several appreciations of Singer's work may be found in Francis W. Hoole and Dina A. Zinnes, eds., *Quantitative International Politics: An Appraisal* (New York: Praeger 1976).

[6] Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley 1957); Kaplan, "Variants on Six Models of the International System," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press 1969), 291-303.

[7] Hsi-sheng Chi, "The Chinese Warlord System as an International System," and Winfried Franke, "The Italian City-State System as an International System," both in

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has devised "constructs which draw upon and combine properties of international systems but do not in themselves necessarily represent any concrete international systems": Industria and Agraria.[8]

Additional categories and subcategories could be described, of course. Hedley Bull, for example, has recently surveyed various alternatives to the contemporary states-system—from Marxist revolutionary models to the "radical salvationist model" of Richard A. Falk.[9] However, the three categories indicated earlier constitute the bulk of recent scholarly inquiry.

This array of studies concerning states-systems—past, present, and hypothetical—has hardly satisfied theorists. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have concluded that reification of abstractions, unwitting elaboration of tautologies, excessively broad generalizations, and other failings have made the contribution of systems theory "to the methodological and conceptual advance of international relations . . . uncertain."[10] Kenneth Waltz recently reached a similar conclusion—that states-systems have yet to be described and explained clearly—after critically scrutinizing work by Hoffmann, Kaplan, and Rosecrance.[11] Modelski has complained that for some theorists "the mere utterance and frequent repetition of the magic term 'system' has become a ritual act of special potency";[12] and Haas has stated that "the word is also used to suggest an almost mystical wholeness, a just barely graspable reality 'out there,' a cognitive map for orienting our halting thoughts and steps."[13] Stephens has suggested that "what we now need are empirical inquiries that can be used as evidence for or against statements about requisites

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Morton Kaplan, ed., *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1968), 405-25; 426-58.

[8] Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System," in Knorr and Verba (fn. 2), 124. Several essays regarding relationships between polarity and stability in international systems furnish additional examples of largely hypothetical systems: Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power," Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," and Richard Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," all in Rosenau (fn. 6): 304-14, 315-24, 325-35.

[9] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan 1977), 233-317. Cf. Falk, *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival* (New York: Random House 1971).

[10] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 1971), 137.

[11] Waltz, "Theory of International Relations," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, VIII; *International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 43-65.

[12] George Modelski, "The Promise of Geocentric Politics," *World Politics*, XXII (July 1970), 631.

[13] Ernst Haas, "On Systems and International Regimes," *World Politics*, XXVII (January 1975), 148.

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and activities of international systems."[14] Others have questioned the utility of the concept even more fundamentally.[15]

All these criticisms are perhaps secondary to a more fundamental problem—namely, the lack of agreement regarding the main issues worthy of study. Beyond a vague consensus that the factors bearing on the stability of specific systems are of interest, and that the configuration of power is probably a crucial factor in stability, there is no agreement as to the main issues involved in the identification and study of specific international systems. Given the diversity of assumptions found in each of the three main categories of theorizing, it is scarcely surprising that no agreement exists. This area of theoretical inquiry seems destined to remain fragmented and rather sterile until certain fundamental questions are recognized as pertinent to *all* studies of states-systems.

II

The late Martin Wight composed *Systems of States* almost wholly without reference to the main categories of states-systems analysis described above, and yet he asked several of the fundamental questions regarding historical states-systems which need to be raised in order to give this area of theoretical inquiry a new empirical and conceptual foundation. As Hedley Bull points out in his magisterial introduction, Wight was indifferent to social-scientific theoretical research in international relations; he did not make much of an attempt to understand such work, or any effort to explain his rejection of it: "The idea that an approach to the subject as secular, as anti-historical and as anti-philosophical as this might provide some guidance as to man's dilemmas in world politics is one that he would have found impossible to comprehend" (pp. 14-15). Wight's approach was distinctly unfashionable; he not only emphasized the value of purely historical understanding of past events for the student of international relations, but also stressed intrinsic moral and philosophical issues. The happy result for students of historical states-systems is a collection of essays of unusual freshness and originality, free of the jargon and conceptual blinders that a greater familiarity with other work on international systems might have imposed.

[14] Jerone Stephens, "An Appraisal of Some System Approaches in the Study of International Systems," *International Studies Quarterly*, XVI (September 1972), 348.

[15] Donald E. Lampert, Lawrence S. Falkowski, and Richard W. Mansbach, "Is There an International System?" *International Studies Quarterly*, XXII (March 1978), 143-66; John J. Weltman, *Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath 1973).

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Wight wrote the essays in *Systems of States* during the eight years prior to his death in 1972; they were prepared for meetings of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, the same committee under whose auspices the distinguished essays published in *Diplomatic Investigations* were written.[16] The essays in *Systems of States* represent Wight's contribution to the British Committee's collective inquiry into "the concept of states-systems, the workings of the modern or Western states-system and of other historical states-systems" (p. 2). Originally, the essays were not intended for publication as chapters in a single book, but all of them are concerned with the theme of systems of states. Bull's introduction includes a brief biographical sketch of Wight, a discerning account of Wight's interrelated religious convictions and theoretical predilections, and an analysis of some of the main features of Wight's thought about states-systems.[17]

The essays in *Systems of States* discuss the concept of states-systems; the states-system within ancient Greece, and its relations with Persia; the geographical and chronological boundaries of the origins of the modern states-system; international legitimacy; and "triangles and duels," or the competitive dynamics of tri- and bi-polar states-systems. Of these essays, the most thought-provoking and useful is the one that Wight modestly introduces as "notes towards clarifying the idea of a states-system" (p. 22). Under the headings of definitional issues, cultural questions, and political questions, Wight in fact surveys major historical states-systems, draws new and telling distinctions, and raises questions that only profound historical investigation could begin to answer.

Wight's definitional method is to compare some concepts of a states-system with historical cases. For states to form a system of states, "not only must each claim independence of any political superior for itself, but each must recognize the validity of the same claim by all the others" (p. 23). This definition leads Wight to conclude that history affords perhaps only three clear examples of a states-system: "the Western, the Hellenic-Hellenistic or Graeco-Roman, and the Chinese between the collapse of the Chou Empire in 771 B.C. and the establishment of the Ts'in Empire in 221 A.D." (p. 22); South India after the collapse of the Satavahana Empire might constitute a fourth example.

[16] Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966).

[17] Bull has provided a fuller discussion of Wight's contributions to international relations theory in "Martin Wight and the theory of international relations: The Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture," *British Journal of International Studies*, II (July 1976), 101-16.

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A states-system in which one state asserts claims to superior legitimate authority that others formally or tacitly accept is, according to Wight, a suzerain state-system. Examples would be China after unification by the Ts'in Empire, Byzantium, the Abbasid Caliphate, and the British Raj in India. A "virtually unique example" of what Wight calls a secondary states-system (composed of state-systems rather than unitary sovereign states) is the Amarna age—that is, "the Near East in the latter half of the second millennium B.C." (p. 25), when the Hittites, Egypt, Babylonia, and Crete each headed a suzerain state-system. Wight adds that other forms of universal political organization may require still further distinctions. Medieval Europe, for example, might be considered "a uniquely complicated dualistic or double-headed suzerain state-system" (p. 29). The massive bureaucracy of the Catholic Church constituted the chief limitation on temporal sovereignty within Christendom, but papal ascendancy was persistently challenged by the Empire.

Another definition of the term "states-system" suggests that the states must have virtually permanent relations. Wight's sifting of historical cases again yields significant facts (the pattern of reciprocally recognized resident ambassadors is a unique invention of the Western states-system), and poses such basic questions as: "whether any states-system other than the Western has attempted to erect constitutional machinery in the shape of a permanent conference," and whether it is "true of most states-systems that economic interdependence precedes diplomatic organization" (pp. 32-33).

The cultural questions Wight raises are even more challenging. The three clearest examples of states-systems (Greek, Western, and ancient Chinese) each arose within a single culture. Is a common code of warfare and diplomacy enough for a states-system to function, or are deeper common assumptions—religious or ideological—required? How significant are the variations in codes among different states-systems? As far as external cultural differentiation is concerned, Wight suggests that the concept of the Just War (all parties have legal rights) may obtain *within* states-systems, while the concept of the Holy War (only the true believers have rights) may obtain *among* states-systems. But this suggestion requires historical verification: "Have all states-systems entertained some notion of Holy War in their external relations? Or is it a product of the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition?" (p. 35). The Western states-system's repeated ideological fissures (the Reformation and religious wars; the French revolutionary wars; the totalitarian wars and revolutions of the twentieth century) introduced concepts of

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Holy War within the states-system. "Has any other states-system shown an internal cultural differentiation leading to ideological schism and crusading attitudes?" (p. 38).

Some of the political questions Wight raises are familiar to students of international systems: for instance, whether smaller membership or similarity of governmental structure within a states-system makes for greater stability, and so forth. But other questions concerning system dynamics seem original: "Do other states-systems show a succession of hegemonies, in which one great power after another tries to transform the states-system, or even to abolish it, by reducing it to unity?" (p. 42). Most states-systems have ended in universal empire—the Chinese Warring States were unified by the Ts'in Empire, the Hellenistic states by the Roman Empire, the Indian states by the Moghul Empire, the states of the Amarna age by the Assyrian Empire. "Is there any states-system which has *not* led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire? Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect a states-system to culminate in this way? If so, what can be said about the possible causal connections?" (p. 44).

The above sampling of issues raised by Wight might seem to imply that he portrays the cases involved as clear-cut and capable of being readily distinguished and analyzed. In fact, the opposite is true:

> A historic states-system may seem a tolerably clear and distinct kind of community, or set of relationships and practices, when we study its internal structure and organic life. But when we examine its penumbra, look at its connections with what lies beyond it, explore the scarcely definable gradations by which it shades into its cultural and diplomatic background, it begins to lose its coherence and identity, and doubts may arise about the validity of the concept itself of a states-system (p. 105).

We can infer from Wight's own methods that only the most laborious historical research, requiring sensitive intuition and careful judgment, will succeed in identifying the essential facts and in relating them to theoretical inquiry.

III

F. S. Northedge's *The International Political System* is an illustration of how difficult it is to apply successfully the methodology that Wight implicitly recommends for the study of historical states-systems. Northedge's abstract definitions of a states-system are similar to Wight's, and he examines several of the same issues—the classification of past states-systems, the chronological and geographical boundaries

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of the origins of the modern states-system, and so forth. But his treatment of these issues seems hasty and superficial in comparison to Wight's.

Northedge contends, for example, that pre-modern forms of universal political organization fall into only two categories: world states encompassing most of the then-known world, such as the Roman Empire, and states-systems composed of independent states, such as ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy. The forms that Wight describes as suzerain state-systems are dismissed as unsuccessful attempts to form world states. Northedge offers the Chinese Empire as an example of the successful creation of a world state: "The Chinese Empire extended continuously, though interrupted by periods of internecine warfare between warring kingdoms into which the Empire as a whole had been split, from the pre-Han dynasties, beginning with the Shang Yin ascendancy in the eighteenth century B.C., to the Ching dynasty of the Manchu Tartars, which maintained itself from A.D. 1644 to 1912" (p. 39). In view of Wight's more precise and discriminating categories, Northedge's seems to be too radical a summarization of Chinese history. For instance, although the Warring States did look back to the collapsed Chou Dynasty for some type of suzerain legitimacy down to about 335 B.C., the period of the Warring States lasted from 771 B.C. to 221 A.D.—a period of nearly a thousand years during which China could scarcely be defined as a unified empire, but could more accurately be described as a states-system.

Northedge and Wight agree on the reasons for trying to identify the geographical boundaries of the origins of the modern states-system. As Northedge puts it, the question is pursued "not so much for its intrinsic historical interest, but as a means of defining what the international system is and what constitutes its principal properties" (p. 64). Once again, however, his conclusions seem uniformly less discerning than Wight's.

Northedge contends, for example, that the geographical boundaries of the modern states-system were extended in several stages from their original limits in Europe, as the independent states of North and South America, the Ottoman Empire, Japan, etc., were recognized by European states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; China, the Arab states, and most African and Asian states were considered full members of the international system only in the twentieth century (pp. 73-76). Wight dismisses a formulation virtually identical to Northedge's as the "orthodox answer," based on nineteenth-century reason-

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ing (pp. 115-17). He notes C. H. Alexandrowicz's argument that the orthodox point of view exaggerates the magnitude of European superiority, and that in fact the European states were obliged to deal with various non-European states in regular diplomatic fashion.[18] Wight finds early historical evidence of such behavior: Venice and the Papacy intrigued with the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century, and the French King, Francis I, did so as well in the early sixteenth century. But, Wight adds, the Ottoman Turks refused to exchange diplomats and professed an intolerant creed that excluded coexistence.

Wight concludes that "a proper view of the nascent states-system will be stereoscopic, seeing in the states-system a dual nature, two concentric circles, European and universal" (p. 118)—the European portion recognizing European international law and diplomatic conventions, and the universal portion including all practical political behavior during the slow extension of European conventions around the world. If a date must be given for the first recognition of this dual states-system in European diplomacy, Wight suggests 1559: in the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, France and Spain agreed to remain at peace within Europe, but to continue their struggle for mastery in the West Indies. The principle was soon extended to the East Indies as well and became the basis for the eighteenth-century distinction between *paix maritimes* and *paix continentales* (pp. 123-25).

Northedge considers two criteria for establishing the chronological boundaries of the modern states-system. The first is acceptance of the "secular principle," the notion that public officials should serve the state's interests without reference to religious or moral duties. He suggests that this notion of *raison d'état* first appeared in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, becoming established during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (pp. 53-55). The second criterion Northedge considers is "the fragmentation principle, or in other words the waning of the idea of a united Europe as a dominant object of policy" (p. 55). He summarizes F. H. Hinsley's arguments in support of this theory:

> . . . the outlines of our modern system became discernible when the Turkish threat to Europe began to decline towards the end of the seventeenth century and European affairs at last ceased to be those of a united but beleaguered fortress besieged by the rulers of Constantinople . . .

[18] Charles H. Alexandrowicz, "New and Original States: The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty," *International Affairs*, Vol. 65 (July 1969), 465-80.

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> this process of the fragmentation of Europe, which began with the decline of the idea of a single Christian republic, was not really completed until 1815, when the defeat of Napoleon I at Waterloo at length put an end, once and for all, to the vision of a recreated and reunited Christian Europe (pp. 59-60).[19]

Unwilling to endorse fully Hinsley's theory that mid-eighteenth century "fragmentation" should be seen as the beginning of the modern states-system, Northedge concludes that its origins extend "from the mid-sixteenth to perhaps the mid-eighteenth century" (p. 64), and that the states-system is "at most, less than three centuries old" (p. 66)—that is, it clearly began after 1675.

Wight considers six criteria as indicators of the chronological boundaries of the modern states-system: sovereign states; mutual recognition; accepted hierarchy; means of regular communication; a framework of law; means of defending common interests. Wight concludes that all of these indicators tend to support what has been the classic doctrine since Guicciardini—that the history of the modern states-system had begun by the late fifteenth century. A turning point can be seen, for example, in the unsuccessful Council of Constance, 1414–1418, "the last Ecumenical Council of undivided Latin Christendom," whose proceedings and final failure "forwarded the transformation of the international papal monarchy into a system of secular states" (p. 132). Soon afterwards the Papacy became one of several Italian great powers, interstate law became more secular in emphasis, the Italian system of resident embassies spread to transalpine Europe, and so forth. Wight rejects Hinsley's thesis that the eighteenth century witnessed the clear emergence of the modern states-system (a thesis half-heartedly supported by Northedge) because Wight regards this thesis as a variant of the theory that the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the transition from religious to secular politics, effectively ended the Holy Roman Empire, and ushered in the classical balance-of-power system. If Hinsley (and Northedge) were correct, Wight argues, the problem of describing the states-system between the Council of Constance and the Congress of Westphalia would remain. "And however we describe it, this system has a greater resemblance to the states-system that succeeds it than it has to the medieval system that precedes it" (p. 151).

[19] Cf. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (London: Cambridge University Press 1963), 153-85. Incidentally, the Europe of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War was hardly a "united" fortress, and the Ottoman threat was still taken seriously in the late eighteenth century.

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IV

The greater part of Northedge's book is devoted to discussions—of uneven value—of various aspects of the modern states-system. The most valuable chapter is perhaps the one devoted to imperialism. Northedge briefly analyzes and rejects Marxist-Leninist and other theories of imperialism, and settles on a theory that distinguishes between inherent, virtually automatic impulses to expansion (population growth, trade, geopolitical opportunity, etc.) and the conscious cultivation of myths of imperial mission. Northedge sees imperialism as permanent and ubiquitous, and he identifies modern methods of indirect and disguised imperialism (pp. 202-4).

The picture of the modern states-system that emerges from Northedge's book is confused; two contradictory themes are never fully reconciled. On the one hand, Northedge insists that the system dominates the decision making of states, and could irrationally produce catastrophe. Arms buildups, for example, appear senseless from a geocentric perspective, but arms racing may represent unavoidable prudence for particular states. Thus "the system as a whole may be irrational while the behaviour of its component parts remains entirely reasonable" (p. 25); and war "could occur even in the absence of any desire among the belligerents to employ war" (p. 276). In other words, it is possible "for all these separate reactions to add up to a total catastrophe which no one can be said to have willed or foreseen" (p. 288). Furthermore, the system's balance of power is basically unstable (p. 285), and the system is "relatively resistant to purposive reform" (p. 32). Although the system ultimately governs the behavior of states,[20] Northedge recommends self-reliance as the only safe policy: "If a state does not look after its own interests, it can be fairly sure that no one else will" (p. 182).

On the other hand, despite this seemingly grim portrait of international anarchy, Northedge argues that the states-system is fundamentally benign, in that

[20] Cf. pp. 27, 30-31, 42, 141, 187-88. Northedge at one point deviates from his contention that foreign policy decisions are determined by systemic necessities. The deviation concerns the developing states which, as Northedge notes, are typically non-aligned and anticolonialist champions of a new international economic order: "For many of these states foreign policy tends to be rather more an external projection of internal requirements than a rational reaction to international events. To that extent, to revert to our terminology, their behaviour in the international system is 'idiosyncratic' rather than 'systemic'" (p. 172). It would seem just as logical to argue that these policies are "systemic," reflecting conformity to prevailing fashions among peers in the system.

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> . . . we must surely see our present international system, not as a driverless, high-powered vehicle speeding to its destruction, with ourselves, bound and powerless, inside, but rather as a guarantee and guardian of continued national freedom for each of us. . . . It is one formula, not without faults, but perhaps with fewer faults than any alternative the world could agree upon, for satisfying those two wants: local freedom and some minimum of order in the whole (p. 323).

If the system is not driverless (despite the fact that anarchic foreign policy decision-making produces irrational results), who is the driver? Northedge's response is surprising: "The people of the world could put an end to the international system tomorrow if they wanted to," by agreeing on a constitution for a world state. But they prefer to continue with the present system, judging its advantages of national freedom to be decisive (pp. 322-23). Northedge apparently takes this argument seriously, since he repeats it (pp. 34, 280) and asserts that the modern states-system allows small states to survive "virtually . . . unhindered by the depredations of the Great Powers" (p. 51).

The reasons Northedge gives for such a positive view of the contemporary states-system are interspersed throughout his book. Above all, he thinks that Soviet-American bipolarity has stabilized the system, especially since the Soviets have developed an "almost bourgeois" stake in the status quo (pp. 102-3). Furthermore, since both sides recognize the dangers of nuclear war and the unpredictable consequences of any war, they have turned to détente. The United Nations and the fiercely independent states of the Third World are, in Northedge's view, additional stabilizing factors (pp. 104-5, 248).

Northedge even speculates that "the passage of time . . . can perhaps breed an idea that the long expected Armageddon may never come. And, with the waning of that expectation, the preparation of minds and weapons for the day of Armageddon may fade away" (p. 298). On balance, however, Northedge concludes that some amount of tension and conflict will always persist; although it may be controlled and minimized, conflict will never be abolished. Northedge expresses some doubt as to whether another world war will ever occur (p. 277), and judges that there are "some reasonable grounds for hope" that it may not (p. 106).

By contrast, Wight's analysis of the dynamics of the modern states-system affords no grounds for the hope of avoiding another world war; nor does Wight take a positive view of the current states-system. Although he asks whether there is "a tendency for triangles . . . to resolve themselves into duels, and duels to end in a monopoly of power

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for one side" (p. 174), Wight acknowledges that identifying historical triangles and duels can seem "arbitrary and subjective," especially since some such power constellations have dissolved fairly quickly (p. 178). Nonetheless, he considers numerous triangles and duels from antiquity on (Punic Wars, Roman triumvirates, etc.), and concludes that "triangles, like duels, are relationships of conflict, and are resolved by war. The triangle of Russia, China, and the United States has not yet been so resolved, but the historical precedents permit no other generalization" (p. 179).

Wight's distaste for the modern states-system is evident in his observation that "some of the historic generations which have experienced the *end* of a states-system have done so with relief and rejoicing," and in his citing St. Augustine's reflections on the superiority of a well-ruled empire to international anarchy (pp. 44-45; emphasis in original). Indeed, Wight even judges that "the advent of atomic power in 1945 at last produced circumstances in which the military domination of the entire states-system by a single power became possible and desirable" (p. 193). Since the United States lacked the political will to make use of its nuclear monopoly, the Soviet Union was allowed to become its challenger. Wight sees only two routes out of the modern states-system: "If the Russo-American duel could be converted into a firm diarchy or condominium, or if either could be eliminated without the other disappearing in the same process, the states-system would be reducible under a single authority" (p. 194).

V

Wight's original explorations concerning historical states-systems could furnish this area of theoretical inquiry with a new conceptual and empirical foundation because he has asked new questions and called attention to previously neglected empirical factors. At the least, it seems, his work casts an indirect but critical light on other studies of historical states-systems. The perceptual and theoretical disjunctions within this field are illustrated by Kenneth Waltz's contention that "hardly anyone . . . considers the increase in the number of great powers from five in the middle of the nineteenth century to seven in the 1920s and '30s as a change of system. Practically everyone regards the decrease from seven in the latter period to two after the Second World War as a change of system."[21] Rosecrance distinguishes four different systems in succession between 1848 and 1945,[22] while Wight points to

[21] Waltz (fn. 11), 65.

[22] Rosecrance (fn. 3).

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the emergence of the main features of the modern states-system in the late fifteenth century. Obviously, Waltz, Rosecrance, and Wight have chosen to emphasize different factors.

Another illustration of uncertainty as to the identification of systems is provided by Raymond Aron. After declaring that the French Revolution inaugurated a new system, Aron has doubts about later boundaries: "Does the accession of Napoleon III mark a change *of* the system? The unification of Germany in 1871 opens another phase of European history. Does it radically alter the European system? Such questions seem to me largely a matter of words."[23] Although Aron is no doubt correct in concluding that theorists are free to use words as they please, it would seem more profitable—at least in the beginning—to confine attention to fundamental similarities than to endorse the fairly uninhibited multiplication of identified states-systems that in fact differ only marginally. Wight's contention that the French Revolution should be regarded as one of the several fractures within a basically homogeneous culture and enduring states-system has one key advantage. It focuses attention on the unchanging factors of sovereign states, hierarchy, diplomatic network, and so forth, which had been aspects of the states-system since the late fifteenth century; the French Revolution did not fundamentally change them.

Wight's clear and reasonable definitions and questions therefore provide a point of departure for critical reconsideration of other studies of historical states-systems. His conceptualizations might also promote greater consensus among students of historical states-systems as to the fundamental outlines of the field and the issues worthy of study. Greater consensus would not necessarily be proof of progress in approaching truth, of course; but it could give this area of inquiry the provisional direction and focus it has thus far lacked.

Studies of hypothetical international systems could also benefit from Wight's approach. The discussions on polarity and stability of international systems are, for example, vulnerable to the criticism of being debates about abstractions virtually divorced from historical and empirical referents.[24] Bi- or multi-polarity can easily be made to appear stable or unstable by introducing different assumptions about the actors and about the system's dynamics. Closer acquaintance with historical

[23] Aron (fn. 2), 148; emphasis in original.

[24] Waltz, Deutsch and Singer, and Rosecrance (fn. 8). This criticism applies with greater force to Deutsch and Singer, of course. Waltz (fn. 11), p. 11, has, incidentally, acknowledged the justice of such criticism.

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cases of bipolarity (such as Franco-Austrian rivalry in the sixteenth century) could suggest new factors and outcomes to theorists partial to investigations of the hypothetical, and give their work a more concrete basis.

It is striking that certain of the actual cases discussed by Wight are nowhere represented in Kaplan's ten models of international systems.[25] Neither Kaplan's "universal international system" nor his "hierarchical international system" corresponds to the "suzerain state-systems" Wight has identified, and Kaplan naturally has no place for the rare historical cases of a "secondary states-system" or a "dualistic or double-headed suzerain state-system." Kaplan does not even consider hypothetical international systems that have been championed and actually attempted—above all, "collective security." Wight reminds us that proposals for this type of states-system were apparently first made in ancient Greece and have been refined through the ages. In short, firmer historical grounding could perhaps give studies of hypothetical systems more practical significance.

Other theorists might also benefit from Wight's determinations and methods. One of the first findings of Singer's "Correlates of War" project was, for example, that a high number of alliance commitments in the international system correlated positively with the incidence of war in the twentieth century up to 1945, but negatively during the nineteenth century after 1815.[26] This discovery appears inconsequential when one recognizes that, by Wight's definition, it concerns only a single states-system during less than half of its history.

Wight's methods also encourage researchers to pay greater attention to concrete historical contexts, to the motivations of various actors, and to internal conditions. Singer and other researchers are naturally free to devise whatever coding rules they please. However, it seems odd that a study of the incidence of war should exclude the two greatest armed conflicts of the nineteenth century—the American Civil War and the Taiping Rebellion in China—simply because they were *civil* wars. It may likewise be a mistake to classify Bismarck's reinsurance treaty of 1887 with Imperial Russia as a non-aggression pact, and to give the same classification to the Soviet Union's non-aggression pacts of 1932 with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland—as if the differences in historical contexts and physical capabilities did not matter in examin-

[25] Kaplan (fn. 6).

[26] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "National Alliance Commitments and War Involvement, 1818–1945," in Rosenau (fn. 6), 513-14.

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ing the effects of different types of alliance commitments on the states' involvement in war.[27]

Although Wight expresses interest in determining the causes of transformations of states-systems, he advances no hypotheses—apparently deeming the available information too meager to justify hypotheses. This humility about how little is known about possible transformation mechanisms is a refreshing change from efforts to prescribe transformation rules for hypothetical states-systems (Kaplan), or to impose a framework that determines one's conclusions (Rosecrance).[28] In fact, little has been learned thus far about the structures of states-systems and the causal factors within them. The contrast between Northedge and Wight concerning the chronological and geographical boundaries of the modern states-system and other issues suggests that identifying states-systems and their main features is a difficult enough task, to say nothing of specifying causal factors and transformation mechanisms. Nonetheless, Wight's methods—his questions and fundamental findings—seem to be solid foundations for ultimate inquiry.

Wight's approach obviously falls short of the rigorous demands Waltz has recently made for theories of states-systems: the systems level must be made distinct from the level of interacting units by "leaving aside questions about the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have [and] . . . questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military relations of states" in order to arrive at a "purely positional picture" based on power capabilities.[29] Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out that Waltz's formulation exaggerates the calculability of state power and, for the sake of theoretical rigor, excludes vital aspects of reality.[30]

A further criticism of Waltz's formulation is that abstracting the configuration of power within the system from the characteristics of the units is an excessively artificial exercise; power depends in part on internal factors such as organization, ideology, technology, and so forth. Waltz's demands are ultimately reductionist, as he himself implicitly admits when noting that, in complex and organized social systems, it is never possible to study two variables of interest while holding all others constant.[31] Although Wight recognizes the theoretical attractiveness of isolating systemic factors from unit attributes

[27] *Ibid.*, 515, 523-24.
[28] Cf. Waltz (fn. 11), 47-50.
[29] *Ibid.*, 46.
[30] Hoffmann, Review of *Handbook of Political Science*, VIII, *International Politics*, ed. by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71 (December 1977), 1635-36.
[31] Waltz (fn. 11), 12.

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(p. 41), in practice his firm focus on historical contexts keeps unit attributes well in the foreground.

VI

For all of the promise offered by Wight's explorations of historical states-systems, it should be remembered that his work consists essentially of inspired trailblazing. In the first place, there are still too few systematic analyses of past states-systems and of other forms of universal political organization. Wight has offered us models of how such analyses should be performed, acknowledging the fallibility and meagerness of historical materials for pursuing some questions. Areas that have scarcely been studied at all from this perspective include the great civilizations of pre-Columbian America and of Africa before European colonization.[32] Given the relatively small populations involved in the Near Eastern Amarna age (200,000 in all of Palestine),[33] some anthropological materials might also be relevant.[34]

Second, the cultural and ideological questions posed by Wight will require scrutiny on several levels, and modifications in his proposed framework may subsequently be necessary. For example, Wight identifies a shift from dynastic and popular principles of international legitimacy to increasingly arbitrary and ideological principles; this shift raises practical and normative questions relating to human rights, international law, and economics—questions that have just begun to be explored.[35] Equally fundamental is Wight's question whether "diplomatic and technological interdependence have today outrun cultural and moral community" (p. 34). The answers range from Adda Bozeman's somber analyses to the efforts of Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal to devise a positivist value-system as a foundation for international law and world community.[36]

[32] That is not to imply that useful historical studies have not been done. For examples, see Basil Davidson, *The Lost Cities of Africa* (rev. ed.; Boston: Little, Brown 1970), and Burr C. Brundage, *Two Earths, Two Heavens: An Essay Contrasting the Aztecs and the Incas* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press 1975).

[33] W. F. Albright, "The Amarna Letters from Palestine," *The Cambridge Ancient History*, II (rev. ed.; London: Cambridge University Press 1966), chap. xx, 12.

[34] See, for example, Paul Bohannon, ed., *Law and Warfare: Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict* (New York: Natural History Press 1967).

[35] Cf. Rupert Emerson, "The New Higher Law of Anti-Colonialism," in Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The Relevance of International Law* (New York: Doubleday 1971), 202-30; Emerson, "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World," *World Politics*, XXVII (January 1975), 201-26; Richard N. Cooper, "A New International Economic Order for Mutual Gain," *Foreign Policy*, No. 26 (Spring 1977), 66-120.

[36] Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971); Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis*, XX (Spring

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Finally, the economic aspects of states-systems raise theoretical issues that are almost wholly neglected by Wight. It is intriguing, for example, that Wallerstein places the origins of the modern states-system at roughly the same point as Wight (the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries), but on the basis of functional and socioeconomic indicators. An even more striking coincidence resides in Wight's implicit view, noted by Forsyth, that all past states-systems were in some sense "imperfect foreshadowings" of the modern states-system.[37] This reflection recalls Wallerstein's observation that "prior to the modern era, world-economies were highly unstable structures which tended either to be converted into empires or to disintegrate. It is the peculiarity of the modern world-system that a world-economy has survived for 500 years and yet has not come to be transformed into a world-empire. . . ."[38] The causal linkages between the socioeconomic indicators highlighted by Wallerstein and the diplomatic and political factors emphasized by Wight must be explored, it seems, before the unique characteristics of the modern states-system can be explained.

Simply to describe these tasks suggests their magnitude. The fresh path Wight has charted will probably prove unattractive to those who prefer the study of imaginary systems, or the manipulation of numerical variables, to intensive historical inquiry. But this approach could give their efforts a firmer foundation while serving as an example to more traditional scholars; it seems the most promising route yet devised for gaining greater knowledge of historical states-systems and other forms of universal political organization. Such knowledge can contribute to a fuller awareness of the human condition, even if—as Wight suggests—control or deliberate transformation of such vast political configurations may prove to be elusive.

1976), 61-102. For a useful discussion of Lasswell and McDougal, with an ample bibliography, see Frederick S. Tipson, "The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity," *Virginia Journal of International Law*, XIV (Spring 1974), 535-85.

[37] Murray Forsyth, "The Classical Theory of International Relations," *Political Studies*, XXVI (September 1978), 414.

[38] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press 1976), 230.

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

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